NATO's 21st century mission -- expansion to the east to include Poland: incentives and obstacles by Kershaw, Justin Frank
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1994-12
NATO's 21st century mission -- expansion to the
east to include Poland: incentives and obstacles
Kershaw, Justin Frank
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/42827
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 
THESIS 
NATO'S 21ST CENTURY MISSION •• EXPANSION TO 




Justin Frank Kershaw 
December 1994 
Donald Abenheim 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 











DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 8 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to avera~ 1 hour per response, mcluding the ttme for rev1ewmg 1ns1ruction, search1ng ex1St1ng data 
sources, gathenng and maintaimng the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 1nformat10n. Send comments regarding this burden est1mate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including sug~ions for reducing this burden, to Washingon headquarters Serv1ces, Directorate for Information Operations 
and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis H~ghway, Surte 1204, Arlington, VA 22202·4302, and to the OffiCe of Mana~ment and Bud~t. Paperwork Reduction Project (0704 
0188) Wash1ngton DC 20503. 
1.AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 12.REPORT DATE 13.REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
December 1994 Master's Thesis 
4.TITLE AND SUBTITLE *TYPE YOUR THESIS TITLE OVER THESE WORDS, S.FUNDING NUMBERS 
WITH SECURITY CLASSIFICATION IF APPUCABLE 
NATO'S 21ST CENTURY MISSION- EXPANSION TO THE EAST TO 
INCLUDE POLAND: INCENTIVES AND OBSTACLES 
&.AUTHOR(S) Justin Frank Kershaw 
7.PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) &.PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER 
Monterey CA 93943-5000 
9.SPONSORINGIMONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10.SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11.SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a.DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
13.ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
The central issue defining the European security debate concerns the future of Central and Eastern European 
countries currently outside of any durable military or political security arrangement. Since 1989, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization has begun to reexamine its historic role within the context of maintaining the 
Alliance's historic role. Based upon the 1949 Washington Treaty and the 1967 Harmel Report, members have 
agreed to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation ... founded on the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law." NATO has accomplished this goal by adhering to the dual approaches of 
attempting to settle disputes by political means while maintaining a strong military deterrent. The Atlantic 
Alliance's raison d'etre into the twenty-first century will hinge upon its ability to take on new missions and new 
members. There now exists a necessity to "export" NATO's core principles eastward in an attempt to secure 
the progress of democratic and market reforms. Moreover, security guarantees must be offered to Central and 
Eastern European states (the Visegrad Four and particularly Poland) because there still exists tangible Eastern 
risks. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Partnership for Peace, 
Visegrad States, North Atlantic Cooperation Council. 
7.SECURITY 8. SECURITY CLASSIFICAnON &.SECURITY CLASSIFICAnON 
:LASSIFICAnON OF REPORT pFTHISPAGE OF ABSTRACT 
Jnclassified Unclassified Unclassified 
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 






Standard Fonn 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
P,.scribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
291!-102 
ii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
NATO'S 21ST CENTURY MISSION-- EXPANSION TO THE EAST TO INCLUDE 
POLAND: INCENTIVES AND OBSTACLES 
Justin F. Kershaw 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., The George Washington University, 1989 
Submitted in partial fulflllment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December, 1994 
Roman Laba, Sec nd Reader 
Thomas Bruneau, Chainnan 




The central issue defining the European security debate concerns the future 
of Central and Eastern European countries currently outside of any durable 
military or political security arrangement. Since 1989, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization has begun to reexamine its historic role within the context of 
maintaining the Alliance's historic role. Based upon the 1949 Washington Treaty 
and the 1967 Harmel Report, members have agreed to 11safeguard the freedom, 
common heritage and civilisation ... founded on the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law. 11 NATO has accomplished this goal by 
adhering to the dual approaches of attempting to settle disputes by political means 
while maintaining a strong military deterrent. The Atlantic Alliance's raison d'etre 
into the twenty-first century will hinge upon its ability to take on new missions and 
new members. There now exists a necessity to 11export11 NATO's core principles 
eastward in an attempt to secure the progress of democratic and market reforms. 
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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's twenty-first century raison d'etre will 
include a re-examination of its missions and membership as it attempts to fulfill the 
historic goals of the 1949 Washington Treaty. Currently (and according to the 
Washington Treaty) the Atlantic Alliance is designed to "safeguard the freedom, 
common heritage and civilisation .. .founded on the principles of democracy, individual 
liberty and the rule of law." If NATO intends to exist into the next century, rather than 
providing for only the 16 nations security, it must now export these ideals and security 
guarantees beyond its current borders into Central and Eastern Europe. Using the 
Harmel Report as an historic reiteration of the Atlantic Alliance's function-ensuring 
Alliance stability by pursuing political solutions and a strong military deterrent-NATO 
must resolve the perception of the Central Europe security vacuum, thereby ensuring 
the democratic and market reforms of these nascent free societies. Though the obstacles 
and costs associated with incorporating only one CEE state (Poland) is staggering, the 
price of ignoring the problems will be much greater in the future. 
The debate over NATO's future course will continue to be a source of debate 
regardless of the Alliance leader's decisions. NATO's evolutionary development since 
1949 and the Alliance's ability to adapt to the changing European security environment 
provides ample precedents for new members and new missions. Far from the 
perception of being a stagnant organization, NATO has formulated new policies and 
missions to address current security realities and keep the Alliance's main goal always 
illuminated. Since 1989, the Atlantic Alliance has presented a series of declarations that 
reflect the core goals in the Washington Treaty and the Harmel Report. The declarations 
presented in London (1990), Copenhagen (1991), Rome (1991) and Brussels (1994) are all 
indicative of NATO's transformation in the post-Cold War era. These declarations have 
become the basis on which NATO has conducted a rapprochement with the states of the 
former Warsaw Treaty Organization. These pronouncements have also been the 
conceptual starting point for NATO to reconstitute its force structure and redirect its 
resources and attention. Each declarations is part of an initial response to the changing 
security realm. Furthermore, they have produced substantive mechanisms to deal with 
the complexities of European security. They include the creation of the NACC, the PfP 
program and the CJTF initiative. 
But expanding NATO membership or reexamining its future mission would 
serve little purpose without justifying the existence of external threats to warrant such 
xiii 
an enlargement. Therefore it is necessary to examine risks to CEE states that might 
endanger their fledging democratic-market societies. Though the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization no longer exist and therefore no longer pose an immediate 
threat to NATO, evidence suggests that Russia possesses adequate resources to pose a 
direct risk to its Western neighbors. Examining several factors lends one to conclude 
that Russia's objectives and initiatives over the past few years warrants the inclusion of 
some CEE states (the Visegrad Four and particularly Poland) into the NATO security 
structure. The shift of President Yeltsin's foreign policy from ''benevolent fraternalism" 
to "confrontational nationalism" is enhanced in Russia's military doctrine, and its 
military, diplomatic and economic relations with its neighbors. For NATO to fail to take 
up the task to "export" its historic commodity of stability would spell the end to the once 
mighty alliance and acquiesce to Russian sensitivities. 
Though some NATO members view expansion as an irrational proposition-
the financial costs would be great, Russia would be displeased and Alliance cohesion 
would be jeopardized-Germany and increasingly the United States view enlargement 
as a "when" not "if' scenario. NATO members who oppose enlargement in the near 
term view such a move as provocative to Russia and furthermore not warranted because 
they insist there is no tangible "Eastern risk." Future deliberations at NATO 
Headquarters will revolve around the issues of a credible threat to warrant expansion, 
as well as Russia's reactions and the turmoil and political costs associated with 
enlargement. While most discussions concern the willingness of NATO members to 
add new members, Poland can improve its situation vis-a-vis Western integration by 
complying with general guidelines delineated by NATO leaders. These include 
improving civil-military relations and transparency of the armed forces, adapting to 
NATO's military force structure and armaments, maintaining economic stability and 
improving infrastructure. Additionally, Poland would use selected land forces-like it 
currently does-and its naval forces to demonstrate a willingness to participate in 
multilateral and multinational operations currently in progress. Finally, NATO 
expansion must be examined by weighing the positive and negative aspects as well as 
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[The North Atlantic Treaty Organization] NATO, for its part, is in no 
danger of losing its political identity. It is an increasingly important 
institution with respect to Eastern Europe, a process that began with the 
July 1990 London Declaration invitation to former Warsaw Pact 
adversaries to establish diplomatic liaison missions at NATO and 
extended to the Rome Summit's creation of the North Atlantic Co-
operation Council (NACC). NACC is linked to NATO's governing 
bodies and includes diplomats from the new democracies of Eastern 
Europe and new states in the former Soviet Union.1 Facing perhaps its 
greatest challenge since its creation in 1949, NATO stands at an historic 
crossroad. The way NATO responds will likely determine whether or 
not NATO will continue to exist and how stable Europe will remain. 
Though NATO's classic role of deterring the Warsaw Pact has vanished, 
NATO remains a transatlantic European security alliance capable of 
providing stability for Central and East Europe in a sea of uncertainty, 
anchoring the flanks to Europe, embedding unified Germany in a 
multilateral structure, and creating confidence through its defense 
planning functions.2 
By 1994 the central issue in the current European security debate had become 
whether the Atlantic Alliance should include such Central and Eastern European 
countries as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989, NATO members began a redefinition of the Alliance's historic 
mission that draws upon the vision of a European order redefined in the 1967 Harmel 
Report, and later articulated in a series of declarations beginning with the London 
Declaration in 1990. As of late-1994, the question remains whether NATO faces risks in 
the East that could evolve into a new threat and whether the mere supposition of such a 
risk constitutes an expansion of NATO. As long as Russia exists as a nuclearized power 
and the driving force behind the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) latest 
offer to former Soviet republics for inclusion in an Eastern military alliance, whatever 
impressions of danger that its power might convey, collective defense in Europe 
remains essential. Modem European history, as well as events of the past few years, 
illustrates the time-honored reflex of states to balance against one another will continue 
for the foreseeable future. Within this context of states balancing against each other, 
there also exists in Central and Eastern Europe a security vacuum, a gray area, in 
between Russia and Germany's Eastern frontier. From this standpoint, Poland, the 
1Philip Zelikow, p. 22. 
2Jeffrey Simo~, Orbis, Winter 1993, p. 35. Simon is a Senior Fellow at the National Defense University. 
1 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia have all expressed the hope for swift entry into 
the NATO Alliance to resolve concerns of their unenviable position within the security 
vacuwn. This paper will analyze what NATO means in 1994, if Poland should be 
considered for membership and what would be the justification and circwnstances 
allowing such an expansion eastward. 
This study traces the events which led to the formation of the 1949 Washington 
Treaty and the subsequent events which led to the 1967 Harmel Report and the 
formation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 which ultimately 
led to the 1994 Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. The Harmel Report was a 
politically significant restatement of the Alliance's vocation to pursue political as well as 
military purposes. This dual track approach (military and political dimensions of the 
Atlantic Alliance) is the foundation for much of the current discussion and the basis for 
NATO's direction into the twenty-first century. For now the Poles have accepted the 
reality that there currently does not exist unanimity within the Alliance to support 
Poland's immediate inclusion into NATO. However, the Polish government views the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace initiative as the first 
steps towards full integration in NATO, which will (the Poles hope) serve to fill the 
perceived security vacuwn throughout East Central Europe. The Poles are resigned to 
working through the outlines of the Partnership for Peace initiative as long as it spells 
eventual membership. One observer aptly noted the dilemma that now faces Poland as 
it attempts to secure membership in the Atlantic Alliance: 
Adrift somewhere between the prosperous West and the confused, 
sometimes threatening hodgepodge of states, led by Russia, that make up 
the former Soviet Union, the countries of Eastern Europe are desperately 
seeking a security blanket to make it through the lonely night of their 
wrenching transformation from enforced membership in the Warsaw 
Pact to capitalism and democracy. That night became even lonelier and 
potentially longer on December 12, [1993] when Russian ultranationalists, 
led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky and spouting claims to the old Soviet 
empire, won more votes than any other party in elections for the lower 
house of Russia's new parliament.3 
One critical factor that this work attempts to offer is a set of prescriptive 
guidelines to accelerate Poland's accession into NATO. This guideline far from being 
inclusive only to Poland's bid, would serve as litmus test for other "Partnership" 
hopefuls. As no NATO member has yet to offer a specific list of criteria or timetables for 
3John Pomfret. The Washington Post National Weekly Edition. 
2 
eventual membership, this thesis suggests an initial starting point in that discussion and 
offers a prescriptive approach for Polish leaders to follow. Since 1989, strategic 
discussion has also centered upon the redefinition of NATO's historic mission -
providing stability and protecting western civilization - to exporting stability and 
conducting "out-of-area" military engagements. The Gulf and Bosnian Wars have 
demonstrated NATO's commitment to go "out-of-area" when an international dispute 
has threatened the security of its members; the question remains of whether or not 
NATO faces a credible threat from the east. As long as Russia exists as a center of vast 
military power with nuclear weapons, whatever impressions of danger that its power 
might convey, there is an essential role for collective defense in Europe. The bipolar 
world that existed throughout the 1980's has given way to a multipolar world and its 
unstable characteristics. Poland continues to express a profound interest in securing 
membership in the Atlantic Alliance. First and foremost, their desire is based upon 
protecting their fragile democratic and market reforms from the imperial designs or 
catastrophic effects of an eastern neighbor. Irrespective of Polish desires, the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace program will serve as the 
mechanisms and initial steps towards full integration in NATO and the means to 
resolve the perceived security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe.4 George Kennan 
clarified the debate over NATO's current situation and the acknowledgment that 
tensions still exist between East and West. He wrote: 
Do the changes now taking place in Russia and Eastern Europe mean the 
end, if they are carried through, of NATO's usefulness as we have known 
it in the past? The answer to my mind is, 'Of course not.' What we have 
before us is not the end of the East-West military confrontation in the 
center of Europe, but simply the possibility of a reduction of its 
dimensions, its intensity and the dangers it presents for some time to 
come.S 
After 1989, debate over the future of NATO has split into four distinct camps; 
from the opinion that NATO should cease to exist, or that it should maintain its status 
quo organization, to the view that NATO should broadly expand to include all of the 
newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union. In any event, The Economist 
aptly stated that an expansion of NATO would take much time and money while the 
4David B. Ottaway, p. A 46. Mr. Ottaway writes that solving the current security vacuum in Central and 
Eastern Europe by expanding NATO would ward off the threats of resurgent Russian nationalism and 
regional ethnic conflicts. 
5George Kennan's comments are cited by Francis H. Heller, p. 434. 
3 
"all-for-one-and-one-for-all" promise, has to be credible, or the Alliance may Jose its 
effectiveness and fall apart.6 NATO's raison d'etre began nearly fifty years ago when the 
Soviet Union, acting upon what it perceived were the agreements of Yalta, utilized the 
Red Army to annex large portions of Central and Eastern Europe. Like the 
thoroughbred that leaps out of the starting gate upon hearing the starter's gun, the 
Western Europeans and the Americans created a political-military alliance as a result of 
the postwar actions and statements by Joseph Stalin. He declared, "Whoever occupies a 
territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as 
far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."7 
With the end of the Cold War, the past European structure lost its bipolar nature 
and emerged as a multipolar one that is inherently less stable. While the war in the 
former-Yugoslavia is proof, the probability of war erupting in Eastern Europe and along 
the Russian periphery is more pronounced, therefore it is in every countries' interest to 
utilize political-military organizations like NATO to dampen the prospects of war. 8 
Thus it is the foremost job of NATO in the future to have the capability to manage crises 
of extended length and conflict and not just solely to wage a nuclear volley.9 More 
peripheral yet no less important, NATO's creation came at a time when the French 
required more than verbal commitments to prevent yet a third German trek across their 
Eastern frontier in the twentieth century. It was this generally held belief circa 1946-47 
that French statesman began to look at Germany as either a future willing partner in an 
economic-military union or as a future adversary in Western Europe. 
NATO's mission in 1949 was: providing for Western stability by preventing the 
invasion of an eastern neighbor and incorporating Germany into a European union as a 
means of preventing its isolation and the necessity to unilaterally rearm. Since 1949, 
NATO's core mission has been to safeguard freedom, common heritage and Western 
civilization while simultaneously containing and deterring a Soviet-led invasion of 
Western Europe. The most remarkable aspect of NATO's success has been its ability to 
achieve its basic goals by a continuing process of transformation in spite of the need to 
6The Economist, 18 September 1993, p. 22. 
'Joseph Stalin cited by Kenneth N. Waltz and Josef Joffe. "The Emerging Structure of International 
Politics." International Security, Vol. 18, No.2 (Falll993), p. 49. Waltz quotes Josef Joffe in, "After 
Bipolarity: Eastern and Western Europe: Between Two Ages," in The Strategic Implications of Change in 
the Soviet Union, Adelphi Paper No. 247 (London: llSS, Winter 1989/90), p. 71. 
8Stephen Van Evera, p. 49. 
9Volker Rtihe, p. 136. Rtihe is Germany's Minister of Defense. 
4 
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find consensus among a sixteen member coalition. One of the most contentious issues 
regarding the merits of expanding NATO to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is 
whether an Eastern threat poses a danger great enough to warrant such expansion. 
In military terms, Russia remains as the region's strongest 
power ... Perhaps the major worry of the authorities in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and to a lesser degree Poland, is the prospect of large 
numbers of uprooted hungry and angry refugees surging westward from 
the former USSR to escape from economic misery and possibly more 
direct physical danger. Civil strife and the collapse of orderly 
government in any of the Soviet successor states could set off such a 
calamity .1 0 
No NATO member (with the possible exception of Germany) believes that an 
Eastern threat persists that requires the early integration of certain CEE states, namely 
the Visegrad countries.ll The "Eastern threat" as viewed by Western and Central 
Europe takes on numerous forms. The main elements include some factors already 
manifest and other possibilities likely to occur: a revival of ultranationalist Russian 
leaders -- both political and military figures -- fomenting and capitalizing upon public 
dissatisfaction; civil war originating east of the Polish-Slovakian-Hungarian-Romanian 
frontier and spreading westward; economic disintegration -- for instance, a substantial 
drop in the value of the ruble, or an increase in unemployment or inflation --that forces 
millions to seek minimum living standards in the West; nuclear disaster as a result of a 
weapon-handling accident or a power plant failure; and finally the risk of uncertainty 
that accompanies a nuclear superpower's quest to completely overhaul its political and 
economic systems. Douglas Hurd acknowledged this possibility stating, 
If the Russians fail, I believe they will export their problems. Instead of 
taking their pigs and pig iron to market, they will take themselves; leave 
their homes and look for a brighter future in Western Europe. Germany 
is already coping with a wave of new immigration from the East. If we 
do not take action, this could turn into a tidal wave and drench the whole 
of Europe.12 
The manifestations of these "risks" or "threats" are illustrative of the relations 
Russia conducts with its neighbors. To illustrate or- demonstrate the existence of an 
Eastern threat, the analysis must focus on how Russia conducts foreign policy with the 
10otto Pick, NATO Review, Apri11992, p. 27-28. 
liThe term "Visegrad countries" refers to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. 
12British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. NATO Review, June 1993, p. 11. 
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Baltic states and Ukraine. Moreover, Russia's continued use of the Kaliningrad Oblast 
and its dominant role in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) suggest that 
many Russians support efforts to seek and maintain a greater sphere of influence 
beyond Russia's current borders. The developments indicate, at least to Western and 
Central Europeans, a continued Eastern risk. The risk to Central and East European 
democratic and market reforms to date are increased because of instability. Democracy 
in its infancy cannot be nurtured in such an insecure environment, 
What happened in Czechoslovakia in 1938 illustrates one kind of danger 
that may confront even a well-established and prosperous free-market 
democracy. When external demands clearly outstrip indigenous 
capabilities - when a severe disequilibrium between threats and 
capacities exists - no political or socioeconomic system will be up to the 
task.13 
An Eastern risk exists because of numerous state-sponsored and subsidiary 
variables working independently or in unison. These factors and their influence on 
Russia's relations with its neighbors constitute an Eastern risk. Central and Western 
European leaders perceive a revival of Russian imperial aims -- championed by Russian 
nationalists - as one of the consequences of Russia's political chaos. Many Central 
Europeans judge that Russia's nascent democracy is not a model for a stable 
government. Central Europeans, particularly the Poles, agree with Horace's assessment 
that, " ... 1Ulm tua re agitur, paries cum proximus ardet .... "14 Skeptics regarding early NATO 
expansion ask: 'Why enlarge NATO when a clear and present risk to the Alliance does 
not exist?" Opponents of an early expansion of NATO also contend that including some 
Central European states in an enlarged NATO and not others would demonstrate the 
extent to which the Alliance is willing to offer protection. In effect, to include the 
Visegrad countries and exclude Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltics might indicate 
Western acquiescence to their incorporation in a Russian sphere of influence. The 
unwillingness to "draw new lines" in Central and Eastern Europe when NATO's 
members do not perceive an imminent Eastern threat is one of the current European 
security dilemmas. 
Russia is still an inherent risk to Central and Western European security for 
numerous reasons, not all of them associated with the threat of military coercion. 
Boaniel N. Nelson, p. 157. 
14Horace as cited by Richard A. Bray on, p. 127. The phrase reads, "when your neighbor's bouse is on flre, 
you are in danger yourself...." 
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Primarily, Russia is a risk because of the chaotic nature of its young democracy, the 
subsequent rise of ultranationalist leaders, and their influence on shifting Boris Yeltsin's 
and Andrei Kozyrev's foreign policy stance from a pro-Western stance to a moderate 
conservative outlook. Russia's heavy-handedness appears not only in the form of 
military coercion, but economic, diplomatic and psychological pressure. Second, 
Russia's diplomatic, economic and military persuasion towards its neighbors in the 
Baltics and Ukraine makes it likely that Russian leaders will continue this course of 
action in Central Europe. Third, Russia utilizes the Kaliningrad Oblast and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as mechanisms to gamer greater influence 
beyond its borders. Fourth, Russia is a risk to NATO and Central Europe because of the 
possibility of civil war originating within Russia or along its periphery and spreading 
further westward. The risks also include the possibility that economic deprivation or a 
nuclear accident could lead to a massive migration of people westward. Finally, 
Russia's present foreign policy includes objectives and initiatives regarding NATO 
expansion. These initiatives are discussed within the context of demonstrable Russian 




NATO today provides political-military assets unrivaled on the Eurasian land 
mass. Along with the evolving nature of NATO's mission, the two most well-known 
organizations designed to meet the changing nature of the Alliance include the NACC 
and the Partnership for Peace program. As Secretary General Womer stated, "NATO 
will not be kept alive solely by nostalgic memories of past historic achievements, nor by 
purely philosophical reflections on common values and destinies." Instead Womer 
insists, "the primary, future mission of NATO will be to project stability to the East."15 
A. DEBATE OVER NATO'S FUTURE COURSE 
Concurrently, there are four distinct arguments for the future course of NATO's 
existence. An analysis of these arguments fits succinctly within the broader discussion 
of NATO's future role and its most likely future composition. The arguments that run 
the breadth and width of the political spectrum for NATO's future course include: First, 
a status quo arrangement whereby no expansion of members nor a greater mission role 
is advocated. Second, a scaled down NATO that not only disassociates itself from out-
of-area conflicts but also favors decreasing membership to include only core continental 
participants such as: Germany, France and Britain. Third, other pundits favor NATO 
completely disbanding, observing that the lack of a credible Soviet-Russian threat 
makes a military alliance costly and unnecessary. Fourth, others favor some sort of 
expansion of NATO that would include a few members or membership open to any 
country that requests it, including an expanded role in historically "out-of-area" regions. 
The first argument, that "NATO is no longer relevant in a post-cold War World" 
because the Soviet Red Army no longer exists, is ignorant of the most recent Russian 
political developments and the implications of a Europe without a credible military 
alliance to fill the security vacuum. One argument for eliminating NATO was that, 
The alliance was no longer needed now that the threat of Warsaw Pact 
attack was fading ... and that NATO's continued existence as a military 
alliance would be de-stabilizing by posing a potential threat to the USSR 
[now Russia] from across the neutral East European buffer zone that 
would divide the two sides.16 
JSsecretary General Manfred Womer in a speech delivered in Brussels, 10 September 1993, p. 4. Womer's 
opening remarks gave little doubt of his opinion to expand NATO membership and the necessity to take on 
new missions. He stated, "The slogan 'out-of-area' ... or 'out-of-business' is out of date. We are acting out-
of-area and we very much are in business," p. 6. 
l 6Ricbard L. Kugler, p. 496. Kugler is a senior analyst at the Rand Corporation. 
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There is a threat from Russia that emanates from its domestic instability and 
imperial mindset of maintaining a sphere of influence and veto over Central and 
Eastern Europe security issues. This argument, though once in vogue immediately after 
the events of 1989, has all but disappeared with the introduction of the Bosnian War, the 
1991 Moscow coup attempt and the resurgence of Russian nationalism. 
The second argument, that "NATO can only exist if it scales down its 
membership and concentrates on the core issue of protecting against a Russian threat," 
fails to take into account the likelihood of future conflicts along NATO's periphery. 
This approach fails to recognize the geopolitical implications of a retrenching United 
States and the certain problems that would arise from such an endeavor. Owen Harries 
- the editor of the National Interest - offered four reasons why NATO should stay 
within its historic borders: 
• NATO expansion does not account for Russian susceptibilities and interests 
and envisages no role for Russia in Eastern Europe; 
• Because of the West's collective and pathetic half-hearted tries to stop the 
Bosnian crisis, a proposal to expand NATO suffers from a massive credibility 
gap; 
• Guaranteeing Central and Eastern Europe's security would inevitably 
include massive peacekeeping and peacemaking roles not formerly 
accomplished; 
• As a result of such operations, Alliance signatories would be forced to 
unanimously support operations that could lead to numerous casualties 
while providing few tangible returns.17 
Though Harries makes a credible case against an expanding NATO, he fails to 
take into account the evolving nature of the Alliance nor does he appreciate the fact that 
NATO has already gone "out-of-area" as was the case in the Gulf War and now in 
Bosnia offering "no-flight" zones. Though he does not specifically mention it, other 
advocates of a smaller NATO fail to realize that the absence of Americans would 
certainly prompt the Germans to protect themselves with nuclear weapons. In the end, 
the process of increased instability in a multipolar Europe will be hurried along if the 
United States leaves or is forced out of the European continent.18 
17owen Harries, pp. 41-53. 
18Stephen Van Evera, p. 34. 
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The third argument that, "NATO membership and its historic mission must 
remain status quo," is perhaps the most dangerous option for NATO's future. Precisely 
because it offers no new strategic endeavors and promises not to upset the current 
balance, many respected scholars have advocated just such a role. Grand theorists like 
Henry Kissinger state that successful organizations like NATO must continually change 
and evolve as international situations warrant. Events such as the collapse of 
Communism in the Soviet Union and the Bosnian War are primary examples of NATO's 
need to meet different challenges that directly threaten peace and stability in Western 
and Central Europe. Failing to restructure NATO's primary mission responsibilities by 
incorporating new members that promote both free-markets and democracy will 
undoubtedly spell the imminent demise of the world's most successful military alliance. 
The geopolitical ramifications associated with an aggressive Russian foreign 
policy and military doctrine combined with a resurgent nationalist sentiment cannot be 
correctly dealt with by maintaining a stagnant alliance. Editorials in The New York Times 
have stated that expansion of NATO now or in the near future is the wrong policy to 
pursue. The editors seem to place a naive sense of trust in Russia's good nature. 
Proponents of NATO as a status quo organization believe that, "In joining NATO, it 
makes no sense for East Europeans to start a fire ... What the remnants of the former 
Soviet Empire most need now is reassurance not deterrence."19 Though he favors 
future expansion of NATO to the East in the future, former Assistant Secretary of 
Defense Richard Perle noted that at least one good reason for not expanding NATO just 
now was the complexities associated with the United States offering Article 5 
guarantees (including the nuclear guarantee) to Poland: 
... the credibility of its underlying guarantee [Article 5 of the NATO 
Treaty] that 'an attack against one is an attack against all' cannot be 
extended without the plans and resources to back it up - and that will 
take time ... An offer of interim associate membership sufficient to calm 
understandable anxieties in Eastern Europe would have been 
appropriate. 20 
There are two views that advocate NATO expansion. Primarily, "Limited NATO 
Expansion ... Only Poland and the Czech Republic maybe Slovakia and Hungary." 
Secondarily, "Broad NATO Expansion ... The Vancouver to Vladivostok Solution." Both 
arguments suggest that NATO's future success as a vibrant alliance is possible only by 
19The New York Times, 25 October 1993, p. A 12. 
~ichard Perle, p. A 17. 
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enlarging its meJ1lbership East and taking on new missions like peacekeeping and 
peacemaking. If NATO does not address the primary security challenges facing Europe 
today, it will become increasingly irrelevant. NATO must go "out-of-area" or it will go 
"out-of-business."21 This argument seems to enjoy popularity among many one-time 
cold-warriors who perceived a lack of Western resolve as a carte-blanche for Russians to 
define their sphere of influence as extending to the German-Austrian border. In the 
1990's NATO's role is like it was in 1949: the maintenance of peace and stability 
throughout Western Europe. Along with the question of expanded NATO membership 
is the tandem question of NATO going "out-of-area." Instead of battling the Communist 
Red Army, and Warsaw Pact troops, NATO's future mission will explicitly answer the 
task of providing security to once "out-of-area" regions (i.e., Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
Among the most vociferous proponents of such an approach to an expanded mission is 
Lady Margaret Thatcher. In her memoirs, Thatcher pondered: 
Ought NATO to give more thought to possible threats to our security 
from other directions? There is no guarantee that threats to our security 
will stop at some imaginary line across the mid-Atlantic. It is not long 
since some of us had to go to the Arabian Gulf to keep oil supplies 
flowing ... potential threats to NATO territory may originate more from 
outside Europe. Against that background, it would be only prudent for 
NATO countries to retain a capacity to carry out multiple roles, with 
more flexible and versatile forces. 22 
To this end, the London and Rome Summits in 1990-1991 were responsible for 
initiating NATO's focus on becoming more of a political alliance with an increasingly 
activist diplomacy toward the East.23 Noted Richard Kugler: 
In past years, NATO's plans had focused on direct physical threats to 
member borders; the mandate to respond to these threats stemmed from 
the collective defense provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty ... Any thought that NATO could ignore 'out-of-area' operations 
was given a rude shock in August 1990.24 
21Ronald D. Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee, p. 31. These men are senior analysts at the Rand Corporation. 
22Margaret Thatcher. The Downing Street Years, pp. 812. 
23Ricbard L Kugler, p. 498. 
24Richard L. Kugler, p. 500. 
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The London Summit produced a declaration calling for, "smaller forces, many at 
lower levels of readiness; enhanced flexibility and mobility to replace the old static linear 
defence ... reliance on multinational forces ... [and] reduced reliance on nuclear weapons 
increased ... "25 The argument for an expanded NATO to all interested CSCE states is 
advocated namely by Russia as a means of subverting NATO's authority and helping 
reestablish a dominant Russian role in European security institutions. However, those 
who advocate an Alliance that extends from Vancouver to Vladivostok ignore the 
deleterious effect such an enlargement would have on the cohesion among members. 
For this reason, NACC and the Partnership for Peace initiative were instituted so as not 
to immediately dilute the effectiveness of the Alliance and so as not to isolate Russia. 
B. NATO'S EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1949 
To prove that NATO has not outlived its utility, an examination of the Alliance's 
evolutionary development is necessary to determine its ability to adapt to the changing 
security environment. By acknowledging an existing Eastern risk and detailing 
proactive declarations altering the Alliance's mission, NATO will be following an 
historic track laid out over forty-five years. Phase one involved the critical contribution 
of a collective security system based upon a defensive posture to halt Soviet aggression. 
This process, much like balancing theory previously discussed, was the initial process of 
international states dividing into bipolar spheres. 
During this phase, the Alliance in response to multiple international incidents 
sought after and incorporated several new members (Greece and Turkey in 1952 and the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1955). Phase two began in 1956 with the Three Wise 
Men's Report on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO. Though articulated in the initial 
charter, this report became the catalyst for greater cooperation between NATO 
signatories on every aspect of policy making. At the behest of the Report's authors, 
greater political consultation was strongly encouraged in order to formulate concurrent 
policies to stern Soviet aggression in the post-Stalinist period, wherein the Soviets, 
"Intended to challenge the west in other regions of the world."26 As a result, the act of 
consulting in all levels of economic and political policy making has been the core 
element of the Alliance's success. Along with this key element of greater political 
25Micbael Legge, p. 13. :Mr. Legge is NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and 
Policy and Chairman of the Strategy Review Group. 
26'J'he North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures, p. 31. 
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consultation, a series of military policies was pursued to meet Soviet aggression 
including massive retaliation against a first-strike Soviet nuclear attack. 
The third phase of NATO's changing mission occurred on December 1967 with 
the unanimous members' approval of the Harmel Report.27 This report advocated the 
strategy of deterrence and defence whereby adequate military capabilities would be 
increased to meet this objective. Further, the report advocated the first-ever steps 
towards disarmament, detente and crises resolution through peaceful means between 
East and West. This report has also been referred to as the Harmel dual approach to 
dialogue and defence. The fourth phase, gradual detente was aided by the Federal 
Republic of Germany's policy of Ostpolitik with its Eastern neighbors.28 The main 
objective in this phase between 1969 and the end of the 1970's was to offer a credible 
nuc1ear defense while simultaneously pursuing detente and the initial SALT I and Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty agreements in 1972. 
The fifth phase was marred by the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and 
its failure to adhere to the tenets of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Brezhnev made no 
secret of his intention to ignore the main tenets of respecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. He stated, "No one should try to dictate to other people, on the 
basis of foreign policy considerations of one kind or another, the manner in which they 
ought to manage their internal affairs."29 Another event that galvanized a chilling of 
relations between NATO and the Soviet Union was the creation of the independent 
trade union "Solidarity" and the Soviet Union's attempt to achieve a satisfactory 
outcome through the use of diplomatic pressure and the threat of military intervention. 
As a cohesive unit, NATO responded to both of these actions of expansionism of Soviet 
hegemony on its periphery with a series of non-military actions. The close coordination 
among NATO members was the result of the much-touted "close consultation" idea of 
the Harmel Treaty among its signatories. In both cases NATO members agreed 
unilaterally to impose non-military steps against the Soviets and thus affected, "A whole 
range of areas of cooperation [between NATO members and the Soviet Bloc] .... "30 
270riginally referred to as the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance. 
28NATO: Facts and Figures, p. 77. "[Ostpolitik was] designed to improve its relations with is Eastern 
neighbours, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany likewise set itself the task of establishing a 
modus vivendi with the German Democratic Republic ... The allies assured the [FRG] that all these initiatives 
bad their sympathetic support." 
29Leonid Brezhnev cited by Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, p. 287. 
30NATO: Facts and Figures, p. 105. 
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The sixth phase of NATO strategic development has been the restructuring and 
downsizing of NATO troop, equipment and armament levels as a primary result of 
Gorbachev's failed policies of glasnost' and perestroika which precipitated the fall of 
Communism. These two policies helped speed up the collapse of Soviet hegemony in 
Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the former Soviet Uruon and forced another 
round of restructuring the mission of NATO. The events from 1989 to the present have 
forced NATO to further redefine its historic mission and have served as a catalyst for a 
future discussion regarding the necessity of a collective security organization on the 
Eurasian continent. This last phase has been the most critical period for the Alliance 
since its inception because of the lack of a clearly defined goal or mission and the 
dispute over the validity of a credible Russian threat. The most popular and articulated 
strategy (though not formally agreed upon) establishes a broad outline for defense 
through the increased mobilization of troops and equipment as well as the flexibility to 
respond to other security challenges. 
C. ALLIANCE THEORY 
In determining the essential features of the most appropriate future of the 
Atlantic Alliance (that NATO must expand its membership and go "out-of-area") one 
must also examine the theory of alliance building to determine what effect, if any, this 
proposition will have on the balance of power and NATO's character. A discussion 
regarding NATO would be incomplete without an overview of the theory of alliance 
building as it relates to the specific aspects of NATO's creation (i.e., balancing and 
bandwagoning). Considering the theory of alliance building, the obvious realization is 
that NATO formed when it became clear that an eastern threat (the Soviet Uruon and 
the Red Army) represented a direct challenge to the frontier countries of Western 
Europe. The formative course for establishing an alliance was the act of balancing 
several Western European countries against what they perceived was a common enemy 
to their way of life (e.g., democracy and capitalism). The Brussels Treaty of 1948 
(representing Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Britain) was the 
initial act of countries balancing against the threatening expansion of the Soviet Uruon. 
Bandwagoning (the act of smaller states joining the weaker of two superpowers 
so as to have more influence within the alliance) as it relates to both the NATO and 
Warsaw Pact was never illustrative of either side's genesis. Instead, the phenomena that 
occurred closely resembled the balancing of two great powers against each other along 
with a collection of smaller yet important states comprising either alliance. The concept 
of balancing was most indicative of the division of power into a bipolar world after 
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1948. The success of the Alliance has been based upon an involuntary schism between 
the Soviet Union and the Atlantic Alliance. Kenneth Waltz, an expert on balance of 
power theory writes that, 
One should .. .look for instances of states making internal efforts to 
strengthen themselves, however distasteful or difficult such efforts might 
be. The United States and the Soviet Union following World War II 
provide such instances: the United States by rearming despite having 
demonstrated a strong wish not to by dismantling the most powerfuJ 
military machine the world had ever known; the Soviet Union by 
maintaining about three million men under arms while striving to 
acquire a costly new military technology despite the terrible destruction 
she had suffered in war.31 
Waltz concludes by adding that, "we find states forming balances of power 
whether or not they wish to ... Bandwagoning and balancing behavior are in sharp 
contrast.32 In the case of the schism between former allies at the war's end, alliances 
formed not as a result of bandwagoning but rather balancing. Whereas the Soviet's 
expansion into Central and Eastern Europe was seen as expansionist and brutish, 
America's presence as one of NATO's founders has been referred to as an "empire by 
invitation." This act of balancing, as John Mearsheirner correctly concludes, is a 
problem-ridden enterprise whereby the, "United States, as well as the Continental states, 
will have to balance ... against any emerging aggressor to offset the ganging up and 
bullying problems that are sure to arise in post-Cold War Europe."33 Josef Joffe sums 
up by stating that, 'The Alliance now faces the greatest threat to its existence ever. 
Having 'won' the Cold War, it has lost its foe, its role ... [and hence its raison d'etre]."34 
The NATO organization vis-a-vis Russia can be examined using structural 
realism as a context for the state of current affairs (i.e., individual states striving to retain 
their relative position in the international system through a system of defensive and 
offensive maneuvers).35 Each state bases its individual structure relative to other states, 
based upon their rank on prescribed conditions. Waltz delineates these factors that 
determine rank and international stature as: size of population and territory, resource 
31Kenneth N. Waltz, p. 125. 
32Kenneth N. Waltz, pp. 125-126. 
33John Mearsheimer, p. 54. 
34Josef Joffe, p. 47. 
35Kenneth N. Waltz, p. 49. 
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endowment, economk capability, military strength, political stability and 
competence.36 As the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev recently stated, "Russia 
remains a superpower - and not only as measured by nuclear and missile strength, but 
by its natural resources, technological skills and strategic geography ... Russia is destined 
to be a great power, not a junior one."37 
Using these criteria, the Soviet Union's and now Russia's relative strength still 
ranks it as a superpower relative to other individual states. According to Waltz's 
criterion, Western European states continue to unite under the auspices of a collective 
military structure whose stated priority is the containment of Soviet-Russian influence. 
Simultaneously, these alliance members protect their own individual rank because they 
view Russia's superpower endowments as a threat to their future existence. In the case 
of alliance building, NATO is illustrative of a group of countries uniting into a common 
political-military organization to balance against a threat. The countries that made up 
the Warsaw Pact were not so much volunteers as they were coerced into the military 
alliance by the Soviet Union. To be sure, the leaders of these Soviet satellites were by 
the late 1940's hard-line Communist dictators whose domestic power base was secured 
and legitimized by the presence of a strong military presence. Formed in 1949, the 
NATO Alliance members like the Concert of Europe participants in 1815, was created 
when there existed a perceived threat to the integrity and sovereignty of the entire 
European continent. The question in 1994 like that in 1815 is, ''What to do when the 
single threat that precipitated an alliance's creation is no longer present?" In the earlier 
case, with few exceptions, the countries who formed to stop Napoleon maintained a 
unified, albeit loose association for nearly 100 years. 
36Kenneth N. Waltz, p. 52. 
37 Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Foreign Minister, 18 March 1994, p. A 11. 
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III. NATO'S HISTORIC MISSION AND RAISON D'tTRE 
The North Atlantic Treaty is the political framework for an international 
alliance designed to prevent aggression or to repel it, should it occur. It 
provides for continuous cooperation and consultation in political, 
economic and military fields ... The signatory countries state their desire to 
live in peace with all peoples and all governments. Reaffirming their 
faith in the principles of the United Nations, they undertake in particular 
to preserve peace and international security and to promote stability and 
well-being in the North Atlantic area ... Under this Treaty, the member 
countries therefore adopt a policy of security based on the inherent right 
to individual and collective self-defence.38 
Therein is the primary reason for NATO's existence and its continuing 
usefulness in 1994. NATO is something more than an arrangement for common 
military defense; it has also been utilized to keep post-war Germany in check by 
incorporating it into a collective security arrangement. It was this fear of the Soviet 
Union and Germany - a revived, remilitarized Germany -- that produced NATO's 
precursor, the Treaty of Brussels.39 Mainly though, as a result of postwar Soviet 
expansion east and west of its frontiers, NATO was created. It was Communist 
agitation beginning in earnest throughout the world after World War II as well as 
several provocative incidents that solidified Western resolve to keep Soviet expansion in 
check. More importantly, however, it was the prevalence of Communist agitation in 
particular regions, namely in South-East Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as 
Western Europe that demonstrated the necessity to create a collective security 
organization. Soviet demands for a territorial share of the Turkish Straits as well as 
assistance to Greek Communist insurgents made the formation of a Western alliance all 
the more appropriate. 
The wartime coalition that included the United States, Great Britain and the 
Soviet Union disintegrated into opposing camps. In response to these Soviet overtures, 
western Europeans and the Americans undertook a series of steps to stem the perceived 
tide of communism. First, Britain and France joined in the formation of the Dunkirk 
Treaty of 1947. In the same year, the United States issued the Truman Doctrine and the 
Marshall Plan with a primary purpose of offering protection to "freedom loving 
countries desiring it and financial aid to post-war countries respectively." In 1948, the 
Brussels Treaty, superseding the Dunkirk treaty included Belgium, the Netherlands and 
38NATO: Facts and Figures, p. 13. 
39J-rancis H. Heller, p. 440. 
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Luxembourg as well as Britain and France in a military alliance. Also in 1948, the 
American Congress passed Resolution 239, otherwise known as the Vandenberg 
Resolution which "cleared the way" for the United States to constitutionally join in a 
military alliance with western Europe.40 By the end of 1948, negotiations were already 
well underway for establishing a North Atlantic defense alliance. Adrian Hyde-Price 
condenses this turbulent four year period which was already surfacing when Winston 
Churchill delivered his "Iron Curtain" speech in Independence, Missouri, in 1946. 
Hyde-Price writes, 
1947 was the decisive year in the cold war division of Europe, and by 
1949, the central features of the bipolar world order were in place. Events 
in this period followed each other with dizzying rapidity. The Truman 
Doctrine (12 March 1947) was fol1owed by Marshall Aid (5 June 1947), 
and given political and conceptual form in Kennan's famous article on 
'containment' Ouly 1947). Communists were expelled from governments 
in the West in the spring of 1947, and the Soviets responded by 
establishing the Cominform in September 1947 (with its theoretical 
underpinnings provided by the 'Two camps' theory of Andrei Zhdanov) 
and the CMEA on 25 January 1949. In February 1948 Czech Communists 
seized power in their 'elegant coup', and from late 1948, Stalin's heavy-
handed attempt to regiment the 'Peoples' Democracies' behind the banner 
of the CPSU led to the rift with Tito and the Yugoslav communists. The 
formation of NATO in April1949 and the establishment of two separate 
German states in May and October 1949 signalled the completion of this 
initial period of bloc-building.41 
Adrian Hyde-Price attributes the failure of the "Big Three" wartime coalition to 
remain together after World War II to the varying interpretations of the results of the 
conferences at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. He writes, 
The attempt by the wartime allies to agree to a common approach to the 
post-war reconstruction and reordering of Europe - especially of 
Germany - ran aground on the divergent interests of the leading 
protagonists. Their varying national priorities led them to pursue 
differing policies in Europe, and even when they could agree on common 
goals (for example, 'democratisation', 'decentralisation' and 
'denazification' in Germany, or 'free elections' in Eastern Europe), their 
different national perspectives and ideological assumptions led them to 
pursue diverging policies.42 
40NATO: Facts and Figures, pp. 10-11. 
41Adrian Hyde-Price, pp. 29-30. 
42Adrian Hyde-Price, p. 25. 
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Finally, in April 4, 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, 
D.C. by twelve signatories.43 NATO's historic mission and reason for existence are bes
t 
expressed when viewed from the perspective of the Western leaders who, at the time
, 
became suspicious of Soviet motives in postwar Europe: 
The defeat of the two great military and industrial powers, Germany and 
Japan, had left an immense vacuum to the East and West of the Soviet 
Union. Taking advantage of such exceptionally favourable 
circumstances, the Soviet Union made full use of the strength of the Red 
Army to conduct an expansionist policy which was soon to threaten 
peace and collective security ... The British Prime Minister, Sir Winston 
Churchill, in his telegram of May 12 addressed to President Truman, 
expressed his anxiety in the following terms: 'What will be the position in 
a year or two when the British and American armies have melted, and 
the French have not yet been formed on any major scale, and when 
Russia may choose to keep 200 or 300 divisions on active service?' And 
he added: 'An iron curtain is being drawn down upon their front. We do 
not know what is going on behind' .... 44 
Over the past four years NATO has begun a redefinition of its historic mission. 
Since 1990, this process has involved a series of summits in which Alliance members
 
have begun to shape not only the force structures but the way in which NATO looks a
t 
the world and the various threats to members. The single greatest impact of the end o
f 
the Cold War has been the renationalization of planning regarding national interest
s 
and threat perceptions that affect the cohesion of the security system. To be sure, th
e 
Atlantic Alliance was never completely cohesive during the Cold War. However, on
e 
Soviet intervention after another (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and Afghanistan 
1979) continued to justify the existence of NATO and proved the importance of alliance 
cohesion against the possibility of a Soviet-led attack on Western Europe. With tha
t 
threat gone, sixteen countries declared an end to, "the legacy of decades o
f 
suspicion ... We are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from th
e 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of an
y 
state ...... 45 
431be twelve original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were: the United 
States, 
Canada, the Netherlands, France, Britain, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Luxembourg, Bel
gium and 
Portugal. Greece and Turkey were admitted in 1952, The Federal Republic of Germany was a
dmitted in 
1955 and Spain was admitted 1982. 
44NATO: Facts and Figures, p. 3. 
4SNATO Transformed: The London Declaration, selected document No. 38. U.S. Department of State, July 
6, 1990, paragraphs 6 & 8. 
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The four major points of the London Declaration were emphasized by President 
George Bush in July 1990. First, the Atlantic Alliance extended an offer of friendship to 
former adversaries of the Warsaw Pact and an invitation to set up liaison offices with 
NATO in Brussels. Second, the Alliance recognized the necessity to continue to reduce 
and limit conventional forces in Europe as well as reiterating its eagerness to implement 
agreements to decrease military manpower and offensive capabilities throughout the 
Eurasian continent. Third, NATO countries acknowledged that NATO's nuclear 
strategy of flexible response, in place since 1967, was still a fundamental aspect of 
nuclear deterrence but resolved to use the nuclear aspect only as a last resort. In 
addition to this "last resort" declaration, NATO members agreed to discuss future 
proposals to eliminate short range nuclear artillery weapons indicating the diminished 
likelihood of war on the European continent requiring tactical nuclear weapons. 
Finally, NATO leaders promoted the idea of enhancing the role and mission of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
NATO's meetings in 1990 and 1991 produced the foundations for a revitalized 
Alliance that could begin altering NATO's strategy and force structure fundamentally in 
order to reflect a diminished eastern threat and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The 
North Atlantic Council meeting in Rome in 1991 created the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council as a means of beginning the process of consulting with former Central and 
Eastern Europe states. Moreover, the meetings in Rome produced a new strategic 
concept to address the changes that occurred in Europe. This New Strategic Concept 
reflected NATO's eagerness to enhance dialogue and liaison in diplomatic, military and 
political fields with Central and Eastern Europe. However, it left unresolved the 
question of what security guarantees, if any, could or would be offered to the CEE 
states. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a military and 
political alliance created after World War II as a mechanism to "safeguard the freedom 
and civilization" of Western Europe and North America. In April 1949, when the 
Atlantic Alliance was formally established, NATO became the single greatest 
amalgamation of states aligned against the Soviet Union, surpassing earlier treaties 
signed in Dunkirk (1947) and Brussels (1947). For the United States, NATO was the first 
European security treaty that called on American participation in the event of war on 
the European continent in over 170 years. The other peculiar feature of the Atlantic 
Treaty was the fact that it was assembled during a time of relative peace. NATO's initial 
signatories assembled into a political-military alliance because they saw several 
antagonistic actions by the Soviet Union as a threat to the maintenance of democracy 
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and free-markets in Europe. In effect, the question to be raised is: Were the numerous 
post-Cold War NATO declarations -- relying heavily upon the tenets of the 1949 
Washington Treaty and the 1967 Harmel Report- catalysts that helped define NATO's 
purpose? If so, what were the tangible accomplishments of the declarations? 
Most observers of the current security environment in Europe believe that 
debating the merits of NATO' s future requires an analysis of what NATO has been. In 
essence, one must answer questions like: What are NATO's core values? What are the 
mechanisms to maintain and enhance its values? How does NATO adapt to changing 
security realities while retaining its purpose and effectiveness? Though some may 
speculate on the success of NATO's contribution to Communism's implosion 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the evidence to date indicates that NATO 
achleved its stated goals in the 1949 Washington Treaty. 
Moreover, NATO was successful in adhering to the same values and principles 
while continuing to adapt the mission functions to achieve the end result. The main 
tenet of the alliance was above all, the common defense of Western Europe to preserve 
democracy and stability. The enduring quality of NATO over the past five decades has 
been its resilience to the changing security environment and the ability of its members 
to adapt various methods to meet the prevailing circumstances. If one ever doubted 
NATO's resilient qualities, it is wise to examine how the former Prime Minister of 
Poland, like every other CEE country, is enamored with its qualities. Hanna Suchocka 
states that: 
The North Atlantic Alliance is the most important element of the new 
European security system. It is a pillar of security and stability in 
Europe. And it continues to play this important role which derives from 
the specific features of NATO: its integrated defence system; the 
transatlantic partnership between Europe and North America; [and] its 
real military strength and ability to adjust to new international 
realities.46 
NATO displayed its capability to respond politically to changing security 
environments while steadfastly maintaining an impressive military force. When detente 
and peaceful coexistence became the modus operandi between the two opposing camps, 
NATO embraced the altered political climate but continued to maintain a strong 
defensive capability. By reiterating its support for closer relations with the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization through the 1967 Harmel Report, NATO displayed an ability to 
change with the times. Concurrently, in 1967, NATO restated its intention to maintain a 
46Jlanna Suchocka, p. 3. 
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mix of nuclear and conventional forces to deter and contain acts of Soviet aggression. In 
the 1990's, like the previous Cold War decades, NATO is again faced with a 
substantially altered security environment. But unlike the Cold War environment, 
Atlantic Alliance members are not threatened by an overwhelming, massive invasion 
force corning from the East. However, NATO members still concede that other less-
credible yet more pervasive risks continue to justify the existence of a security 
organization to protect its members. 
Granted the threat of a huge Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe is gone. 
Indeed, the Atlantic Alliance has taken numerous measures to substantially alter the 
means by which NATO would continue to ensure, "stability and well-being in the North 
Atlantic area."47 The first impetus of a need to change, or at least restate the means of 
conducting the political-military dimensions of the Alliance occurred at the end of 1967 
with the Harmel Report. More recently, the Atlantic Alliance has produced several 
declarations and initiatives that reorient the political-military mission to respond to a 
non-existent Soviet threat but an abundance of smaller, yet potentially destabilizing, 
threats to Western European security. NATO's goal of ensuring democracy and stability 
on both sides of the Atlantic remains the essence of its raison d'etre. 
Indeed, NATO's primary goal remains unchanged, with the exception that 
NATO now sees itself as an "exporter" of democracy and stability. Nevertheless, the 
Alliance must now redefine the mission and strategy necessary to best fulfill the long-
stated objective. In essence, NATO still serves its intended function but it is currently in 
the midst of adapting to the momentous changes in a post-1989 Europe. The dilemma 
that faces NATO are: (1) going out-of-area in order to quell instability on NATO's 
periphery; (2) expanding to the East in order to ensure the flourishing of democratic and 
market societies at the expense of antagonizing the Russians; (3) changing the political 
and military functions and structures in order to respond to an absence of an eastern 
threat. 
The predicament that arises is: How does a military-political alliance that 
worked so well over five decades continue to justify its existence with the absence of a 
clear existential threat? The answer is that an examination of the Alliance's critical birth 
certificate document reveals that no specific threat was ever mentioned. The problem is 
not merely justifying continued existence but rather defining the new threats that exist 
and determining the proper means of defending against them. For these reasons, 
several post-1989 instruments are critical in assessing NATO's future missions and the 
41NATO: Facts and Figures, The North Atlantic Treaty, preamble, p. 376. 
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redefinition of the Alliance's force structure. A senior planning officer in the political 
affairs division of NATO stated that, 
NATO's transformation process since the end of the cold war has indeed 
created a basis on which to initiate such proactive policies ... The 
beginning of a comprehensive political dialogue with the former Warsaw 
Pact countries perhaps marked the changing rationale of NATO most 
clearly: the Alliance is moving from a largely passive provider of 
deterrence to an instrument of shaping the political evolution of an 
undivided Europe."48 
The United Nations Charter is the bedrock of the 1949 Washington Treaty. 
Incorporating the basic concept of the United Nations Charter, as the premise for the 
existence of the Atlantic Alliance, gave NATO the international sanction to establish 
itself. To create such an impressive military and political alliance of nations within a 
vacuum, without international sanction, would certainly call its validity into question. 
By adhering to the United Nations Charter, authors of the Washington Treaty sought to 
minimize any conflict that might arise over the legality of forming such an alliance. 
Calling upon specific articles as the impetus for such an ambitious alliance, the founders 
in effect "incorporated" NATO under the auspices of international sanction. Article 1 of 
the United Nations Charter states that all signatories shall strive, 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches 
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means ... To develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights .... 49 
Article 1, in effect gives international legitimacy to countries that align in 
collective defense structures. Article 51 states that, "Nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations .... "50 Article 51 in essence is the 
international sanction required to afford the Atlantic Alliance the legitimacy necessary 
to survive five decades. Both Article 1 and 51 are specifically mentioned in the 
48Michael RUhle, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 13, 1994, p. 316. Mr. RUhle remarked that, "The creation of 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the adoption of the Partnership for Peace (PtP) initiative are a 
visible shift towards a proactive policy of projecting stability beyond its own borders." 
49Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 1, from the 
Encyclopedia Americana, International Edition, p. 456. 
soNATO: Facts and Figures, Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, p. 375. 
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Washington Treaty and are indicative of the founders' desire to have a raison d'etre and 
international sanction to collectively align. An examination of specific NATO Treaty 
articles as they apply to the expansion of membership and the redefinition of its mission 
is critical in determining whether or not the Alliance has a precedence for changing its 
current form. Of the fourteen articles; Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 provide the best justification 
for an expanded NATO role. 
A. THE WASHINGTONTREATY1949 
NATO's initial legitimacy was the resuJt of the founders' incorporation of the 
United Nations' Charter articles 1 and 51. The Atlantic Alliance's continued success 
over the past forty-five years is due in large part to the continuation of specific political 
and military means created to ensure the Alliance's stated aims. The main statements of 
the Washington Treaty do not specifically mention a Soviet threat but rather any threat 
to Alliance security. While the signatories to the Washington Treaty reaffirmed the 
commitment to: "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their 
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the ruJe of 
law."51 Similar to the forty-five years preceding the reduction of East-West hostilities, 
they also fulfilled this lofty goal through military strength and political savvy. The 
specific articles of the NATO Treaty enabled NATO to conduct a self-imposed 
metamorphosis under the aegis of Articles 2, 4, 5 and 10. By adhering to Article 2 of the 
Washington Treaty, NATO met its primary objective: maintenance of stability and 
democracy throughout the Atlantic Alliance. Article 2 stated, 
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful 
and friendly international relations by strengthening their free 
institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles 
upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions 
of stability and well-being .... "52 
Article 2, like Article 4, implies that NATO's geographic areas of operation 
extend beyond the signatories' borders. Article 2 defines the goals, aspirations and 
obligations between fellow signatories and how exactly to pursue international relations 
regarding social and economic commitments. Article 2 gets its impetus from Article 1 of 
the United Nations Charter, whereby the collective security organization will take 
action to prevent and remove threats to peace. NATO accomplished this by specifically 
SlNATO: Facts and Figures, The North Atlantic Treaty, preamble, p 376. 
S2NATO: Facts and Figures, The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2, p. 376. 
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creating a number of civilian and military structures designated to enhance relations 
and strengthen institutions. These included the North Atlantic Council, the Defence 
Planning Committee, the Nuclear Planning Group, the General Secretariat, Supreme 
Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT), Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) 
and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Though this is not close to 
an all-encompassing list, the point is that the intent of Article 2 was met through the 
formation of a series of bureaucratic and military directorates and integrated command 
structures. 
Article 3 is critical to future NATO expansion because it forces all signatories to 
develop and maintain an ability to resist attack. This collective defence and resistance 
to attack laid the groundwork for a variety of political-military strategies including: 
massive retaliation, flexible response, deterrence and defence and eventually arms 
limitation, detente and cooperation on mutually beneficial programs with the Soviet 
Union. As the debate continues, this article will be rigorously imposed on future 
applicants (Poland and the Czech Republic) because it requires an economic 
commitment to upgrade and maintain a military force capable of providing an ability to 
resist attack. 
Article 4 is the second most important article whereby signatories to the Treaty 
agree to come to the aid of others and protect any other member whose territorial 
boundaries are breached. Article 4 envisages a threat to the territorial integrity, political 
independence or security of one of the member countries of the Alliance and provides 
for joint consultation whenever one of them believes that such a threat exists. 
Furthermore, the construction of bureaucratic and military command structures 
facilitated the eventuality of carrying out Article 4 of the Treaty. Article 4 states that, 
'The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."53 By 
creating a dual structure of civilian and military command, the authors of the 
Washington Treaty purposely laid the groundwork for each of NATO's members to 
participate in consultation. The idea of consultation, having worked so well over five 
decades, would become the cornerstone of a post-Cold War era in which NATO 
members actively pursue consultative relations with Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) states as the first step towards warmer relations and integration. 
Article 5 is the core of the Treaty whereby member countries agree to treat an 
armed attack on any one of them, in Europe or North America, as an attack against all of 
S3NATO: Facts and Figures, The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 4, pp. 376-377. 
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them. It commits them to taking the necessary steps to consider assisting each other in 
the event of an armed attack. To be sure, a credible guarantee to Central and Eastern 
European countries today would precipitate a lack of enforcement because NATO is not 
currently equipped (militarily, economically or politically) to deal with such a scenario. 
Artic1e 5 is the crown jewel that each of the Central and Eastern European hopes to one 
day possess. One Pentagon official stated that Poland's ideal situation would be 
obtaining NATO's Article 5 guarantee and Desert Storm weapons. 
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty -- commonly referred to as the 'Three Musketeer's 
pledge" of "all-for-one-and-one-for-all"- is reckoned to be the single-most important 
artide in the Alliance Treaty. Because this clause has come to symbolize the common 
cause of Western Europe and North America, CEE states are obviously anxious to reap 
its implied guarantee. Although the specific wording leaves it up to each country to 
decide whether it is in the best interests to fight alongside an ally under attack, there 
seems to be little ambiguity that the United States would not have hesitated to protect 
itself and Western Europe by any means necessary. Article 5 states that, "The Parties 
agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America 
shall be considered an attack against them a1I...."54 However, the Artic1e also states that 
each NATO member, 
... in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence 
recognised by Artide 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of 
the North Atlantic area. 55 
Artide S's enduring promise of assistance is the single greatest reason why CEE 
countries want to join NATO and why NATO has chosen to restrict its use to only 16 
countries. In contrast to Article 5, Article 6 has been employed by leaders of NATO to 
prevent "out-of-area" military excursions by members. However, the strictures imposed 
by Article 6 were never interpreted so narrowly as to block all discussion and debate 
relating to extra-regional developments. Douglas Stuart aptly points out that NATO's 
long experience in consultation on international conflicts ranges from: 
S4NATO: Facts and Figures, The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, p. 377. 
SSNATO: Facts and Figures, The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, p. 377. 
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,.-------------------------------------------
... dispute resolution (e.g., Suez, Angola) to information and consultation 
(e.g., French Indochina, Cuban missile crisis) to policy coordination (e.g., 
Falklands, Desert Shield/Desert Storm). This diplomatic activity is 
authorized by Article 4 of the NATO Treaty ... Extra-regional cooperation 
is also authorized by Article 2 of the Treaty .... 56 
This article will invoke NATO countries in the future to consider such out of 
area actions like air strikes in Bosnia and protecting territory in Poland if Russian 
expansion extends westward. The article 
... defines the area in which the provisions of Article 5 apply. However it 
does not imply that events occurring outside that area cannot be the 
subject of consultation within the Alliance. The preservation of peace 
and security in the North Atlantic Treaty area can be affected by events 
elsewhere in the world, and the North Atlantic Council must therefore, as 
a matter of course, consider the overall international situation. 57 
In other words, the Alliance can and must be allowed to adapt to changing 
international situations by consulting and taking military and political action. NATO's 
use of airpower in attempting to affect the outcome of the Bosnian War is de facto 
recognition of the Alliance's new found mission for going "out-of-area." Though the 
initial intent of these articles remains intact, their evolution has been part of an eight-
tiered process that has characterized NATO's changing mission over the past forty-five 
years. The crucial point is that NATO has never been a stagnant organization with the 
stated purpose of deterring Soviet aggression with a single strategy. Instead, it has been 
in a constant state of evolution since 1949, metamorphosing through a series of 
conceptual phases. The most recent declarations illustrate the changing course of 
European security and are the basis for the future of NATO. 
The German, British and French defence ministries have all articulated a position 
regarding Central and Eastern European security. One can compare these statements 
with the common NATO declarations of the early 1990's and make a direct link to their 
defense white papers in 1994. It is essential therefore to examine the central elements of 
NATO's most recent declarations to clarify each country's defense posture as it applies 
to Central and Eastern Europe. Although then-Prime Minister Thatcher and President 
Mitterrand felt Chancellor Kohl was too quick securing German unification, there was a 
commonly held perception in Western Europe and North America after 1989 that 
leaders in NATO capitals were slow to respond to the cataclysmic changes in the 
S6oouglas Stuart, pp. 15-16. 
S7NATO: Facts and Figures, p. 14. 
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international order. Fortunately, the London Declaration, published in July 1990, 
addressed key issues related to the fast-changing international scene and offered broad 
guidelines for NATO's response to these developments. 
Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, like Articles 2, 4 and 5, is relevant to the 
success of NATO to adapt to the changing security environment during the Cold War 
and now in the post-1989 era. Article 10 was employed four times over 30 years to 
extend NATO membership when the perceived threat to the Alliance was great enough 
to warrant expansion. Article 10 states that, 'The Parties may, by unanimous 
agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this 
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic .... "58 CEE states like 
Poland that lobby for inclusion in NATO view Article 10 as the singular just cause for 
membership. The dichotomy that exists however, is that NATO members do not view 
CEE states as contributing to the security of the Atlantic area, while CEE states see their 
exclusion as symptomatic of a greater breakdown in European security. In any case, 
Article 10 is the mechanism NATO will use to implement enlargement. 
Far from being a relic designed to deter a clear, existential threat, the Atlantic 
Alliance has a purposeful future in securing the basic tenets of European security. The 
dissipation of the Soviet threat does not necessarily mean that other factors do not pose 
similar risks to Western institutions. NATO's post-1989 declarations provide a path to 
continued European security. There are still threats that pose dangers to Atlantic 
stability: mass migration as a result of civil wars and economic depravations, nuclear 
disaster, ultranationalist tendencies of Russia's political and military leaders. The 
Atlantic Alliance is an invaluable component of the present and future European 
security realm because: 
• America's involvement and its nuclear guarantee have proven to be a 
stabilizing factor throughout Europe; 
• The integrated military structure has proven to be the best means of 
ensuring cooperation and consultation in European security matters; 
• The creation of a civilian and military bureaucracy has enhanced political 
and diplomatic ties between NATO members; 
• The Article 5 provision continues to maintain an aura of great value to both 
the member countries of NATO and the CEE states that want it. 
58 NATO: Facts and Figures, The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 10, p. 378. 
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B. THE HARMEL REPORT 1967 
The Harmel Report, officially known as The Future Tasks of the Alliance, was the 
first significant reiteration and clarification of the Washington Treaty. The two main 
tenets of the Harmel Report, like the original1949 Treaty, emphasize the use of military 
and political methods to secure Atlantic security. Confronted with an evolving security 
environment that saw the rise of Ostpolitik, detente and peaceful coexistence, Alliance 
members saw a need to expound on NATO's central elements - military strength and 
political solutions - but simultaneously encourage closer relations with the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization. German Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke stated that, "NATO's 
reaction to the end of the Cold War was immediate: it did not hesitate in implementing 
the intentions of the Harmel Report philosophy to build bridges to its former 
opponents." He commented that, 
The Harmel concept, named after the then Belgian Foreign Minister and 
adopted by the NATO Council in 1967 as its general policy guideline 
with respect to the countries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation, 
therefore emphasised not only the necessary collective defence of NATO 
Allies but also the aims of improving understanding and confidence and 
of building bridges with the Warsaw Treaty states. 59 
The Harmel Report thus endorsed the theme of continuity of maintaining large 
ground forces to deter any aggression but at the same time encouraged an emerging 
spirit of detente. In effect, the Harmel Report authors sought to adapt the Alliance's 
strategy to conform with the warmer political realities but not to compromise its goals. 
They fundamentally advocated keeping NATO's guard up but pursuing political means 
to ease East-West tensions. By acknowledging the Alliance's ability to change with the 
times, paragraph three of the Report stated that, "the Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous 
organisation which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions."60 Moreover, 
paragraph four recognized the change but reiterated the fact that the fundamental 
problem still existed. Article 4 declared that, 
Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 the international 
situation has changed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance 
have assumed a new dimension ... [T]he Soviet doctrine of 'peaceful co-
existence' has changed the nature of the confrontation with the West but 
not the basic problems."61 
S9 Ambassador Gebhardt von Molt.ke, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, NATO, p. 9. 
60NATO: Facts and Figures, The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report), paragraph 3, p. 402. 
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By recognizing an altered "international situation" but not a cessation of the basic 
"East-West" problems, the Harmel authors implied a willingness to cooperate, but only 
from the position of military strength. The enduring quality of the Harmel Report and 
its continuing relevancy to the current European security discussion is the steadfast 
reliance on military strength. Today when NATO members speak about closer 
integration with the East and expanding its roles and missions beyond its current 
borders, it is within the context of the Harmel Report and its adherence to NATO's main 
functions. Paragraph five of the Harmel Report states, 
The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to 
maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter 
aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of 
member countries if aggression should occur ... [T]he Allies will maintain 
as necessary a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, 
thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.62 ... [I]ts 
second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable 
relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. 
Military securitx- and a policy of detente are not contradictory but 
complementary. 63 
The Harmel Report's strength was in its reassertion of the main features of the 
Alliance's purpose and function. First, an acknowledgment that the 1949 Treaty -
featuring the dual approaches of political and military means -- had been successful for 
nearly 20 years. Second, the goal of ensuring stability and democracy in Western 
Europe and North America had come about through applying political means and 
military strength. Third, the Alliance, in order to be successful in the future, must 
continue to adapt to changing political relations with adversaries. Fourth, that military 
security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary. To this end, 
the Harmel Report continues to be used within the general context of a mutable Alliance 
strategy that reflects current security requirements. Though detente is no longer used in 
the 1990's security lexicon, maintaining a strong military force while simultaneously 
pursuing political and diplomatic solutions remains the foundation of NATO's post-
1989 ideal. 
The 1967 Report left an indelible mark on the present-day discussions regarding 
NATO's future course and raison d'etre. Precisely because NATO leaders return again 
61 NATO: Facts and Figures, The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report), paragraph 4, p. 402. 
62NATO: Facts and Figures, The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report), paragraph 5, p. 402-403. 
63NATO: Facts and Figures, The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report), paragraphs 4 and 5, pp. 
402-404. 
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and again to two fundamental points: (1) Maintenance of a military force and command 
structure capable of meeting the present security environment. (2) Pursuit of political 
and diplomatic channels with adversaries and former adversaries to further embrace the 
security of Alliance members. It is no wonder then that the Harmel Report is still 
referred to throughout discussions concerning NATO's future and within the context of 
the London, Copenhagen, Rome and Brussels Declarations. 
C. THE LONDON DECLARATION JULY 1990 
Six months after the downfall of Communist regimes throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe in the falJ of 1989, NATO produced the first in a series of declarations 
that responded to the rapidly-changing security environment in Europe. In July 1990, 
NATO members convened a ministerial meeting in London that commenced a 
fundamental reassessment of the Atlantic Alliance's strategy, force structure and 
policies for the future. Like the Harmel Report two decades before, the London Summit 
restated the main tenets of NATO's existence and offered a road map for the future. 
The London Declaration's main points included a reiteration of military and 
political means to address European security problems; a declaration of an end to 
hostilities with the Warsaw Treaty Organization; an invitation to CEE states for 
diplomatic liaison; a proposal for closer military contacts with CEE countries; a proposal 
to further reduce military arsenals and manpower under the aegis of the Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) 
mechanisms; an announcement to field smalJer, more flexible forces and a proposal to 
alter the strategic military strategy. Though this was considered at the time to be an 
ambitious list of priorities for NATO, coming only nine months after the first breach in 
the Berlin Wall, many skeptics failed to see the monumental shift in policy and 
intentions. Outside of Brussels, NATO has rarely been given credit for such a sweeping 
proposal to overhaul the Alliance's outlook and mission so soon after the first signs of 
Communism's demise in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Perhaps the casual observer might contend that the London Declaration was just 
an ambitious list of statements of intent with no tangible accomplishments. One can 
readily see the remarkable number of accrued benefits of this watershed 1990 summit. 
In paragraph two of the North Atlantic Council London Declaration, the Heads of State 
reaffirmed, "that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and 
we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance .... "64 This reiteration of 
64NATO Transformed: The London Declaration, paragraph 2. 
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the Harmel Report called for the formulation of political rapprochement with the East. 
Further clarification of this point in paragraph six stated that, 
The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member 
states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation a joint declaration in which we 
solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our 
intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state .... 65 
Thus by taking the initiative, NATO under the auspices of the London Summit 
promoted the first official easing of tensions. Not only did they renounce hostility with 
the East, NATO offered an invitation to commence diplomatic contacts. Far from being 
mere political statements, these proposals sprang forth a myriad of new contact forums 
with unprecedented levels of cooperation. Paragraph seven invited the, "Soviet Union 
and representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to come to 
Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council ... [and] establish regular diplomatic 
liaison with NAT0."66 
Along with the long-held politico-military dual approach to security, Atlantic 
Alliance members proposed establishing military contacts to enhance confidence among 
their enemies. Paragraph eight proposed to, "intensify military contacts, including those 
of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European 
capitals."67 With the basic idea of creating a framework for political and military 
cooperation, the London Declaration held to the Harmel Report and the Washington 
Treaty by advocating arms reductions and for restructuring but not at the expense of 
Alliance security. 
The authors wrote that, "to reduce our military requirements, sound arms 
control agreements are essential." However, in keeping within the confines of this 
statement, they also reflected an objective to, "conclude the negotiations on the follow-
on to CFE and CSBMs [confidence and security building measures] as soon as 
possible .... "68 By acknowledging an altered security environment, NATO advocated 
altering the force structure, readiness requirements a proposal for a new strategic 
concept. The proposal called for NATO to, "field smaller and restructured active 
6SNATO Transformed: The London Declaration, paragraph 6. 
66NATO Transformed: The London Declaration, paragraph 7. 
67NATO Transformed: The London Declaration, paragraph 8. 
68NATO Transformed: The London Declaration, paragraphs 12 and 13. 
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forces." Moreover, 'These forces will be highly mobile and versatile ... NATO will scale 
back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of 
exercises. "69 
The main tenets reaffirm political and military functions as the basis for Alliance 
security provided for under the 1949 Treaty's Article 2. The question raised is whether 
or not NATO has met the original goals of the Washington Treaty in the post-1989 
world. Though the inability to stop the war in the former Yugoslavia is constantly 
raised as a failure of NATO, one could make the point that for the time being, NATO 
has at least kept the conflict contained and prevented it from spreading to other NATO 
countries. In any case, the post-1989 declarations that recognized an end to, "a legacy of 
hostility with the Warsaw Treaty Organisation," have substantially altered the military 
forces structure and strategic policies to combat future Yugoslav-type crises. 
The failure to end the war in Bosnia seems to be more of a result of prostrate 
western and Russian leadership to agree on a common course of action, then on any of 
NATO's systemic shortcomings. NATO's improved capability to provide flexible and 
mobile forces to meet more diverse threats is indicative of the Alliance's success in 
adapting to the changed security environment. The effort to more closely cooperate on 
different levels has no doubt led to the on-going success of CEE countries in the 
transformation of their societies. Juxtaposed against the ambitious declarations of the 
1990 Summit, the tangible accomplishments of these statements are illustrated by 
examples of the altered policy. 
During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the Atlantic Alliance - supported by more 
flexible forces to adapt to threats other than a massive Soviet land invasions -- upheld 
the premise of Article 5 by responding to Turkish requests for capabilities to deter an 
Iraqi invasion. NATO's Secretary General Womer remarked that during the Gulf War, 
Alliance response to Turkish requests for allied assistance was to send "an air 
component of the ACE [Allied Command Europe] Mobile Force to Turkey."70 William 
Taft N supported Womer's claim, writing that, 
In December, Iraq made statements threatening Turkey. The response of 
the Alliance was to deploy to Turkey the air component of the Allied 
Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force composed of German, Belgian, 
and Italian aircraft; to deploy additional air defence missiles including 
69NATO Transformed: The London Declaration, paragraphs 14. 
70fdanfred Womer, NATO Review, February 1991, p. 9. 
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Dutch Patriots; and to reaffirm our commitment to our ally. Turkey was 
never attacked by Saddam's forces?1 
The London Summit's conciliatory tone and expectations to lower nuclear 
stockpile no doubt helped the process of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). 
The START agreement signed on 31 July 1991 contributed to the lowest level of nuclear 
weapons since their inception, reduced Soviet and American strategic arms and 
expanded the bilateral military transparency between the two countries?2 Far from 
NATO being a static organization, the Atlantic Alliance has illustrated the courage to 
chart a new course for the evolving security environment. 
D. THE COPENHAGEN DECLARATION JUNE 1991 
In the second step towards a redefinition of NATO's future mission and strategy, 
the Copenhagen Declaration reaffirmed the basic premise of the London Declaration 
with the additional emphasis on ever closer military contacts with CEE states. This 
reiteration became the modus operandi for CEE states to reorganize their military 
operations along NATO lines and create transparent defense establishments. Stephen 
Flanagan explains that the Copenhagen Summit was the first articulation of NATO's 
commitment to develop a security "partnership" with all governments in Europe?3 
Expanding upon the London Declaration of closer diplomatic and military contacts, 
NATO made its first declaratory statement that linked the Alliance's security with that 
of non-NATO states. 
Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in 
Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of 
democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or 
intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us ... ?4 
In effect, the Copenhagen Summit would set the stage for NATO to not only 
protect its own stability and Western institutions, like it had done over the past forty-
71William H. Taft IV, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, NATO Review, June 
1991,p.8. 
72"Military transparency" may be defined as a set of arrangements designed to provide evidence of the 
absence of threatening military activities. It may include data exchanges, inviting observers to military 
exercises, providing notification prior to certain military activities and other "Confidence and Security-
Building Measures (CSBMs)." 
73stephen J. Flanagan, pp. 141-142. In the Spring of 1992, Flanagan was a member of the Planning Staff of 
the U.S. Department of State. 
14Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, issued by the North Atlantic Council, 6-7 
June 1991, paragraph 3. 
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five years, but would now export stability eastward. Military cooperation and 
consultation between NATO and CEE countries was given its biggest boost to date with 
a statement that championed ever-closer military links. It stated that NATO would 
implement, 
Intensified military contacts between senior NATO military authorities 
and their counterparts in the Central and Eastern European states, 
discussions at NATO Headquarters, SHAPE and major NATO 
commands with military officers from those countries on matters of 
mutual concern, and invitations to military officers and civilian 
ff. · 1 75 o tCia s .... 
NATO members used the Copenhagen Summit to emphasize the continuity of 
purpose of the Atlantic Alliance. The authors wrote, 
NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and 
reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and 
security of all its members by political and military means in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common 
values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has 
worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting 
peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged?6 
In addition to reiterating the Alliance's purpose and historical goals, members of 
the Copenhagen Summit reviewed and published a list of tasks that the Alliance should 
strive to attain. In contrast to speculation that the Alliance was slow to act, this list of 
tasks appeared less than two years after the initial collapse of Communism in Central 
and East Europe. In order to fulfill NATO's future security role, the Copenhagen 
authors listed four fundamental security tasks that have since been incorporated into 
later declarations: 
• ''To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security 
environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and 
commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes .... " 
• ''To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a 
transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their 
vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' 
•ty II secun .... 
75 Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, issued by the North Atlantic Council, 6-7 
June 1991, paragraph 9. 
16NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe, issued by the North Atlantic Council, 6-7 June 
1991, paragraph 1, "The Purpose of the Alliance." 
37 
• "To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory 
of any NATO member state." 
• 'To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.''77 
Finally, the Copenhagen Declaration, in a further clarification of the London 
Summit, issued a call for the creation of a "European pillar" within NATO. In keeping 
with the active approach taken by the Alliance after 1989, the ideas of a European 
security identity and a mechanism-- Combined Joint Task Force- to support a separate 
identity came into existence. The genesis of these ideals would be meted out in the 1994 
Brussels Summit. These aspirations formed part of the Minister's Final Communique 
that stated, 
[NATO welcomes] ... efforts further to strengthen the security dimension 
in the process of European integration and recognise the significance of 
the progress made by the countries of the European Community towards 
the goal of political union, including the development of a common 
foreign and security policy ... The development of a European security 
identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European 
pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of 
the Atlantic Alliance?8 
E. THE ROME DECLARATION NOVEMBER 1991 
Coming less than six months after the Copenhagen Summit, the November 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Rome (7-8 November 1991), produced 
one organization to deal with the changes in the East as well as The New Strategic 
Concept. Adding to the basic tenets of the London and Copenhagen Declarations, the 
Rome meeting created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and established the New 
Strategic Concept. The Rome Declaration further reiterated not just London and 
Copenhagen but also the Harmel Report calling for closer military and political contacts 
with the East. It relies upon the relevance of NATO's core functions of political and 
military means to establish the Alliance's prime role with the establishment of The New 
Strategic Concept and the NACC. The major objectives were creating a new security 
architecture, providing a new strategic vision, defining a European security policy and 
defense role, reiterating the role of relations with the Soviet Union and countries of 
71NATO's Core Security Functions in the New Europe, issued by the North Atlantic Council, 6-7 June 
1991, paragraph 6, "The Fundamental Tasks of the Alliance." 
78Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen, Final Communique, 6-7 June 1991, 
paragraph 1. 
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Central and Eastern Europe and supporting the CSCE process. The Alliance reaffirms 
its raison d'etre: protection of Western Europe and North America and its institutions of 
democracy, but it establishes NATO as an exporter of these institutions throughout 
Europe. NATO's Secretary General commented about the Rome Summit that it was the, 
.. .latest in a series of high level meetings that over the past two years 
have guided the Alliance's transformation and redefined its role and 
missions in the new Europe. What is significant about this process of 
transformation is not simply that it has been completed so quickly ... but 
also that such a far-reaching exercise - involving all those political and 
military aspects of the Alliance built up over four decades - has been 
carried out in an exceptional atmosphere of consensus ... ?9 
Recognizing the stable nature of the Atlantic Alliance, the Rome Declaration 
went beyond the traditional role of ensuring tranquillity within NATO and boldly 
stated its intention to act beyond its frontiers in order to project stability. 
Acknowledging that the world had changed dramatically and adding to earlier NATO 
statements, the Rome Declaration stated that it was an agent of change, "a source of 
stability and the indispensable guarantor of its members' security, our Alliance will 
continue to play a key role in building a new, lasting order of peace in Europe .... "SO 
Continued emphasis on enhancing regional cooperation was highlighted by the 
Alliance's willingness to define the new security architecture of Europe. The authors of 
the Rome Declaration used the 1991 summit to promote closer integration with other 
European security institutions but not at the expense of subordinating NATO's 
resources to either the WEU or the CSCE. In describing the "new security architecture" 
the authors stated that NATO is "working toward a new European security architecture 
in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of 
Europe complement each other."81 This statement gave the impetus for the far-reaching 
cooperation of WEU and NATO forces to continue to carry out a naval embargo of the 
former-Yugoslavia. The creation of the New Strategic Concept was introduced as the 
centerpiece of the future model of the Alliance's core function. It reiterates the position 
that the East is no longer a threat to launch a massive military attack. The European 
security identity and defense role reiterated the importance of the Copenhagen meeting 
79Manfred Wtmter, December 1991, p. 3 
SO Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 2. 
81 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 3. 
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whereby a "European pillar" within the Alliance would take shape. Looking back to the 
Harmel Report and the Washington Treaty, NATO in 1991 outlined the key elements of 
the Alliance's Cold War success as being critical to its future existence. It states that, 
Never has the opportunity to achieve our Alliance's objectives by 
political means, in keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington 
Treaty, been greater. Consequently, our security policy can now be 
based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialoGe; cooperation; 
and the maintenance of a collective defence capability. 
The North Atlantic Conference on Cooperation was created in 1991 in the 
aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc in order to offer 
consultation to any of the newly independent states on regional security matters. Its 
initial purpose was designed to integrate former Warsaw Pact countries into the wider 
European discussions covering a broad range of topics. The most notable of these 
subjects were: arms control, defense cooperation, crisis management, peacekeeping, 
continued momentum on the CFE (Conventional Forces of Europe Treaty) and 
consultation and policy coordination with regard to the war in the former-Yugoslavia. 
During its initial inception, NACC looked as if it would become the successor of 
NATO, incorporating all of the former Soviet Union countries with an alliance 
extending "From Vancouver to Vladivostok." However, as geopolitical realities set in, 
and the euphoria of newly democratic states gave way to the ruminations of "shock 
therapy" and the election of ultranationalists, NACC became more of an non-binding 
forum for over 38 Eurasian countries to coordinate mutual policies without specific 
security guarantees. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that NACC is 
becoming "a central element in the grouping web of security ties that bind us together" 
and that it had to "step up its consultations on political and security issues."83 
Another factor that will undoubtedly raise the probability of allowing Poland to 
join NATO is the large amount of Western aid and investment that has flowed into 
these countries. With aid amounting to over 25 billion dollars and investment totaling 
over 4 billion, Western investors are also pressing for security arrangements to protect 
their investments.84 There is a necessity to establish a grand strategy to define NATO's 
82Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 4. 
113 Alfred A. Reisch, 9 July 1993, p. 45. 
84Barry Newman, p. A 1. Newman notes that "90 big foreign companies have invested over $2 billion [in 
the last two years] in Poland without [the assistance] of the EBRD." 
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U.S. commitment to stability in Central and Eastern Europe and enhance their 
peacekeeping and peacemaking. Just because NATO is not thoroughly familiar with 
these roles does not limit its ability to act so in the future. Precisely because Articles 5 
and 6 are well-established, NATO has a legalistic rationale for future expansion. This is 
necessary in order to create a stable political society in Central and Eastern Europe. In 
the post cold-war era, Europe is definitely more dangerous and less stable with the 
possibility of Bosnia spilling over into the rest of Europe. 
In a recent interview with a Swiss army officer, it was revealed that the Bosnian 
crisis has created a wave of illegal activities among refugees of the former-Yugoslav 
Republic throughout Switzerland. He stated that since the war in Bosnia began, there 
has been a dramatic rise in organized crime by nationals of the former Yugoslav 
Republic.BS The future of NACC will be less an instrument of policy making and more 
of an organ where European states and states along the Russian periphery can come 
together and confer on matters of mutual security interests. For the Central and Eastern 
European countries, NACC is one of a few organizations that will assist hopeful new 
members of NATO join in a timely and successful fashion. NACC will continue to be a 
clearinghouse for discussions relating to CFE arms control, crisis management, 
peacekeeping and proposals for peacemaking. 
The future of NACC will be less an instrument of policy making and more of an 
organ where European states and states along the Russian periphery can come together 
and confer on matters of mutual security interests. For the Central and Eastern 
European countries, NACC is one of a few organizations that will assist hopeful new 
members of NATO join in a timely and successful fashion. NACC will continue to be a 
clearinghouse for discussions relating to CFE arms control, crisis management, 
peacekeeping and proposals for peacemaking. Inasmuch as political dialogue would 
increase between NATO and CEE states, there would be no future subordination of 
NATO's collective defense capability. Paragraph five reiterates that: 
The military dimension of our Alliance remains an essential factor .. .its 
· collective arrangements based on an integrated military structure ... and 
for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear 
forces ... [NATO's] military forces will adjust to [its] new tasks, becoming 
sscolonel Hans Wegmiiller, Swiss Army. In an interview conducted 15 February 1994, Colonel Wegmilller 
acknowledged that the Bosnian War has precipitated a rash of criminal activities throughout Europe and 
especially in Switzerland. 
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smaller and more flexible ... Nuclear forces committed to NATO will be 
greatly reduced .... 86 
The achievement of these aggregate goals were highlighted by Douglas Stuart 
who wrote that the meetings between NACC participants and NATO members, 
... helped to maintain the momentum for approval and compliance with 
the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and other arms 
control agreements. They [NACC meetings] have also provided a forum 
for consultation and policy coordination relating to ongoing crises in the 
former Yugoslavia and in portions of the former Soviet Union.87 
To be sure, by 1992, tangible and residual accomplishments had already been 
produced as a result of the earlier declarations. With regards to relations with the Soviet 
Union and Central and Eastern Europe, NATO pledged practical assistance to CEE 
countries because of .the practical notion that NATO's security is based with all others. 
This concept merged the new security architecture with a new strategic vision in order 
to define common ground for a revised European security policy. They completed this 
through the addition of the wording in paragraph nine which stated that NATO, 
... will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them succeed in 
this difficult transition. This is based on our conviction that our own 
security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.88 
This concept of "inseparable linkage" with the East, in conjunction with pledges 
to institutionalize consultative and cooperative mechanisms with CEE states was the 
impetus for the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). NACC's birth certificate 
is thus seen as having been the ideal behind paragraph eleven whereby NATO intends, 
"to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political 
and security issues."89 The invitation to Central and Eastern Europe to attend a 
December 1991 meeting became the initial starting point of the North Atlantic 
86Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 5. 
B7Douglas Stuart, p. 17. The author contends that, "While it is true that some member governments 
[Poland] would have preferred direct membership in NATO to partnership through the NACC, no one who 
monitors these developments can fail to be impressed with the progress that NACC has made in 
institutionalizing pan-European security cooperation in such a brief period of time." 
&8Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 9. 
89 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government at theN orth 
Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 11. 
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Cooperation Council (NACC). According to the Rome Declaration, NACC was 
developed to provide the following activities: 
• Annual meetings with the NAC at the Ministerial level in the NACC; 
• Periodic meetings with the NAC at the Ambassadorial level; 
• Additional meetings with the NAC at the Ministerial-Ambassadorial level. 
It followed then that the establishment of NACC meetings would be comprised 
of NATO subordinate committees to include political, economic and military 
committees. Jeffrey Simon notes that, 
On balance NATO has been responsive in a short time; but is it enough? 
The CEE states believe that more than meetings are needed to secure 
European peace. Because NACC expanded to 36 members rapidly, it is 
in danger of being 'neutralized' as a security institution. 90 
Under the auspices of NACC and the establishment of political, economic and 
military committees, consultations and cooperation between former adversaries would 
be greatly enhanced. According to paragraph twelve, 
[NATO's] ... consultations and cooperation will focus on security and 
related issues where Allies can offer their experience and expertise, such 
as defence planning, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, 
civil/military coordination of air traffic management, and the conversion 
of defence production to civilian purposes.91 
Within this context, NACC has been used as a consultative forum bringing 
members of NATO and CEE states together to discuss a wide range of issues. Namely 
the Council has been instrumental in disseminating information on a variety of security 
matters that include limiting nuclear weapons stockpiles, Nuclear-Non Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) matters, CFE provisions, CSCE matters and topics related to START 
negotiations. While the Alliance continues to reduce manpower and conventional 
weapons levels, there remains an emphasis on flexibility and mobility to meet an altered 
yet still lethal threat. The threat may be as obvious as a Soviet land invasion or as 
diffuse as the "threat of uncertainty." Nevertheless, politically and diplomatically, the 
Alliance articulated a forum whereby CEE states could come together to be integrated to 
NATO institutions in the form of NACC. NACC and the Strategic Concept are the 
descendants of the Harmel Report and the Washington Treaty. As Gebhardt von 
90Jeffrey Simon, Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1994, p. 39. 
91 Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government at theN orth 
Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 12. 
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Moltke points out however, the NACC is not intended to supplant or duplicate the 
CSCE or distract the Alliance from its primary tasks. He writes that the NACC, 
... was established on the principle that it would be a complement to the 
CSCE and not a substitute for it. Although there are common elements in 
the objectives of the two institutions in relation to security and 
admittedly a certain degree of overlap in their activities, NACC's primary 
role was to assist the post-Communist reform process in the area of 
defence and military matters and to address the specific security issues 
resulting from the previous four decades of Cold War rivalry.92 
Manfred Womer enumerates a number of activities that came about through the 
implementation of the NACC. These programs will enhance the cooperation between 
CEE states and the West and expedite their integration into Western institutions. 
Specifically they are: 
• Defence production conversion; 
• Air traffic management; 
• Peacekeeping planning and development of exercises; 
• Defense procurement management; 
• Civil emergency planning; 
• Cooperation to "Westernize" Civil/Military relations; 
• Cooperation on scientific matters; 
• Information exchanges.93 
Additionally, as a forum for consultation and European cooperation, Womer 
gives credit to NACC for functioning as a conduit to help resolve of numerous security 
problems. Specifically, he lists the following conflicts discussed in the NACC since its 
inception: 
• The question of the Russian troops' withdrawal from the Baltics; 
• The Armenia-Azerbaijan (Nagomo-Karabakh) dispute; 
• The implications of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.94 
The "Contact Group" made up of Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany and the 
United States recently met in Brussels, in December 1994 at the ministerial level to try 
mediate an end to hostilities in Bosnia. By introducing NACC and the New Strategic 
92Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, p. 11. 
93Manfred Worner, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO's Sixteen Nations, 
No. 2/94, p. 6. 
94Manfred Worner, NATO's Sixteen Nations, No. 2/94, p. 6. 
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Concept as mechanisms to cope with an altered security environment, NATO not only 
dealt with the realities, it provided a means to offer new successes. The Rome 
Declaration acknowledged the primary purposes of NATO yet devised means to cope 
with ever-changing conditions. The declaration stated that, 
The North Atlantic Alliance was founded with two purposes: the defence 
of the territory of its members, and the safeguarding and promotion of 
the values they share. In a still uncertain world, the need for defence 
remains. But in a world where the values which we uphold are shared 
ever more widely, we gladly seize the opportunity to adapt our defences 
accordingly; to cooperate and consult with our new partners; to help 
consolidate a now undivided continent of Europe .... 95 
Moreover, John Kriendler, a senior NATO official, offers other contributions that 
the Alliance has offered as part of its restructuring of post-Rome declarations. 
Specifically, in implementing the naval blockade in the territorial waters off the former-
Yugoslavia, by mid-June NATO ships had challenged over 12,000 ships, stopped 803 
vessels, diverted and inspected 176, and detected nine violators. Additionally, air assets 
including AWACS and NATO fighter aircraft have enforced a no-fly zone over 
Bosnia.96 The Rome Declaration, in proving its willingness to encourage cooperation 
and consultation with its "new partners," created a new security architecture, a new 
strategic vision with a European security policy and defense role by incorporating CEE 
states in the process without excluding other worthwhile institutions (CSCE and WEU). 
Diplomatic liaison -- initially begun under the London Summit and later encouraged by 
the Copenhagen and Rome Summits - has led to high-level exchanges between NATO 
and CEE countries that has fostered closer relations. 
F. THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT NOVEMBER 1991 
The Strategic Concept, borne out of the declarations of the Rome Summit, made 
the possibility of conducting "out-of-area" operations more likely. By de-emphasizing 
massive mobilization forces to counter a Soviet threat, the New Strategic Concept gave 
rise to the idea of using smaller forces to combat an expected increase in the number of 
smaller, more-elusive threats. Specifically, NATO's changing mission is to meet the 
same goal of stabilizing Europe while simultaneously accomplishing the following 
objectives under the aegis of the Strategic Concept. 
95Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government at the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 20. 
96John Kriendler, NATO Review, June 1993, p. 19. 
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NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, and 
reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and 
security of all its members by political and military means in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common 
values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has 
worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting 
peaceful order in Europe .... 97 
The New Strategic Concept called for ending the hostile relationship between 
NATO and the East as well as changing from bulky Cold War era forces to highly 
mobile and flexible units. This New Strategic Concept has been the foundation upon 
which Central and East European states have tailored their own forces to facilitate 
integration into the Atlantic Alliance. The New Strategic Concept, designed by and for 
NATO members, reflects a more diffuse threat coupled with fewer Western military 
resources. It can be characterized by the following excerpts: 
• "All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled 
the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West...." 
• "Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression 
against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences 
of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political 
difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are 
faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe .... " 
• "The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the territorial integrity 
and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to 
peace and stability in Europe." 
• "To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an effective 
role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any ally, 
they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured 
capability for augmentation when necessary ...... 98 
Michael Mihalk.a writes that, 'The French also had a plan that competed with the 
partnership proposal." In the French proposition, "They had proposed a security 
conference on minority problems, which was meant to meet European concerns about 
91Jhe Alliance's New Strategic Concept, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic 
Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph, 16. 
98The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic 
Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraphs 2, 10,36 & 47. 
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stability and security in the East."99 In 1993, French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur 
proposed an initiative that would accelerate Western integration of CEE states by first 
addressing and resolving ethnic and national disputes that could erupt in a crisis similar 
to that in the former-Yugoslavia. The particular elements of the Stability Pact as 
outlined by Balladur include: 
• "Diplomatic measures to prevent ethnic and national conflict; 
• Each European nation signing bilateral and limited multilateral accords to 
resolve problems; 
• The Pact would be the centerpiece of the European Union's diplomatic efforts 
to integrate Central and Eastern European countries in western 
institutions.100 
In 1993, the President of the European Community (now the European Union), 
stated the purpose of the French proposal as viewed by the entire European Community 
as, 
... another exercise in preventive diplomacy and joint action under the 
common foreign and security policy. It has the virtue of concentrating on 
minorities and borders but does not ignore the fact that the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe have no real security guarantees at 
present.101 
The pact has been embraced by the European Union and NATO. The EC now 
the EU adopted the charter in 1994 as part of an overall strategy aimed at diffusing 
ethnic and national tensions and also as a means of differentiating the so-called civilized 
West from the anarchic East. Most CEE countries opined a less-than flattering 
perspective of the document, claiming that it patronized the eastern countries, ignored 
similar problems in Western Europe and was a sublime attempt to keep the East divided 
and segregated from the West. The importance of mentioning the Balladur Stability 
Pact within the wider discussion of NATO expansion East concerns France's self-
assigned role as a leader in EU diplomacy. 
Inasmuch as the French would like to deal with CEE issues using French 
proposals like the Stability Pact, they would prefer their fellow Europeans not to 
~cbael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 6. 
IO<Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, pp. 6-7. Mibalka cites a speech by Prime Minister Balladur made in 
December 1993 explaining the utility of the Stability Pact in Eastern integration. 
101Speech of President Delors at ITSS Conference, Questions Concerning European Security, Brussels, 10 
September 1993, p. 9. 
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endorse purely American initiatives. As evidence of France's attachment to the Stability 
Pact as a means of promoting French initiatives and quelling ethno-national disputes, 
the NATO Brussels Declaration included a reference to the Pact's utility. According to 
the January 1994 Declaration: "As part of our overall effort to promote preventive 
diplomacy, we welcome the European Union proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe, 
and will contribute to its elaboration .... "102 
Generally, "Atlanticists" favor integrating the East through the use of the NACC 
mechanism resulting in closer cooperation and consultation on politico-military matters. 
The French and other "Eurasianists" keep CEE countries at arm's length until they can 
peacefully resolve a myriad of ethno-national disputes, which EU countries fear could 
involve the West. Furthermore, although "All the countries that were formerly 
adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological 
hostility to the West," the members still realized the passing of one threat did not negate 
future risks. The Strategic Concept states that, "In contrast with the predominant threat 
of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multifaceted in nature and multi-
directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess."103 In perhaps the most 
implicit recognition of the existence of an Eastern risk, paragraph 14 reads, 
Even in a non-adversarial and co-operative relationship, Soviet military 
capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still 
constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take 
account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe.104 
I02Declaration oft'M Heads of State and Government, participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 11. 
103The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph, 9. 
104The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph, 14. 
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Acknowledging the changed threat and the new possibilities NATO stated that, 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. 
The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the 
security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring 
validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment 
offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a 
broad approach to security .1 05 
Finally, in an effort to further reform the forces into more flexible and mobile 
units, the Rome authors set out to specifically advocate such a future policy. 
NATO's strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect further developments 
in the politico-military environment, including progress in the moves 
towards a European security identity, and in any changes in the risks to 
Alliance security.106 
Klaus Kinkel concluded that the early 1990's had produced a number of 
quantitative results as a consequence of NATO's forward-looking summits. He 
remarked in October 1992 that, "A review of the last two years will show what has been 
achieved" as a result of the London, Copenhagen and Rome Summits: 
• ''The Paris Charter for a New Europe, signed at the CSCE Summit in 
November 1990, points the way towards cooperative security structures ... 
• START has been supplemented by an agreement [to reduce] nuclear short-
range systems ... 
• Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) ... came into force."107 
Secretary General Womer furthered Kinkel's claim when he commented in 
December 1992 that NATO has, 
... achieved a drastic reduction in nuclear stockpiles; the adoption of a 
new strategy, command structure and force structure, the formulation of 
a new concept of multinational forces; new types of crisis management 
exercises, and now participation in peacekeeping) OS 
lOS The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph, 15. 
106The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph, 60. 
l07Dr. Klaus Kinkel, German Foreign Minister, p. 4. 
108Manfred WOr'ner, December 1992, p. 3. W5rner notes that despite the perception that the Alliance had 
failed to change with the times, NATO has taken on several new roles and missions to meet the new, diverse 
threats. First, "as an instrument of crisis management in the context of the new international order." 
Second, "as the cornerstone of a security community encompassing both East and West." Third, "as an 
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The New Strategic Concept along with the declarations since June 1990 have 
placed NATO in the position where it has offered to support United Nations missions 
and CSCE operations to protect humanitarian relief efforts through the use of heavy 
weapons, close air support and the monitoring of airspace with NATO Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. Michael RUhle adds that, 
NATO's enforcement with the Western European Union (WEU) of the 
UN maritime embargo against Serbia and Montenegro and NATO's 
enforcement of the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia have shown that NATO's 
capability to orchestrate complex multinational military operations is 
unique and can serve a wider purpose than only defending member 
nations' territories. Moreover, NATO's air-strike decisions of 1993 and 
1994 indicate that the Alliance can react to threats other than a direct 
attack by an enemy.109 
As further evidence of the Rome Summit's effectiveness in carrying out the 
concepts first described in the London and Copenhagen Declarations, the Commandant 
of the NATO Defense College listed several initiatives begun since 1991. These include 
the following outreach activities begun by NATO's Defense College since 1991 serving 
namely CEE states: 
• Special courses for CSCE members; 
• The international research seminar on Euro-Atlantic as the "primary vehicle 
for closer academic/research relations with the newly emerging 
democracies;" 
• The NATO symposium focusing on the role of military forces in CEE states; 
• The conference of commandants was expanded in April 1992 to include 
commandants of defence colleges in CSCE countries; 
• The NATO Reserve Officers Course (NAROC) familiarizing CEE countries 
with NATO organizations and information for new reserve approaches; 
element of stability in Europe from which the new [market economies and] democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe will also benefit." Fourth, "as an instrument to support the verification and implementation 
of arms control." Fifth "as a possible instrument to organize a credible defense [in order] to protect Europe 
from the dangers of the proliferation of missile technology." 
109Michael RUhle, p. 317. 
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• The General/Flag Officers course to familiarize CEE states with NATO 
organizations, specifically SHAPE and AFCENT; 
• The College's Fellowship programme offering a three-month fellowship to a 
NACC country; 
• The College's Field Studies Programme offering study-familiarization trips in 
NATO countries.110 
G. THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION JANUARY 1994 
The Brussels Summit in 1994 proposed three far-reaching programs: (1) 
Partnership for Peace, (2) European Security Identity, (3) Command Joint Task Force 
(CJTF). Each of these programs was designed to meet the current security realities and 
to prepare the Atlantic Alliance for the challenges of the twenty-first century. These 
included integrating willing CEE states into western institutions, promoting a European 
defense identity to guarantee "European" mechanisms to deal with European problems 
and creating a combined joint task force (CJTF) to supplement this process. 
Though it is difficult to assess the quantitative results of each of these three 
programs because of their contemporaneous nature, they add a significant contribution 
in conjunction with the New Strategic Concept, as main conduits of NATO's future 
course. While admitting the general will of CEE states to join NATO, the Atlantic 
Alliance members stopped short of immediate expansion for fear that it might 
destabilize the European security realm. Inasmuch as the Brussels Summit maintained a 
cautious course regarding the immediate expansion of NATO, the three initiatives put 
forward represent another clear indication of NATO's transformation of the strategic 
goals while adhering to the original Alliance's goals. 
1. The Partnership for Peace Initiative 
The Partnership for Peace initiative has its origins in what some have cynically 
deemed 'The Era of Talbottism."111 President Clinton's January visit to European 
capitals included numerous speeches enumerating the benefits of the Partnership For 
Peace initiative. In his initial Brussels speech, Clinton said, 
uor.t. General Richard J. Evraire, Commandant, NATO Defense College, pp. 16-17. 
lllThe "Era ofTalbottism" refers to a period early in President Clinton's administration (approximately the 
frrst two years) in which Strobe Talbott's "Russia First" policy had the support of most top administration 
officials. Some of the administration's most out-spoken critics referred to this policy as appeasing Russia 
and precipitating "Yalta II," vis-a-vis the other Central and Eastern European states. 
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This partnership will advance a process of evolution for NATO's formal 
enlargement. It looks to the day when NATO will take on new members 
who assume the Alliance's full responsibilities. It will create a framework 
in which former communist states and others not now members of 
NATO can participate with NATO members in joint military planning, 
training, exercises and other efforts.112 
The main tenets of Partnership for Peace are the promotion of regional 
infrastructure projects and economic cooperation, stimulation of foreign private 
investment and consolidation of democracy throughout the region.113 Other aspects of 
the initiative include: crisis management, peacekeeping, search-and-rescue and disaster 
relief. Though most non-NATO members have signed on to this program that promises 
no security guarantees or premises of mutual defense, each signatory has had its own 
agenda for accepting the vague terms. Henry Kissinger noted in regard to these 
budding Central European democracies, 
Refused a security guarantee and offered the placebo of nebulous joint 
missions, which have not been defined and do not respond to their 
concerns, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary must have noted the 
absence of any distinction between Russia, the cause of their anxiety, and 
themselves, the historical victims of Russian aggression.114 
For the Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia) the Partnership for Peace initiative, like NACC, is just another 
instrument that is being used to increase the likelihood of being accepted into NATO. 
For Russia, their participation is designed namely to be party to any security institution 
that their neighbors to the West are involved in, lest they be left isolated in Eurasia. For 
Eastern Europe, Partnership For Peace is akin to applying a bandage where major 
surgery is required. The Partnership For Peace plan has been considered a "half-
measure" designed to placate President Yeltsin and other conservative Russian leaders. 
Though not initially supported by Secretary State Christopher, Partnership For Peace 
112President Clinton's excerpts from his speech "Binding a Broader Europe." President Clinton's 9 January 
1994 speech in Brussels regarding the future direction of the Atlantic Alliance from the American point of 
view. Although this speech was seen as the first step in a long process towards full integration by Central 
and Eastern European countries, the initiative did not contain substantive policies or requirements towards 
this goal. As such, most signatories from former-Warsaw Pact nations saw this proposal as a symbolic 
placation of Russian sensitivities and acquiescence of their broader sphere of influence in the region. 
Lastly, the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians have asserted that because membership in the Partnership is open 
to any country the political and military significance of Partnership for Peace is substantially watered-down. 
IBoavid B. Ottaway, p. A 36. 
114Henry Kissinger. "Not This Partnership," p. A 49. 
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became the official American policy and then NATO's current policy at the behest of 
then Ambassador-at-large to Russia Strobe Talbott. 
Partnership for Peace has been criticized for placating Russian expansionists 
with a "Russia-first-Russia-at-all-costs Policy," selling out worthy NATO prospects and 
diluting the meaning of the initiative to the point that anyone could be a signatory. To 
this end, only nine percent of Russians polled had confidence in the ability of NATO as 
a credible Alliance that included Russia. However, most of the Russian military elite 
would be alarmed if its Western neighbors were admitted and the Russians were 
excluded.115 Polish President Lech Walesa though critical of the vagueness of the 
initiative said, 'We are too weak, and we have to accept almost everything, but we don't 
forecast anything good in this concept." The Polish Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk was 
even more unimpressed by the "Partnership" declaring, "The Partnership lacks 
imagination. It doesn't satisfy our needs."116 
In the future, Central and Eastern European countries desiring membership in 
NATO will have to be satisfied with this initiative as a means of gaining NATO 
membership. Though not pleased with the lack of a firm commitment, these countries 
seem willing to undertake the kinds of reform necessary to make them viable and 
valuable partners in a greater NATO expansion. Most experts agree that any effort by 
the Russians to join the Partnership for Peace initiative would be a calculated attempt by 
Moscow's foreign policy and military leaders to dilute NATO into something similar to 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and thereby causing its 
ruination. 
NATO members have been tom between two difficult positions. Expansion of 
NATO could involve numerous negative repercussions for the Alliance. Conversely, 
exclusion of the CEE countries might cause resentment and result in the collapse of 
democratic and free-market societies. In any case, there are numerous obstacles 
associated with NATO expansion that currently outweigh the justification for CEE 
countries to obtain NATO membership. When he was the Head of the International 
Security Program, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Professor Trevor Taylor 
listed seven reasons why NATO should not expand to Central and Eastern Europe: 
115Erika v.C. Bruce, p. 8. Ms. Bruce's cites polling information from Mr. Mikhail Lechtshinsky, an analyst 
and correspondent with Ostankino Television in Russia. 
116John Pomfret. 
53 
• Extending NATO membership would alarm nationalist forces in Russia; 
• Bringing CEE countries into NATO would disrupt the Alliance's doctrine, 
force structure and deployments; 
• Admitting that NATO members lack the resources to extend defense 
coi111TUtments eastward; 
• Putting membership expansion on NATO's agenda could prove very 
disruptive for members; 
• Realizing that CEE states might be hard to control because their economic 
and political systems are not firmly established; 
• Giving membership to some countries under certain criteria might lead 
other CEE states to expect the same criteria to apply later; 
• Realizing that there is no need to admit CEE states because no 
overwhelming threat exists.117 
Despite the predominance of these judgments, it was widely agreed that some 
measures had to be taken in order to assure CEE states that the West was serious about 
eventually integrating them into Western institutions and helping them fill the apparent 
security vacuum. Pfr is a mechanism intended to balance both opposing factors. 
Western leaders advocating Pfr expended little or no domestic political capital by 
taking this cautious approach. President Clinton in January 1994 defended the 
American proposal as follows: 
I do not view this as some sort of half-hearted compromise. In substance, 
this is a good idea. It is the right thing to do at this moment in history. It 
leaves open the best possible future for Europe and leaves us the means 
to settle for a future that is not the best but is much better than the 
past.118 
Though it displays a general Western desire to integrate the East, Pfr offers no 
specific guidelines for partners to attain membership. Open to any country belonging to 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), PfP is sometimes 
referred to as an American "gadget" or relabeled as 'The Partnership for 
Procrastination." Pfr is a sign of NATO's unwillingness to grapple with the issue of 
central importance: the presence of a security vacuum as the result of the absence of 
security measures that could plausibly protect Central and Eastern Europe from Russian 
117Jeffrey Simon (ed.), The Challenge of Change, pp. 204-207. Trevor Taylor offers a concise collection 
of the best-known objections for NATO expansion. Though this is not all-inclusive, it serves the purpose of 
delineating a number of problems associated with expansion. 
118President Clinton, 10 January 1994. 
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coercion or aggression. PfP is symbolic of Western reticence to immediately expand 
NATO. Michael Mihalka writes that, "NATO members generally applauded the 
partnership initiative. Many of them had been uneasy about offering membership to 
the East Central European states." Mihalka concluded by quoting the Canadian foreign 
minister who remarked, "A number of countries have some hesitations about expanding 
the membership of NATO at this moment. "119 Mihalka surmises that, 
Among the other major allies, the British and the French, for different 
reasons, adopted a straightforward, realist view of NATO, seeing it 
primarily as a security alliance and opposing its enlargement. The 
Germans, on the other hand, viewed NATO as the kernel of the 
developing European security order and championed the idea of 
granting security guarantees to the East and Central European states.120 
According to one of the chief architects of the plan, former Secretary of Defense 
Les Aspin, the Clinton administration advocates PfP because: 
• PfP "avoids drawing new security lines" in Europe that might prove to be 
destabilizing; 
• PfP "sets up the right incentives." PfP offers partners an alliance based on 
shared values of democracy and free markets; 
• PfP "provides equality of opportunity for all eligible countries," but measures 
progress entirely on the behavior of individual states; 
• PfP puts the question of NATO membership "at the end of the process rather 
than at the beginning."121 
When compared to the initial views of NATO's members to the Atlantic 
Alliance's purpose in the early years one sees a unique continuity to the PfP document. 
Jolyon Howorth, an expert on European security issues, remarked that, 
The UK saw NATO, at least in the early years, as a vehicle for the 
retention of a world role, underpinned by a 'special relationship' with 
Washington. Germany and Italy saw it as a means of holding 
communism at bay pending political and economic reconstruction and 
the emergence of a new international identity as key members of a Euro-
Atlantic community. France regarded the Alliance esseantially [sic] as a 
transitional structure which would eventually be superseded by a 
119Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 4. 
12<Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 5. 
121Les Aspin, pp. 12-13. 
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European defence or security identity, dominated, naturally, by 
Paris ... .122 
For mainly national reasons, PfP is a very popular document. Each NATO 
member can, because of PfP's ambiguity, find something to support its national 
interests. Partnership for Peace is responsible for creating a framework for military, 
economic and political cooperation between NATO and partnership members. The 
recent PfP exercise near Poznan, Poland, in September 1994 is the first of many future 
exercises to be conducted on a bi-lateral and multilateral level between NATO members 
and "partners." Not only does this military cooperation strengthen the process of 
confidence-building measures, it prepares CEE states for eventual multilateral and 
multinational operations. Both of these activities complement NATO's long-held desire 
to protect stability in Western Europe but most recently its attempt to export stability. 
The following objectives were set forth in the framework document for the Partnership 
for Peace: 
• Assistance to produce transparency in national defence planning and 
budgeting processes; 
• Assistance to ensure democratic control of defence forces; 
• Maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute to UN, CSCE 
operations; 
• Development of cooperative military relations with NATO for training, 
exercises, and operations to include peacekeeping, search and rescue, 
humanitarian missions; 
• Development of forces better able to operate with Atlantic Alliance 
members.l23 
As a result of the declarations since 1990, the January 1994 Summit reflected the 
recent years of success acknowledging that because of NATO's attention, "the full and 
timely implementation of existing arms control and disarmament agreements as well as 
to achieving further progress on key issues of arms control and disarmament," have 
been concluded. Specifically, these include: 
• The indefinite-unconditional extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons; 
• The early enforcement of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and new 
measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention; 
I22Jolyon Howorth, p. 3. 
123 Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 3. 
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• The negotiation of a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty; 
• The process of ensuring the integrity of the CFE Treaty and compliance with 
all of its provisions.124 
There can be little doubt that the countries that comprise NATO are still facing 
credible security challenges to their economic and political stability. Governments will 
continue to debate the advisability of Eastern expansion of NATO in the North Atlantic 
Council. Several mechanisms will assist the West in addressing the future of Eastern 
Europe, including the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace and 
the Balladur Stability Pact. Created as a means of encouraging CEE involvement in 
politico-military affairs of NATO, the NACC has been, at the least, useful in the initial 
process of promoting closer contacts with the East. 
As one NATO expert states, ''The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC) has been the most substantial political gesture on NATO's part 
towards the Visegrad group and other former communist states."125 These Visegrad 
countries, though upset by not being offered full membership immediately, have come 
to accept NACC and PfP as vehicles to gain eventual access into NATO. NACC and PfP 
have become the forum for collaboration and consultation between former adversaries 
and NATO, emphasizing closer contacts in the fields of civil-military relations, defense 
policy transparency, defense conversion and peacekeeping.126 
2. The European Identity and Combined Joint Task Forces 
NATO, supporting the idea of a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance - with 
American approval - announced its intention to strengthen the European Defense 
Identity. 
We give our full support to the development of a European Security and 
Defence Identity [that] ... will strengthen the European pillar of the 
Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European 
Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and 
defence.127 [Moreover, NATO supports] strengthening the European 
pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union ... .128 
124Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council held in Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 18. 
125Paul Latawski, p. 40. 
126Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 2. 
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According to a defense journal, the CJTF arrangement is the best possible 
solution in an era of changing military and political security arrangements in Europe. 
The CJTF structure calls "upon the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Supreme 
Allied Commander Atlantic to designate a notional general officer and HQ staff that 
could be drawn out of the NATO integrated structure."129 The Combined Joint Task 
Force (CJTF) provides the, 
... flexibility that would be required to allow NATO and non-NATO 
forces to act together in peacekeeping and other contingency operations. 
Using a 'building block' approach, command elements could be detached 
from major NATO commands for operations under NATO or, where 
NATO decides not to become involved, under WEU auspices.130 
[NATO endorses] the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means 
to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with 
participating nations outside the Alliance.131 
Lastly, under the plan European (NATO) countries could use NATO assets like 
intelligence resources and radar reports while North American units would be 
excluded, pending political decisions, from entering a European conflict.132 
While the goals of CJTF and PfP are explicit and can be seen as hedging 
against possible future problems in the East, their implementation might 
have immediate, unwitting, and unwanted regional implications. PfP 
could undermine CEE sub-regional cooperation by turning local actors 
into competitors; it could also erode domestic support for the region's 
democratic reformers, fragile civil-military relations, and sub-regional 
security perceptions and expectations.133 
127 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council held in Brussels, I 0-11 January 1994, paragraph 4. 
I 28Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council held in Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 5. 
129Barbara Starr, p. 32. Starr interviewed Lt. Gen. Daniel Christman, U.S. representative to the NATO 
Military Committee. General Christman believes that, "Part of the concept is that CJ1Fs could be activated 
for operations either under the control of NATO or the WEU. A key reason for the formation of the CJ1F 
plan was that NATO political authorities wanted to ensure that if the USA and Canada opt out of an 
operation, there would still be a mechanism to ensure a viable European-run security operation." 
I3D:Manfred Worner, NATO Review, February 1994, p. 4. 
l31Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council held in Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, paragraph 9. 
132Steven Greenhouse, 16 January 1994, p. A 5. 
133Jeffrey Simon, Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1994, p. 40. 
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The point of detailing the evolving mission of NATO over forty years is that the 
Alliance has successfully expanded its membership and changed its historic mission 
roles in order to adequately respond to the changing international scene. This is 
characteristic of the transformation that alliance theory assumes when great powers 
evolve and change to meet different requirements in order to preserve their rank. For 
NATO to debate the issue of expansion, there is a necessity to detail the existence of an 
Eastern risk to warrant such a future enlargement. For NATO to retain its historic 
mission and provide a raison d'etre into the twenty-first century, it must take on new 
members and new missions while simultaneously identifying current and future 
threats. To be sure, the current dilemma remains, "Can Russia in 1994 still be 
considered a threat?" For several reasons, Russia must still be considered a threat to 
NATO and more directly Central and Eastern Europe (particularly Poland) and NATO 




IV. ALLIANCE MEMBER'S VIEWPOINTS ON NATO'S FUTURE 
No doubt because of their proximity to Central and Eastern Europe, Germany 
and its leaders have been the most outspoken proponents of an enlarged NATO. 
Foremost among these are the German Defense Minister Volker Riihe, who recently 
stated that, "If we don't export stability, we are going to wind up importing 
instability."134 These other varied extracts are indicative of the Atlantic Alliance's 
peculiar members and the uncertain future of NATO as it grapples with the issue of 
Eastern expansion: 
The United States wants influence with the minimum commitment, while 
most Europeans prefer American resources accompanied by a light 
political touch. It is still hard to work out quite what France wants. 
Perhaps, in the post-Mitterrand era, Paris might move to reconcile the 
contradiction inherent in its adhesion to the North Atlantic Treaty ... .135 
In prosperous years, it [Germany] is the first up; in lean years, the last 
down (and not all that much down). Italy is too tired, skeptical, unruly, 
and confused to count. Victorious Great Britain has seen its arrogant 
pride fade away along with its wealth, power, and prestige. France, of 
course, firmly and loudly proclaims itself Number One, but too firmly 
and too loudly at times.136 Among the other major allies, the British and 
the French, for different reasons, adopted a straightforward, realist view 
of NATO, seeing it primarily as a security alliance and opposing its 
enlargement. The Germans, on the other hand, viewed NATO as the 
kernel of the developing European security order and championed the 
idea of granting security guarantees to the East and Central European 
states.137 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the destruction of the Warsaw Pact and the 
Soviet Union, new European security implications surfaced immediately. In 1991, when 
the Warsaw Pact collapsed there was serious debate whether NATO should still exist. 
The abortive August 1991 coup in Moscow, coming in the wake of armed conflict in 
Yugoslavia, greatly alarmed both western Europe as well as Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Poland. These events in the east not only justified NATO's future existence, they 
prompted Central European calls for closer political and military links with NAT0.138 
134Stephen Kinzer, p. A 6. 
13SThe Independent, 22 August 1994, p. 13. 
136t_uigi Barzini, p. 69. 
137Micbael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 5. 
138Alfred A. Reisch, 9 July 1993, p. 38. 
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Desiring not to be locked inside another security vacuum, these same Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) states began to lobby for membership in NATO. In effect, these 
CEE countries were looking to NATO for security guarantees to ensure the future 
existence of budding democracies and free markets against a revitalized Russian threat. 
The mechanism allowing future members into NATO requires a unanimous vote 
from each of the 16 participants. Furthermore, each of these 16 countries must submit 
the proposal for expanded membership before a legislative body for ratification. 
Therefore one Alliance member, no matter how influential, could not permit expansion 
unilaterally. If NATO expansion occurs in the future, it must first be agreed upon by 
the most influential members to even discuss the matter. Therefore, it is essential to 
gauge the opinion of the Alliance's main protagonists in order to fully understand the 
issue of expansion. If NATO does expand, it will occur under the auspices of Article 10 
of the Washington Treaty that stipulates a unanimous consent of members. Although in 
principle each country in the Alliance has an equal voice in the North Atlantic Council, 
some voices are more equal than others and thus deserve special attention in this thesis. 
The countries to be analyzed include the United States, Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, Italy and the Southern tier states. 
While the CEE states clamor for NATO's Article 5 protection and for Desert 
Storm-type weapons, many in the Alliance hold that there is no credible eastern military 
threat to warrant such security guarantees. Instead of an immediate or plausible threat, 
diffuse risks threaten some members more directly than others. The renationalization of 
threat perceptions has lowered Alliance cohesion as countries take a national view of 
their security interests. In other words, expert observers in NATO see domestic 
concerns and the specific national security concerns as tantamount to an overall threat 
to the Alliance's political cohesion. This has been the result of losing a credible threat 
that could have destroyed them all. 
As NATO emerges from the first five years of restructuring, its purpose and 
force structure continue to be influenced by the national characteristics of its members, 
including each country's historical experience, geo-strategic location in North America 
and Europe, and political traditions, as well as domestic concerns. These national traits 
influence policies regarding the two issues of expansion and Partnership for Peace (PfP). 
During the Cold War, NATO's members set national problems aside, to a noteworthy 
extent, for the greater good of Alliance cohesion in the face of the Soviet threat. Since 
the perception that an overwhelming threat of a land attack by Russia does not exist, 
leaders in each of the major Western countries have felt it necessary to define security 
interests not with regard to· Alliance cohesion but rather with regard to what directly 
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threatens national interests. In light of a survey of the majority of Alliance members' 
views and given the lack of what Western Europeans view as a credible, looming threat, 
it appears that NATO expansion will be a very slow process. 
More than ever, the opinions regarding expansion and PfP of the various 
Atlantic leaders will reflect the national interests and historical experiences of each state 
as well as the current political and social environment of the day. Western European 
governments, relatively weak in recent years owing in part to an economic recession, 
see no sense in wasting political capital by trying to convince voters that an Eastern 
threat is credible enough to warrant security commitments to buoy former communist 
countries. However, as the economy improves and national interests coincide with an 
effort to expand NATO, countries may be expected to view Partnership for Peace and 
NATO expansion in a more favorable light. 
The Central and European (CEE) countries, particularly the Visegrad Four 
(Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) can cite numerous examples of 
threats from the East. They could also easily prove that a security vacuum not only 
exists in Central and East Europe but is detrimental to overall European security and 
especially to their fragile democratic and market economies. The most important battle 
CEE states face is proving a necessity for union that will convince NATO and non-
NATO Europeans to accept new commitments at a time when Western Europe's and 
North America's leaders are consumed with domestic political concerns. As Machiavelli 
observed, 
... indecisive republics never choose beneficial policies except through 
force, for when there is doubt their weakness never allows them to arrive 
at a decision; and if that doubt is not removed by some form of violence 
which drives them on, they remain forever suspended in a state of 
indecision.139 
Therefore, there is a necessity to analyze opinion among NATO member states 
regarding Eastern expansion from the standpoint of national characteristics including: 
political personalities, domestic political matters, the historical experience, gee-strategic 
location, national threat perceptions and idiosyncratic national qualities. The study 
examines the extent to which historical legacies combine with geo-strategic location ai)d 
national interests and how these factors have worked in conjunction with important 
NATO declarations to give a uniquely national characteristic to each member's outlook 
13~iccolo di Bernado Machiavelli, The Portable Machiavelli: The Discourses Book I, chapter XXXVIII, 
pp. 251-252. 
63 
on NATO expansion and the Partnership for Peace. All members of the Atlantic 
Alliance must agree on any changes to the Alliance's membership, roles, missions and 
outlook on European security. 
The core of NATO expansion is the examination of strategic interests and the 
national character of each country. In other words, if a country has no overwhelming 
security concerns, it probably does not have a strong position and looks to the 
Partnership for Peace mechanism as the best possible non-binding, non-committal 
policy. In that sense Partnership for Peace is a politically acceptable document because 
it pledges an ambiguous form of cooperation and integration without committing 
resources or political capital. The connection is between individual NATO member 
opinions regarding expansion and PfP, their interests and national character. 
A. THE UNITED STATES 
During the Bush Administration, NATO took a series of redefining steps 
aimed at responding to the tumultuous events that occurred in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe. As far as NATO expansion to include Poland and the other Visegrad 
states was concerned, the Bush Administration seemed intent on pushing for closer ties 
with the East. However, up until 1992, there was little serious discussion about 
incorporating CEE countries into NATO. All of this began to change, however, with the 
aftermath of the Soviet coup in 1991 and the rise of ultranationalist forces in Russia who 
championed the popular idea of reconstituting the Soviet Empire and reasserting 
Russia's dominance in its historic sphere of influence - Central and Eastern Europe. 
The personality of President Clinton plays a considerable role in the cautious 
American response to NATO expansion. The Clinton Administration, as seen by other 
Alliance members, has displayed less interest in maintaining a U.S. presence in Europe 
than previous administrations. Stanley Sloan points to several incidents that have led 
many in Europe to question the reliability of the Americans. As examples of the United 
States, 'Tilting away from Europe" he lists: 
• "President Clinton's renewed recriminations aimed at France and the UK" for 
opposing his proposal to lift the arms embargo in Bosnia and conduct air 
strikes on Serbian targets; 
• "Secretary of State Christopher's assertion that Western Europe is no longer 
the dominant area of the world' and that Washington had been too 
'Eurocentric' for too long;" 
• The November 1993 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit 
where unnamed "senior Administration diplomats and trade officials" 
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implied that APEC relations "were becoming more important than those 
with Europe."140 
The Economist went farther, condemning the Clinton Administration for sending 
''bad signals" to Europe over the last two years: 
For sending a series of shivers down Europe's spine, Bill Clinton's 
administration has only itself to blame ... Too often officials with their 
minds elsewhere (usually on domestic policy) seemed careless of old 
friends ... Mr. Clinton has allowed relations with Western Europe to suffer 
badly; less by design than through a combination of naivete and 
neglect.141 
Critics of the Clinton Administration are most vociferous when the President 
claims not to have an influential voice in the future of NATO. Clinton raised their ire 
when he stated that, "I think [the Poles] have virtually assured that they are at the front 
of the line as NATO will be expanded ... We just have to get together and work out the 
details." Clinton went on to say that, "It's not for me as the American president to say 
what the details should be."142 The election of President Clinton has produced the first 
traceable signs of an American retrenchment from Europe. To be sure, the NATO 
infrastructure fund was cut by Congress while President Bush was still in office and 
troop levels set at 100,000 were negotiated well before Clinton took office. 
However, there has occurred a perceptible shift in American administration 
attitudes away from Europe and towards other regions. The domestic political situation 
(billions of dollars of federal debt and government downsizing) in the United States 
makes it nearly impossible to advocate additional resources to integrate and improve 
militaries of Central and Eastern Europe. The President appears to have surrounded 
himself with advisors who have as a primary objective maintaining cordial relations 
with Russia. No one can argue that the American view on NATO expansion is nearly 
mute in comparison to pre-1989 presidential initiatives. The trend is seen as an effort 
not to engage in Europe but rather to turn attention westward. Henry Kissinger 
recently wrote that, 
Part of the reason for the decline of what was once the most vital 
American policy is that NATO has come to be taken for granted as part of 
a landscape that needs no further tending ... [T]he generation of American 
J40stanley Sloan, pp. 27-28. 
141The Economist, 12 March 1994, pp. 21-24. 
142President Clinton, 12 July 1994. 
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--------- --------------------------------" 
leaders whlch has reached prominence in the last decade and a half has 
been drawn mostly from the South and the West, where there are fewer 
emotional and personal ties to Europe ... American liberals ... have 
frequently felt let down by democratic allies whlch practice a policy of 
national interest rather than of collective security and reliance on 
intemationallaw ... .J43 
The idiosyncrasies of the American character (sometimes isolationist, 
sometimes interventionist) combined with a hlstorical experience that make it less-than-
enthusiastic in European affairs. Luigi Barzini asks, 
Is the United States a fundamentally interventionist or a determinedly 
isolationist country? ... [T]he United States can be both things, isolationist 
and interventionist, but one never knows whlch it will be and 
when.144 ... At times the United States (as seen by foreign observers, 
anyway) still behaves as the small, peace-loving, homespun, philosophlc 
Republic it used to be, whlch could afford to propose or proclaim any 
desirable, noble, or crackpot idea -- the Open Door policy or the Kellogg-
Briand Pact outlawing war - because nobody would take it very 
seriously and nothing much happened ... .J45 
The national experience of the United States as a liberal democracy with 
competing strains of isolationism and interventionism over the past century illustrates 
the current American dilemma in Europe. Particularly as a result of an emerging liberal 
strain of thinking that developed during the Vietnam War, American policy makers of 
thls post-war generation deprecate the use of force and the implementation of Realpolitik 
and instead emphasize economic harmonization as a comprehensive means to global 
peace. President Clinton's national security advisor, Anthony Lake, recently reiterated 
this view in the op-ed section of The New York Times. He wrote, 
Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, and 
they make for reliable trading partners. They tend not to abuse their 
citizens' rights or wage war on one another. The Administration has 
made a good start at building security and economic institutions 
designed to create the conditions in which democracy can flourish.146 
The security institutions founded in the Cold War era, however, still serve a vital 
function but do not fit into the scheme of the Clinton administration's liberal conscience. 
143Henry Kissinger, p. 819. 
144Luigi Barzini, pp. 241-242. 
145Luigi Barzini. pp. 252-253. 
146Anthony Lake, 23 September 1994, p. A 17. 
66 
For this reason, one sees the current administration turning from military organizations 
like NATO to more global-economic ones like the UN, GATT and APEC. Michael 
Howard, while not directly addressing the current administration, does elaborate on the 
1960's liberal conscience view of President Clinton and his top advisors on eastern 
expansion. "By the 1960s," Howard writes, "many liberals ... were growing uneasy about 
the [international] situation. The vast military establishment with its industrial 
ramifications and its horrific weapons-systems; the dubious allies shored up by arms 
and dollars .... "147 
The gee-strategic location of the United States makes it more inclined to look 
farther west (Asia) and towards North and Central America. This geo-strategic location 
of the United States has much to do with the current westward orientation of the current 
American administration. Rather than engage in nineteenth century debates over 
balance of power, Realpolitik and M.achtpolitik, to the detriment of Russian-American 
relations, the U.S. is decidedly more enthused about fostering greater economic ties to 
Asia, which in tum promotes greater American prosperity. The geo-strategic location of 
the United States in the 1990's does not facilitate, according to the Clinton 
Administration, American engagement in Europe the way it did during the Cold War. 
Asia with its booming economies is more apt to get American attention. Therefore, no 
bold American initiatives toward Europe should be expected until at least 1997. There 
no longer is a pressing need to relive the historical experiences of World War I, World 
War II and the Cold War when it is thought that global economic harmonization is more 
beneficial to maintaining peace. 
Thus, U.S. threat perceptions have changed, with an emphasis less on balance of 
power and maintenance of an American military presence in Europe and more on 
enforcing human rights in the Western Hemisphere. All of these elements have 
combined to make the United States an ambivalent Atlantic partner. One manifestation 
of this reluctance to get involved in European affairs is the PfP. Furthermore, notions of 
collective security are replacing the strength of the alliance because of the liberal notion 
that alliances presume confrontation. Henry Kissinger writes, 
The American objection to NATO membership for the Visigrad countries 
is one of principle. Going back to Wilson's historical objection to 
alliances -because they were based on the expectation of confrontation -
President Clinton has used the occasion of a NATO summit in January 
147Michael Howard, p. 129-130. Howard writes about the new "Concert of Europe" that then-Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger attempted to resurrect as a means of balancing the Atlantic Alliance, "American 
liberals watched this process with a kind of stunned bewilderment. .. " 
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1994 ... President Clinton put forward a scheme which he called the 
Partnership for Peace. It invites all the successor states of the Soviet 
Union and all of Moscow's former East European satellites to join what 
amounts to a vague system of collective security.l48 
Strobe Talbott and Peter Tarnoff see a quick expansion of the Atlantic Alliance as 
threatening to Russia, financially expensive to the United States and filled with potential 
political pitfalls, including the incorporation of Yugoslavia-like situations. The New York 
Times portrayed Strobe Talbott's role in the formulation of the "Partnership" proposal as 
pivotal. Michael Gordon writes that Secretary of State Christopher was persuaded 
against offering Visegrad countries immediate membership in NATO, 
... after Strobe Talbott, the journalist turned policy maker who was named 
this week as Mr. Christopher's deputy, intervened. On the weekend 
before a critical Cabinet-level meeting in October, Mr. Talbott, who has 
been Ambassador at Large to the former Soviet republics, typed a memo 
on his horne computer arguing against NATO expansion and sent it to 
Mr. Christopher. Within days, Mr. Christopher and Defense Secretary 
Les Aspin were flying to Europe to explain the go-slow approach 
endorsed by Mr. Talbott.149 
Gordon goes on to write that Talbott and Tarnoff led a faction in the Clinton 
administration that strongly opposed expansion. He writes, 
Mr. Talbott, the Administration's foremost booster of Mr. Yeltsin, and 
Peter Tarnoff, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. They 
insisted that letting some Eastern European nations into the alliance 
would undermine the prospects for Russian reform ... Mr. Talbott's 
intellect, bureaucratic skills and long friendship with President Clinton 
made him a formidable force.JSO 
Lastly, in making the case for keeping Central Europeans out of NATO, Talbott 
lobbied hard to show a potential destabilizing effect of such an action. Gordon states, 
In his memo, Mr. Talbott argued that if NATO were opened, some 
Eastern European nations, like Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
would be admitted soon since they have done the furthest to implement 
democratic reforms. But Russia and the Ukraine, where reform efforts 
are less advanced, would be left outside for years. This, he argued, 
would encourage Russian fears that NATO was coiJ\IlUtted to a policy of 
1411Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 824. 
14~cbael R. Gordon, p. A 1. 
15CMicbael R. Gordon, 2 January 1994, p. A 1. 
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containing Russian power and also complicate efforts to persuade 
Ukraine to give up its nuclear arms."151 
PfP has numerous attributes that its proponents proclaim throughout receptive 
European capitals. PfP requires minimal U.S. commitment to eastern Europe while 
simultaneously demonstrating to NATO partners that the U.S. is still engaged in 
proposing security arrangements in the post-Cold War era. PfP is not hostile to Russian 
interests. PfP is ambiguous enough that both partners and NATO members can glean 
any specific meaning to fit their purpose. PfP's invitation to "one-day join NATO" is an 
offer no Central and Eastern European country could tum down, even though it never 
stipulates how a country would achieve NATO membership. PfP is an offer no NATO 
member could refuse, including Germany, lest they create a policy dispute and hasten 
an American withdrawal. PfP gives breathing space to governments of Europe who 
fear immediate alliance enlargement would drain domestic resources. PfP is relatively 
"cost free." For all of these reasons NATO members have warmly embraced it. 
With the election of President Clinton, all foreign policy matters were 
subordinated to his bold domestic agenda. Moreover, the new team of foreign policy 
experts seemed more concerned with dealing primarily with Russia than with NATO 
Europe. This so-called "Russia first policy" was guided by Talbott, the translator of 
Nik.ita Khrushchev's memoirs and a co-editor of Time magazine, who made several 
prognostications and statements regarding to the Soviet Union that seemed to illustrate 
his "Russophile" tendencies and his lack of understanding for NATO's purpose. Robert 
Zoellick, former undersecretary of State and deputy chief of staff at the White House 
during the Bush administration, commented that, 
In his own determined way, Ambassador Talbott is one of [a] few high 
foreign policy officials who has charted a course in his area of interest 
and fought to stick with it. The problem is that there has been no strong 
counterbalancing force making the case for a European policy separate 
from our Russian calculations ... We are now witnessing a policy that 
places our anxieties about threats to a Russian leader ahead of our 
commitment to the alliance and to the democracies of Central and 
Eastern Europe.152 
The Economist also noted Talbott's "romantic fascination with Russia," remarking 
that, "If a cautious adjustment of [Clinton's] hitherto Russo-centric strategy is taking 
place, it falls far short of the wholesale reordering some people want." Moreover, "As 
151Michael R. Gordon, p. A 4. 
15ZRobert B. Zoellick, p. 28. 
69 
communism collapsed he said the Soviet threat had never been as serious as it was 
cracked up to be: 'The doves in the great debate of the past 40 years were right all 
along'."153 Talbott engineered the "Partnership for Peace" initiative, which has further 
endowed the Clinton Administration with the reputation of seeing foreign policy 
matters, especially European matters, as suitable for ''benign neglect." That reputation 
was reinforced when then-deputy director for the State Department Peter Tarnoff, in 
response to Europe's wave of nationalistic wars, declared that the world of the future 
would have many more nations and many more national wars, and it would not be the 
responsibility of the United States to come and settle each dispute. He stated in an off-
the-record talk with reporters at the Overseas Writers Club on 25 May 1993: 
... our economic interests are paramount. The U.S. must 'define the extent 
of its commitment and make a commitment commensurate with those 
realities. This may on occasion fall short of what some Americans would 
like and others would hope for.' [As this applies to future Bosnian-like 
conflicts] 'we simply don't have the leverage, we don't have the 
influence ... to bring to bear the kind of pressure that will produce positive 
resu Its' ... _154 
Though this sentiment does not contradict a widely held view by an isolationist 
American public, the mere utterance of such a future pragmatic approach sent shock 
waves through European capitals as a harbinger of America's waning interest in 
European matters. It is no wonder then that the State Department has claimed 
widespread support from allies for PfP. Stephen Oxman has stated, 
[PfP] ... has the enthusiastic support of all of our allies and has now been 
widely welcomed in the East. But some in this country and abroad have 
objected that the Partnership is a halfway measure which does not go far 
enough to ensure the security of Central and Eastern Europe, and that it 
falls short because it does not offer the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe early NATO membership. I disagree ... ) 55 
The problem with the Partnership for Peace is not so much the concept of a pay-
as-you-go, go-slow-approach. Its weakness is the implication that a disengaged 
America neither accepts its responsibilities as a major international force nor feigns an 
interest. Partnership for Peace was the ideal document for nearly all of the West 
153The Economist, 12 March 1994, p. 36. 
154Heinz A. J. Kern, "The Clinton Doctrine: a New Foreign Policy." The Christian Science Monitor, 18 
June 1993, p. 19. 
lSS Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, Stephen A. Oxman, 1 February 1994. 
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European capitals whose leaders, not universally popular among the voters, could 
embrace a bland document that did not pledge them to quickly accept new members or 
to fund their programs aimed at gaining membership. Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher adamantly supported the initiative when he said, "this new Partnership for 
Peace will in no way erode NATO's core capabilities or undermine, in any respect, its 
responsibilities for the collective security of the NATO countries."156 Earlier, he had 
said, "NATO is not an alliance of convenience, but an alliance of commitment. 
Expanded membership must strengthen, not weaken the ability of the Alliance to 
act."157 The Poles have seen pfp as a gimmick. In a Warsaw newspaper, a Polish writer 
charged that, 
Clinton and Strobe Talbott, the author of Clinton's foreign policy, will not 
propose that Poland be accepted into NATO faster (which the U.S. Senate 
wants). The U.S. Administration is afraid that this could put relations 
with Russia in jeopardy and could create another 'hot spot' quite 
unnecessarily.158 
American reticence has been viewed positively by the French as a pact of 
necessary evolutionary process for Europeans to reclaim the initiative in security 
matters. Other Europeans will go along with the Partnership for Peace so as not to 
hasten an American withdrawal. It is important to analyze the role the American 
Congress has played in shaping the debate over NATO expansion because many 
congressional leaders have spoken out on the necessity for eastern expansion of NATO. 
Congressional leaders in both the House of Representatives and the Senate have been 
instrumental in pushing the Clinton Administration into a more activist role supporting 
East Central European membership in NATO. In the Senate, Senator Richard Lugar (R) 
Indiana; Senator Hank Brown (R) Colorado and Senator Mitch McConnell (R) Kentucky, 
have all been outspoken in their condemnation for Clinton's pfp initiative and the 
necessity to offer concrete criteria for eventual membership. President Clinton has 
piqued Senator Lugar's ire, suggesting that Pfr is the mechanism for Eastern 
membership without specifically addressing criteria. Clinton stated that, 
(Pfr] ... is the beginning of a process that will not only eventually lead to 
an expansion of NATO, but much more importantly, gives us a chance to 
have a secure and unified Europe in which, for the first time, all nation 
1S6secretary of State Christopher, 7 January 1994. 
1S7secretary of State Christopher, 2 December 1993. 
158Tomasz Wroblewski, p. 3. 
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states really do respect the territorial integrity of one 
another.159 ... Partnership for peace is not NATO membership. But 
neither is it a permanent holding room.160 
Senator Richard Lugar in his critical appraisal of the P£P plan stated that, "In 
many respects, Partnership for Peace epitomizes the Administration's ad hoc approach 
to European security problems. It is a band-aide offered in place of corrective 
surgery."161 'The basic flaw in Partnership for Peace is its underlying premise -- the 
avoidance of line-drawing. Titis is a really an attempt to avoid choices and thus to 
avoid the establishment of clear policy objectives."162 Finally, with the recent 
Republican victories in the House and Senate as well as the promotion of Ambassador 
Holbrooke to a senior position in the State Department, U.S. policy towards expanding 
the Alliance seems to have reversed earlier trends set by Talbott and Tarn off. 
B. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
The Germans officially welcomed the Partnership for Peace as the first step 
towards the inevitable expansion of NATO. P£P is the correct first step, but the Germans 
are very eager to continue the process from initial ambiguity to providing a set of 
standards, criteria and timelines for eventual membership of Central and Eastern 
European countries. The White Paper 1994, (Germany's defense statement) clearly states 
the intention not to make P£P an indefinite holding area for CEE states. The main 
concern for German security planners is incorporating at the very least the Visegrad 
countries in order to provide a stable front that borders Germany's eastern frontier and 
the need to stabilize fragile democracies. Within the German coalition government, an 
almost schizophrenic attitude has emerged. On the one hand, Helmut Kohl is taking a 
moderate position, the defense minister aggressively is pursuing early expansion while 
the foreign minister is warning about the implications of early membership. 
His ambitious Defense Minister, Volker Riihe, takes a very hard, line partly 
championing immediate expansion because of his CDU affiliation and mostly because 
he is using the issue of NATO expansion as a means of creating a name for himself in 
the German and international press. Meanwhile, as part of the coalition, the Foreign 
159J>resident Clinton, 7 July 1994. 
160J>resident Clinton, 12 January 1994. 
16lsenator Lugar, 9 December 1993, p. 9. 
162senator Lugar, 1 February 1994, p. 5. 
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Minister, Klaus Kinkel, a leader in the Free Democratic Party, takes a very conciliatory 
tone, attempting to support the American PfP position and to assuage any fears Russia 
may have about NATO expansion eastward. In all, the official German government 
position supports the American PfP initiative because it keeps Germany from having a 
policy schism with Washington. Second, it keeps the U.S. in Europe and simultaneously 
subverts French attempts to play a greater leadership role. Third, it does not upset the 
Russians. Fourth, PfP supports a German moral obligation to correct past wrongs 
towards its Eastern neighbors. 
German foreign policy regarding an expanded NATO is based upon the 
country's historical gee-strategic position in Europe as well as the current social-political 
realities facing the ruling government. Chancellor Kohl's political, military and 
economic standing is maintained through a careful balancing act between competing 
domestic concerns and Germany's position as a regional power. The current German 
policy concerning the maintenance of a balance in Europe involves the careful 
maintenance of a German-American Atlantic cooperation. Germany's policies therefore 
are based upon the primary consideration of maintaining the Atlantic link and thus all 
policies flow from that. 
Primarily, German historic interests derive from: (1) The gee-strategic location 
between Russia-Central and Eastern Europe and France. (2) The necessity to maintain 
strong ties with Russia, France and the United Kingdom lest they return to a 1914 or 
1939 scenario where for many reasons they became divided and enemies. (3) The 
historical interest in stabilizing or at least having a say in Central European affairs, a 
kind of modem-day Zwang nach Osten. Jolyon Howorth notes that, "Germany's 
overriding preoccupation in the immediate future will have to be with her Eastern 
neighbours. But three points should be noted here. The first is that such a concern 
derives more from a sense of Zwang nach Osten than from Drang nach Osten, or, as 
Gregory Treverton has put it, "more the pull of perceived obligation than the push of 
imagined destiny."163 (4) Since 1945, a necessity to conduct foreign policy so discreetly 
so as not to damage relations with the United States or European partners. 
Based on these recent historical interests, the current German eastern policy and 
view of NATO's future may be summarized as follows: (1) Eastern expansion of NATO 
but not at the expense of alienating the Americans or alarming other European powers 
(namely Russia and France). (2) The maintenance of a viable American military and 
163Jolyon Howorth, pp. 13-14. Howorth quotes from Gregory Treverton's 1992 article in Foreign Affairs, 
"The New Europe," 71/1, p. 100. 
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diplomatic presence (100,000 troops). In addition to the American viewpoint, the 
German position on expansion of the Atlantic Alliance is the most influential opinion 
among NATO members because it is most directly affected by developments in the East. 
Germans have invested billions of dollars in CEE economies. If the Germans 
perceive a lack of resolve to incorporate East Central Europe into NATO and the 
European Union structures, they can be expected to raise the issue in the following 
years as Europe moves towards closer integration. For the past forty years, Germany 
has relied upon integration with other allies to form a common defense. The rejection of 
an assertive nationalistic or "singular" policy has been repeatedly confirmed by German 
statesmen since the end of the Second World War. Germany's preference to work in 
conjunction with fellow allies has made it a strong "team player" that stresses 
multilateral diplomacy and multilateral actions in a wide realm of political and military 
fields. 
Within the context of national threat perceptions, Germany sees the expansion of 
NATO as providing a number of beneficial results. First, Germany sees the expansion 
of NATO, including at least the Visegrad countries, as bringing stability farther east and 
at least pushing any near-term instability farther from its eastern border. Second, 
Germany views expanded membership as beneficial to Russia because the Alliance 
would act as a moderating factor for CEE countries and a tool to ease the concerns about 
the security vacuum. Third, Germany recognizes that an extension of the NATO 
Alliance is really an extension and future commitment of American involvement on the 
Continent. Though NATO is comprised of sixteen sovereign states, German officials 
recognize the weight that the United States can bring to future European security. 
Finally, German leaders prefer an American presence that balances a French one. 
Elizabeth Pond, a expert of German affairs notes that, 
President Bush's unstinting support for unification in 1989-90 showed the 
Germans the benefits of maintaining an alliance with a large, distant 
friend who is not as burdened by European history as are Germany's 
neighbors. The French-German relationship will always form the core of 
the European Community, but the Germans will also need, for a long 
time to come, a less parochial counterweight to Paris and London.164 
164Elizabeth Pond, p. 116. She adds that, "To be sure, West German enthusiasm for America and NATO 
could be abnormally colored at this point by gratitude for Washington's stalwart support for unification 
against the French and British (and Soviets). But there probably will continue to be numerous issues in 
which German stakes will coincide more closely with American than with French or British interests, and 
Germany will value its augmented influence in European councils arising from its American connection in 
NATO," p. 122. 
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Although the issue of WEU IN A TO congruence has not yet been resolved, 
Germans recognize that membership of the Visegrad countries into only the WEU 
security alliance and not NATO, would immediately signal an American loss of prestige 
and presence. German leaders see the enhancement of NATO's mission and expansion 
of its membership as providing three general benefits: 
• A "multinational European framework" that has worked successfully for 
forty years; 
• The ideal way to ensure future "American engagement" to European 
stability; 
• A means of quelling Germany's need for renationalizing of its threat 
perceptions.165 
Ronald Asmus suggests that Germany's interest in facilitating Eastern stability is 
through the use of NATO membership. He states, 
Eastern Europe and Russia top the list of Germany's 'vital interests,' 
replacing France. Moreover, when asked to identify the greatest 'critical 
threats' to Germany's 'vital interests' in the years ahead, Germans name 
threats in the East - the spread of nationalism, nuclear proliferation, 
ethnic and regional conflict, and emigration. This growing public 
recognition of Germany's interest in the East might be termed Germany's 
new 'Zwang nach Osten.' It does not reflect any aggressive German 
intent, but rather a defensive and pragmatic realization that Germany is 
most vulnerable to the rise of nationalism and instability on its eastern 
borders.166 
It is this reason why most observers claim that without cooperation from the 
European Union or NATO in the future Germany might be forced to proceed on its own 
and offer limited security assurances. Kelleher and Fisher note, "with a strong interest 
in the future of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Germany could be forced 
to assume a leadership role in the region, if the European Community is unable or 
unwilling to do so."167 The German Defense Ministry views PfP not as the sole 
mechanism for expansion but rather the first step that facilitates quick membership of 
16Sstephen F. Szabo, p. 13. 
166Ronald Asmus, p. 71. 
167Kelleher & Fisher, p. 170. The authors also imply that Helmut Kohl's moderate position on Eastern 
expansion is a reflection of the Chancellor's realization that there is a minority of Germans who might be 
troubled by Germany financially overextending itself. They write that some Germans fear, "the dual 
fmancial burden of domestic unification and assistance to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
[fearing that] both may erode the economic strength that has been the primary source of German pride and 
influence in the postwar period." P. 172. 
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Central and Eastern Europe. The White Paper 1994 states, "The 'Partnership for Peace' is 
an important and useful step along the road to leading new partners towards the West's 
security institutions. It is no substitute for expanding the Alliance."168 Advocating a 
more ambitious policy than the Chancellor, Volker Riihe, Germany's Defense Minister, 
is said to voice opinions that Helmut Kohl espouses but is in no position to publicly 
state. As members of the Christian Democratic Union, Kohl and Riihe have both been 
more outspoken on integration of CEE states than the Foreign Ministry, which is headed 
by a coalition partner, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel of the Free Democratic Party. The 
FDP is not as interested in Eastern expansion because it wants to avoid upsetting Russia 
and Europeans that believe NATO and German influence are filling the void left by 
Russian troops too quickly. 
Germany's historical interest in keeping the United States engaged in European 
affairs forces the government to support PfP as an initial strategy, in order not to further 
divide the American-German position. Germany seems willing to go along with most 
American proposals, either tacitly or otherwise, which would commit America to 
Europe for the future. As with other NATO members including France, German leaders 
see several benefits in retaining an American presence. In addition to political benefits 
associated with an American presence, the United States offers several strategic assets 
that are critical to maintaining a credible military force within NATO. Gerard Berkhof 
outlines several American resources that makes its presence critical to the present 
success of NATO. He writes, 
As a defence alliance NATO is still the most flexible organisation. The 
strategic assets of the United States - nuclear weapons, advanced 
conventional cruise missiles and stealth bombers, sea-based air and 
heavy transport planes and, above all, a world-wide intelligence-
gathering capability- are essential for the defence of European territory 
and of great value in dealing with contingencies at the lower end of the 
violence scale.169 
Domestically, there is little support for the CDU to advocate financial 
commitments to CEE states while Germans have experienced a decrease in their 
standard of living as a result of incorporating East Germany. This position could 
change if Kohl was elected to another term; if the economy experienced an incremental 
improvement, thereby providing greater resources; or if a new American president 
168White Paper 1994, p. 54. 
169Gerard C. Berkhof, p. 12. 
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advocated quick NATO expansion. CEE integration will cost Germany billions of 
deutschmarks over several years while there is less money in the German Central Bank as 
a result of economic development of Eastern Germany. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has 
been an early proponent of expanding the Alliance east in the near-term. He is eager 
not to show an overwhelming desire to integrate the eastern systems because of the 
enormous costs associated with military integration. Furthermore, his opinion is further 
muted by his attempt not to appear over-ambitious in the realm of foreign adventures, 
lest he incur the distrust of France and other countries. Finally, he realizes that being 
too far out in front on the issue would distance himself from the Americans, a situation 
that most Germans would prefer to avoid. Kohl's concept of NATO expansion is 
outlined in the 1994 German Defence White Paper. In the White Paper, the Chancellor's 
moderate opening statement on Central and Eastern European integration is contrasted 
by Riihe's blunt call for specific actions for closer ties. Specifically Kohl writes, 
Today, the most effective way of serving stability on our continent is to 
support the fledgeling democracies of Central, Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe in their efforts to consolidate a free and democratic order in their 
states and societies and to establish efficient and competitive market 
economies ... this involves the prospect...of drawing closer to the existing 
Western communities.170 
Volker Riihe, more adamant on the issue, states that, "indicating that it is willing 
to admit new members, NATO is making a major contribution to the stabilization of 
Eastern Europe. Integration and cooperation are the foundations of ... European 
stability."171 The two varying statements are less a testament of a schizophrenic CDU 
position and more illustrative of the extent with which a German Chancellor can 
diverge from a vague Alliance agreement (PfP) and propose bold foreign policy 
initiatives in the name of a newly reunited German Republic. In other words, Riihe's 
ambitious position probably indicates the unstated intentions of the Chancellor 
articulated by someone other than the Chancellor. Germany cannot be too pro-
American during an election campaign. Neither can the ruling party afford to support 
PfP exercises in Germany during an election year. As one American defense observer 
remarked, "Kohl's government does not want to risk their slim lead in exchange for a 
l70German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, writing in the Foreword section of the White Paper 1994, pp. VI-VII. 
171German Federal Minister of Defense Volker Riihe, writing in the Foreword section White Paper 1994, 
pp. vm-IX. 
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bunch of Polish-speaking soldiers tromping through Bavaria in the summer." Germany 
can also not be too pro-American for fear of upsetting the French and Russians. 
Ri.ihe's adamant "expansion soon" stance must be put within the context of 
domestic German politics. He is actively pursuing an international issue that keeps his 
prominence nearly parallel to that of the Chancellor. Second, his ambitions to become 
Germany's next chancellor, after Kohl, sometimes leave his position at odds with the 
mainstream CDU line. Whenever Riihe has the opportunity, he offers undivided 
support for NATO expansion. Recently he proclaimed that, 
We [NATO] cannot afford to delay decisions until perfect visions of 
Europe have been designed. The Atlantic Alliance must not become a 
'closed shop. I cannot see one good reason for denying future members 
of the European Union membership in NAT0.172 
Ri.ihe also recently said that Germany in the past "has contributed the lion's 
share of the aid ... we cannot pay the bill for the rehabilitation of Eastern Europe ... What is 
required is a great collective effort, an all-European solidarity pact for the states in the 
Eastern part of our continent." Klaus Kinkel advocates a middle-of-the-road approach 
that stresses the importance of not diverging from Washington's Pfr initiative. 
The main position of Kinkel and the CDP is that Germany should help resolve 
the security dilemma in Central and East European but not at the expense of isolating 
Russia or other cautious NATO members. According to Alfred Reisch, Foreign Minister 
Kinkel reportedly stated that Germany wanted to help assure security for East European 
countries but at the same time make sure that such steps did not make Russia feel 
isolated. NATO, Kinkel said, "would declare that it was open to new members 'in 
principle' but confine its specific proposals to ways of increasing mutual 
cooperation."173 Michael Mihalka asserts that President Yeltsin's authoritarian methods 
to quell the coup attempt in October 1993 cut short Kinkel's support for early 
membership of Central Eastern European states. He wrote, 
... the role that Kinkel was willing to accord Russia in NATO's policies 
went far beyond what any other NATO member was willing to concede. 
Reacting to Russian concerns, Kohl also expressed the opinion that the 
enlargement of NATO now belonged to 'a further-off future·.l74 
172Volker Rtihe, Survival, p. 135. 
173 Alfred A. Reisch, 25 March 1994, p. 25. 
174Micbael Mihalk.a, 25 March 1994, p. 8. 
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C. FRANCE 
France does not favor immediate NATO expansion for a variety of reasons. 
Primarily, prompt membership is contrary to the Balladur Stability Pact that calls for 
delaying western integration until positive diplomatic resolutions to ethno-national 
problems were completed. Second, France's Gaullist tendencies leave it suspicious of 
Atlantic schemes to immediately expand NATO, preferring instead European security 
solutions to Atlantic ones. In effect, the French are seeking to "deepen European 
security not to widen the Atlantic Alliance."175 Third, France views expansion as 
enhancing Germany's de facto influence over CEE countries as a result of its gee-
strategic location. Fourth, France views NATO expansion as implying a continued 
American presence that includes a nuclear deterrent and additional political and 
diplomatic initiatives further subverting French influence. Unless France rejoins 
NATO's integrated military command structure, enlargement of the Alliance and 
America's continued presence in Europe would upgrade the status of SACEUR/SHAPE. 
Fifth, France views the transfer of resources from the southern tier (where France 
believes a more immediate risk exists) as antagonistic to Russia and also a waste of 
valuable NATO assets. Sixth, France perceives enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance as a 
step towards integrating CEE countries into the European Union, precipitating an influx 
of cheap agricultural goods. Lastly, French officials realize that enlarging NATO 
requires substantial financial resources from all the major NATO capitals -- a likelihood 
not welcome by either French leaders or the public. Dr. Holger Mey writes that, 
... the French stressed the importance of Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty, in order to prevent NATO from playing a bigger role in European 
security affairs, while the argument here is that one must emphasize 
NATO's core function: defense of its members, in order to maintain the 
organization's strength and continuous relevance.176 
Echoing the reticence of French leadership to expand NATO promptly, the 
current French Foreign Minister has been less-than-enthusiastic for the proposal. 
French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe stated in October 1993, "Before entering into the 
process of enlargement, let us make the existing institutions work. For that we have the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council." In September 1993, the French Defense Minister 
"gave only qualified support" to NATO expansion advocated by the Germans. He 
stated that 'The process has started and we on the French side will certainly not raise 
175paul Latawski, p. 41. 
I76Dr. HolgerMey, 1993, p. 244. 
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any obstacle in this expansion." The defense minister added that "he did not think that 
all" Central and Eastern European states were "equally ready for membership, and he 
expressed concern" about how other CEE countries might react if they were 
excluded.177 By January 1994 Alain Larnassoure, France's European Affairs Minister, 
proclaimed his support for the cautious Partnership for Peace proposal and his 
opposition to immediate expansion.178 
French foreign policy goals regarding NATO expansion, are a manifestation of 
its historical experience and national interest. These include: (1) promoting the 
realization of a French world vision that has France as the dominant European power 
and is thus reliant upon American retrenchment and German and British acquiescence 
of the French "special leadership role" in Europe; (2) maintaining a presence and a 
leadership role in the Maghreb, particularly in Algeria; (3) advocating foreign policies 
that do not expend French financial reserves; (4) championing the Balladur stability 
pact proposal in order to stern any possible ethnic or national wars from being imported 
from CEE states. 
France makes the point that by extending guarantees to Central and Eastern 
Europe, NATO might be only importing additional sources of disharmony and strife 
westward. The main point is that France is very concerned about the risk of bringing 
Eastern Europe's problems west when in fact the proper course is to gradually integrate 
and bring these countries up to the same standards as Western Europe. "Forming or 
extending alliances will not solve any problems, especially those of minority borders, 
which have re-emerged with a vengeance, forming potential sources of grave crises."179 
For all of these reasons, French leaders are not enthusiastic about enlarging the Alliance 
immediately or even in the near term. 
France's policy of Eastern expansion reflects its ambivalence about supporting 
expansion at the expense of its visionary policy of a greater European leadership role. 
The ambiguity of the P£P Initiative and its failure to spell out specific guidelines and 
requirements for prospective members accentuates the French desire not to compromise 
its national interests and ideals. The caution of the British and Americans about 
extending security guarantees to CEE countries is repeated by France's Minister of 
Defense in the 1994 White Paper: 
I77Fran~ois Uotard cited by Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 7. 
I78French European Affairs Minister Alain Lamassoure cited by Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 7. 
119Livre Blanc sur Ia Defense 1994, p. 35. 
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The new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, with whom a 
number of agreements have been concluded in a few years, will enjoy 
higher priority in the allocation of resources and military 
cooperation ... The establishment of closer relations between the armed 
forces and the defence ministries of these countries and our own, the 
multiplication of concrete links at all levels, as well as joint training and 
exercises, are elements that will gradually reinforce both the democratic 
evolution of these countries' defence systems and the feeling of solidarity 
between France and these States) SO 
France prefers the Partnership for Peace initiative for several key reasons. First, 
P£P does not imply or explicitly state a leading American role in European security 
decisions. Second, P£P is virtually cost-free, and requires very little from France's 
limited resources. Third, PfP advocates a "go slow" approach in order to have CEE 
countries improve their policies on minority issues in accordance with the Balladur 
Stability Pact. Fourth, no substantive statements call for the diversion of resources away 
from NATO's Southern tier to Central and Eastern Europe. 
In order for France to maintain what has been described as its "self-assigned 
status as the world's third military power," the proposed "deepening" of the EU which 
many French politicians tirelessly defend might be undermined by additional NATO 
members. Therefore, in keeping with France's grand ideals, French leaders are, 
nevertheless, not overly enthusiastic about immediate or even eventual expansion of the 
Alliance.l81 The French concept of deepening European institutions and 
simultaneously downplaying all but American nuclear guarantees has been the 
underlying French policy since the early 1980's. "The principal change in French 
Alliance policy under Mitterrand has been the emphasis throughout the past decade on 
deepening West European security and defense cooperation .... "182 The French dilemma 
is attempting to balance the necessity for the American nuclear deterrent as a last resort 
under Article 5 while continuing to resist a subordinate role in Europe. By advocating 
the use of NATO structures to integrate the East, France sees its leadership role 
lBOiivre Blanc sur Ia Defense 1994, pp. 39-40. The most telling aspect of this passage is that it remains the 
most aggressive statement regarding NATO expansion. The key word is "gradually," implying that NATO 
expansion is not an immediate proposition. 
IBloavid s. Yost, "France," p. 272. 
1B2oavid s. Yost, "Mitterrand and Defense and Security Policy," pp. 149-150. Additionally, Yost 
maintains that, "The French want to retain a U.S. military and nuclear presence in Europe, but not on their 
soil. Mitterrand sometimes conveys the impression that he would like to retain the United States as a 'last 
resort' security blanket for France, but feels it imperative to diminish West European dependence on the 
United States." 
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diminished because it would occur under the auspices of SACEUR. Margaret Thatcher 
noted this problem writing, 
What these new approaches will require, however, is a recognition from 
the French political elite that any stable European balance of power will 
require the more or less permanent presence of the United States in 
Europe. And that is a recognition that so far French presidents have been 
prepared to grant only in private.183 
Thus, if the French accept the use of NATO structures, they essentially undercut 
their own leadership role and, in effect, return to the Alliance's integrated military 
structure. As one observer explains, "French participation in multinational units, 
including US forces under SACEUR's authority, would amount to a return to NATO's 
integrated military structure."184 The French insistence to be Europe's leader, Barzini 
states, and the need of other European states to keep the United States engaged creates a 
never-ending turmoil. He writes, 
The insistent crowing from the dungheap, the demand that France be 
treated always as the foremost nation after the two superpowers, surely 
the first in Europe, the sometimes incoherent and contradictory foreign 
policy, complicate any relations with it as never before. Relations with it 
are further embroiled by the fact that it is admittedly true that it is still, in 
many ways, Nwnero Uno in continental Europe, whatever that may 
mean, and that Europe would be inconceivable without it.185 
Though France has had an historic distrust for Alliance partners, it has 
nevertheless been forced to rely upon them since the early nineteenth century. Along 
this same line, France's on-going dilemma with the United States concerns the 
preoccupation it has with the role Americans play on the continent. France's view 
towards NATO expansion therefore is contingent namely on how enlargement of the 
Alliance transforms French authority with the rest of Europe. France's preoccupation 
with its perceived "first rank grandeur" is the single most important factor affecting the 
French outlook regarding NATO expansion. 
France sees as its most immediate threat emanating from the Maghreb and the 
potential for instability as a result of Islamic fundamentalism. In listing France's new 
sources of vulnerabilities, one sees the absence of Alliance-specific threats and the 
emergence of national threat perceptions. France views terrorism, extremism of 
1B3Margaret Thatcher, p. 815. 
184oavid S. Yost, "France and West European defense identity," p. 331. 
185Luigi Barz.ini, p. 125. 
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religious and nationalistic types and drug traffic as the main threats to its national 
security. France's southern coast is perceived as the entry point for these destabilizing 
factors. Instead, French leaders see no point offering security guarantees and diverting 
limited resources to CEE countries when the only quantifiable threat exists along 
France's southern periphery. Like Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, France is more 
concerned about the more immediate risks associated with Islamic extremism in Algeria 
than any near term Eastern threat. 
To be sure, France keeps its attention focused on matters as they occur in the 
East. Instability as a result of a mass exodus from Algeria, Tunisia or Morocco is a more 
likely scenario for French officials than massive refugee movements from Central and 
Eastern Europe. To devote resources and attention away from the Southern tier - a 
natural consequence of expanded NATO to the East - would inevitably raise concerns 
about NATO's willingness to respond to a Southern threat. There is some thought in 
western capitals that once President Mitterrand leaves office in 1995 that the Gaullist 
defense policies of the 1960's will at least be reexamined within the context of current 
and future European security realities. In France's case, immediate Alliance expansion 
is deleterious and PfP is the most practical approach to the current European security 
environment. For France, PfP is the best interim solution because it does not give 
specific requirements for membership and thus force NATO countries into specific 
concessions. 
D. GREAT BRITAIN 
Britain has a very pragmatic approach to NATO expansion in the Alliance. The 
ruling conservative government recognizes, like the Germans and the Italians, that 
keeping the Americans engaged in Europe requires British acquiescence to U.S. 
initiatives. In order to guard against any leading French role, Britain, Italy and 
Germany do not advocate views too disparate to those of the Americans for fear of 
alienating ambivalent American leaders. Second, British officials believe that immediate 
integration of the CEE states (particularly the Visegrad countries) would be too 
destabilizing to Alliance cohesion. Third, the long-standing policy of widening the EU 
in order to keep continental influence subdued is not compatible with the idea of 
broadening NATO membership. Finally, the argument of a moral obligation to make 
up for the perceived mistakes and policies prior to World War II does not play a 
decisive factor in influencing British decision-making. The British government opposes 
immediate membership of Central and Eastern European countries for the following 
reasons: 
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• Fear that Alliance cohesion would deteriorate with the immediate accession 
of new members; 
• Belief that the British public would not support programs that funneled 
financial resources away from the U.K. that would be necessary to integrate 
CEE states; 
• Judgment that no overwhelming threat exists to CEE states. 
The British support PfP as a adequate first step towards integrating CEE states 
because it ensures future American engagement in Europe. British officials are very 
skeptical of immediate NATO expansion, mainly on the grounds that Alliance cohesion 
(more members and less agreement) would be seriously compromised. The utilitarian 
British view the extension of the Alliance as a dual proposition. Primarily, new 
members should clearly have to enhance the security of the organization. Secondarily, 
adding new partners should not detract from Alliance cohesion and lead to the 
transmogrification of NATO into something resembling the CSCE. British Defense 
Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind has argued that, "Membership of NATO involves 
responsibility as well as rights and cannot be seen as a political statement or as a means 
of enhancing the security of any one individual country."186 Rifkind, like other British 
leaders has argued that NATO is not a club but a security organization requiring 
sacrifices and resources of each member state. 
Sherard Cowper-Coles points out that Britain's first priority when creating the 
Atlantic Alliance was to ensure European stability by means of a permanent American 
presence. Along with numerous apprehensions concerning immediate enlargement, 
Britain warmly embrace the PfP initiative because it corresponds with fulfillment of 
British security priorities. Cowper-Coles writes that, ''The UK's contribution to 
collective defence in Europe and beyond has been heavily influenced by judgments of 
what has been required to satisfy American expectations of Britain and to maintain the 
UK's place in the Alliance."187 Britain's historical unwillingness to "Die for Danzig" 
has been supplanted with a noticeable hesitancy to guarantee, at least immediately, the 
186Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 6. Mihalka citing David White's "Caution Urged on NATO 
Expansion," Financial Times, 23 September 1993 writes that during the January 1994 NATO summit, 
Rifkind restated the practical British approach declaring that, "a decision to extend NATO's territory and 
commit our troops to the defence of new borders cannot be taken lightly .. .Any hasty decision about who 
does and does not belong to NATO risks creating a new division in Europe. We do not want to set Russia's 
teeth dangerously on edge." 
1S7sherard Cowper-Coles, p. 145. Cowper-Coles contends that the 1994 Brussels summit confrrmed, "the 
Alliance's slow metamorphosis from a club concerned mainly with the collective defence of its members' 
territory to one preoccupied with the collective promotion of its members' wider security interests." 
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security of Gdansk.l88 The ruling conservative party headed by Prime Minister John 
Major maintains the view that immediate NATO expansion is too disruptive to Alliance 
cohesion and not warranted by any overriding threat to CEE security. Moreover, 
rushing to expand NATO only exacerbates European instability where there is a lack of 
prescriptive mechanisms to accomplish integration of CEE countries. In a standard 
display of British mindfulness of the many complexities associated with immediate 
enlargement, the Secretary of State for Defense stated in the 1994 Defence Estimates 
that, 
The overall aim [of P£P] is to improve security for the whole of Europe 
and not to create new lines of division in Europe ... All the defence and 
security co-operation in the world will not help if eastern Europe 
degenerates into economic and social chaos.189 
In December 1993, Malcolm Rifk.ind reiterated Britain's official policy on the 
possibility of expanding the Alliance stating that, 
.. .it will depend on certain criteria that render them homogeneous with 
the alliance: the strength of their democratic institutions and the maturity 
of their armed forces ... For the time being, our objective is to avoid 
creating new divisions in Europe that could encourage Russia to think it 
has a free hand in the neighboring countries that used to belong to the 
Soviet Union.190 
Britain's pragmatic approach to involve the Americans in European matters is 
still the prevalent strategy among the defense and foreign ministers. Similar to the 
period preceding the end of World War II, Britain cannot afford the burden of 
maintaining European order on its own. Michael Howard writes that the, "American 
withdrawal from an international system which the British now knew they could never 
have the strength to manage was seen in London as the ultimate disaster."191 
Therefore, P£P is the most practical approach because it proposes the creation of a slow, 
balanced integration process. Moreover, P£P promotes continued strong ties with the 
U.S. and does not incur British financial obligations. 
188Paul Latawski, p. 41. 
189Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994, paragraph 7, p. 14. 
190aritish Defense Secretary Malcolm Rifkind cited by Michael Mihalka in an interview conducted by the 
Italian newspaper 11 Giornale,17 December 1993, p. 6. 
191Michael Howard, p. 119. 
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Finally, having been accepted by Russia, pfp is viewed as the best means of 
slowly incorporating the East while not drawing lines or aggravating Russian leaders. 
The British position as argued by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in September 
1993 was that the expansion of the Alliance was simply pragmatic and that, "despite the 
apparent softening of Yeltsin's position, NATO should not be quick to enlarge and 
'drive Russia back into some sort of opposition'."192 Similarly, according to Michael 
Mihalka, "New members should enhance the security of the alliance as a whole." In his 
opinion, "concerns about possibly greater European security through the inclusion of 
the Central and Eastern European states in NATO did not enter British calculations."193 
The 1994 British Defence Estimates is another example of Britain's cautious 
approach and deference for the complexities associated with incorporating the CEE 
states into NATO. Thus, Britain's current government has supported Pfr as the most 
adequate mechanism to slowly incorporate the East. An excerpt from the 1994 Defence 
Estimates states that, 
The NATO Allies said they expect and would welcome NATO expansion 
that would reach democratic states to their east, as part of an 
evolutionary process, and taking into account political and security 
developments in the whole of Europe.194 
Domestic problems, certainly the economic recession throughout Europe over 
the past few years, has had an impact on NATO's unwillingness to take on new 
members and incur costly measures to integrate Central and Eastern Europe. David 
Greenwood writes that, "During the 1980s, financial and manpower constraints made it 
increasingly difficult to sustain all-round competence and commitment in a credible 
way .... "195 A final aspect of the British experience is that the U.K. has historically shied 
away from committing financial and military resources to the Continent unless the 
situation was grave enough to warrant such an effort (i.e., Napoleonic Wars, W.W.I, 
W.W.II and the Cold War). Again, British pragmatism and skepticism towards 
continental involvement acts to restrain it from offering immediate membership to CEE 
countries. This reflects not only British sensibilities but willingness to accept American 
initiatives to preserve U.S. support. 
192Michael Mibalka, 25 March 1994, pp. 5-6. 
193Michael Mihalka, 25 March 1994, p. 6. 
194Statement on the Defense Estimates 1994, paragraph 6, p. II. 
195oavid Greenwood, p. 281. 
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The Labour party, for the most part, has kept its opinions on NATO expansion 
quiet. One British observer claims that the reason for this is both the strategy of 
Labour's leader, Tony Blair, and an unsaid political maxim. Blair, in his bid to become 
Britain's next Prime Minister, has made a point of keeping Labour's initiatives 
ambiguous, fearing a skeptical electorate that might find disfavor with a specific view. 
From a general political standpoint NATO expansion, not being a hot topic of 
conversation on either side of the House of Commons, is not worth expending political 
capital. One might suspect that after failing to offer security guarantees to CEE states 
earlier in the century, British leaders might feel a sense of moral responsibility to right 
past wrongs. However, the British moral obligation to incorporate CEE states because 
of the results of Yalta and Munich does not enter into the formulation of practical British 
security estimates. Again, the pragmatic British approach might consider circumstances 
in extremis that would compel NATO to expand eastward. However, expansion for the 
sake of expansion does not serve current Britain's security interests. 
E. ITALY 
Italian leaders support the prudent American position on NATO expansion for 
three reasons. First, Italy does not want NATO resources diverted to Central and 
Eastern Europe while a war is being waged in the former-Yugoslavia and Islamic 
fundamentalism is threatening regional stability along the Italian periphery. Second, 
Italy's chaotic domestic political scene and financial problems preoccupy leaders and 
prevent them from supporting costly plans for integration. Third, Italy has a historic 
policy of keeping the United States engaged in Europe by supporting American policies 
like Partnership for Peace. The four-year-old battle in the former-Yugoslavia, the on-
going revelations of widespread government corruption, the economic malaise and 
Islamic fundamentalism to the south, leave Italy's leadership and the Italian public too 
distracted to worry about integrating CEE states. Furthermore, there is a sense that like 
the Germans and the British, the Italians prefer not to scrutinize American proposals lest 
they hasten the withdrawal of U.S. security guarantees. Luigi Caligaris is mindful of the 
vital role the United States plays in the northern Mediterranean, noting that, "If ... US 
forces were to disappear or be reduced in the southern region, the isolation of southern 
countries would become much more severe."196 
As early as 1982, Italian defense experts began the process of addressing Italy's 
specific threats on a national and sub-regional level. With the realization in the late 
196Luigi Caligaris, p. 78. 
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1980's that a Soviet-led invasion was no longer likely, Italian leaders sought to shore up 
what they perceived as deficiencies in Italy's national defense posture from regional 
Mediterranean threats. Luigi Caligaris notes that in shifting from alliance concerns, to 
Italian national concerns, Italy recognized that its own threat perceptions required 
attention equal to Alliance concerns. He writes, "An alliance the size of NATO cannot 
provide the kind of guidance that is needed by each nation." In 1982 Italian leaders 
reorganized Italy's defense posture to address both national and Alliance threats. 
Specifically the defense committee proposed: 
• A "reorganisation of the defence posture to enable Italy to meet both the 
Warsaw Pact threat" and other threats against the south and the Italian 
peninsula; 
• An "increase in bilateral politico-military relations with other southern 
countries" within the Mediterranean context; 
• An improvement in the "politico-military assistance to countries which had a 
stabilising role in the Mediterranean;" 
• An "increased contribution to peace-keeping operations. "197 
Since then, this defense model has become the leitmotiv of Italian defense 
debates.198 Caligaris observed that this socio-economic approach to Italian defense 
plannmg throughout 1988 continued to be the dominating factor in all parliamentary 
defense discussions. In addition to threats to NATO stability, Italy's gee-strategic 
position leaves it exposed to a myriad of crises associated with the Mediterranean. The 
New Strategic Concept, favoring flexibility and mobility over cumbersome forces, 
favorably suits Italy's security concerns. Though the Strategic Concept is a post-Cold 
War invention, the idea of highly mobile forces to address a variety of threats has been 
advocated by Italian defense planners since the early 1980's. 
Caligaris writes that, "In the Mediterranean at large, the answer to both national 
and international security problems would be for Italy to adopt a defence posture based 
on quick reaction and strategic 'inter-service' mobility."199 This was the view of Italian 
policy makers in the 1980's, years before the New Strategic Concept enumerated this 
idea of flexible units. Within this context, it is easy to see why Italians view immediate 
197Luigi Caligaris, p. 78. 
198Luigi Caligaris, p. 83. From the "Modello di Difesa secondo Ia proposta del Governo," presented by 
Secretary of Defense Lelio Lagorio at the Defense Commission of the Chambers of Deputies, 14 April 
1981, in Annuario 1981-1982 (Rome: ISTRID), pp. 192-193. 
I9~uigi Caligaris, p. 78. 
88 
expansion of NATO-- and the northward diversion of forces --as creating an inherently 
more dangerous security situation not only in Europe but along the Italian perimeter. 
Maurizio Cremasco notes, 
Italy because of its geographic location, military commitments in NATO, 
and political and economic relations with the riparian nations, is 'by 
necessity' a Mediterranean country ... Although Italy will continue to be a 
loyal ally, NATO decisions will be examined more closely in the context 
of Italy's specific national and international interests, and Italy's specific 
military requirements will be given more weight.200 
Thus, Italy regards NATO expansion and the Pfr initiative through the same 
myopic national interest spectrum as the other major NATO countries. In effect, Italian 
leaders ask: How much will it cost Italy to incorporate the East? How does this affect 
the status of NATO resources on Italian soil vis-a-vis threats from Northern Africa and 
the former-Yugoslavia? Does the lack of a clear Russian-eastern threat warrant the 
division of resources away from a proven hotspot? The obvious answers to these 
questions, based on factors affecting Italian security interests, are readily apparent. 
First, immediate integration would be too costly to Italians regardless of the price, with 
no discernible benefits. Second, rechanneling NATO resources from the Southern tier to 
Central and Eastern Europe is antagonistic to the Russians and, more importantly, 
inherently a poor step to take in light of the numerous Mediterranean threats. Third, no 
existential Eastern threat currently poses a danger great enough to justify immediate 
incorporation. 
Italy's poor financial position, as a result of the long recession, high inflation, 
unemployment rates and corruption, have left Italy's leaders and the public cynical 
about diverting scarce resources to CEE states. All of these economic woes along with 
the continuing scandals throughout the Italian government have distracted the Italian 
public from the issues like integrating CEE states. As Joseph Rallo suggests, 'To assess 
decision making in key sectors including defense, one must define the shifting themes 
of Italian domestic politics," (impermanence of postwar governments (50), public debt 
and resurgent organized crime).201 Pfr is the appropriate type of non-binding, 
ambiguous formulae that does not force Italy to deal, at least for the moment, with 
matters of secondary importance. Pfr allows Italy's leadership to manage what they 
lOCMawizio Cremasco, pp. 195 & 229-230. 
201 Joseph Rallo, p. 313. Rallo notes that replacing past defense postures has been the "New Italian Defense 
Model" which still addresses Italy's defense needs through Active Prevention supporting both national and 
Alliance security policy. 
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regard as the more pressing matters of NATO and Italian security (i.e., containing the 
war in the former-Yugoslavia, keeping Islamic fundamentalism in check, improving the 
economy by keeping resources in country, maintaining a functioning government in the 
wake of the corruption scandals and maintaining an American presence in Europe to 
counter French and German influence). The Permanent Representative of Italy on the 
North Atlantic Council recently stated that, 
The issue of the Alliance's expansion could prove difficult to 
resolve ... there will have to be a comprehensive process of change, to be 
implemented gradually and with political insight. In this context, the 
American proposal for a Partnership for Peace, open to all NACC members 
and other European countries, has already received widespread attention 
and support. 202 
Italy's historical link to the United States assumes that the Italians will continue 
to go along with American proposal like Partnership for Peace in order to secure nuclear 
guarantees and a continued conventional presence to contain the Bosnian War. In 
conjunction with an Italian reliance on a sustained American presence, Maurizio 
Cremasco lists three principles of Italian security policy: (1) cooperative military 
relations with the United States "inside and outside the NATO framework" and the 
continued faith in the deterrence ensured by American nuclear forces; (2) the 
acceptance of NATO's New Strategic Concept, no longer a flexible response strategy, in 
order to combat diverse threats and (3) the strict acceptance of NATO's military 
planning and commitments.203 Italy's continued support for an American leadership 
role in Europe is as much a function of the United States' nuclear deterrent as an Italian 
unwillingness to be subordinates in a French-German dominated Europe. Carlo jean 
writes that, 
Italian security policy is shaped by two major factors: Italy's membership 
in the Atlantic Alliance and in Europe; and the country's geopolitical 
position ... Another constant in Italian foreign and security policy is the 
fear of being isolated from Central-Northern Europe through de facto or 
formal establishment of so-called 'directorates.' Italy has expressed 
doubts about the formation of a French-German axis in Europe.204 
202ffiovanni Jannuzzi, pp. 13-14. 
203Maurizio Cremasco, p. 213. The New Strategic Concept that replaced the policy of flexible and 
graduated response is one aspect that Italy has greatly supported. The Concept compliments Italian efforts 
to advocate flexible, mobile responses to threats originating along Italy's perimeter. 
204Carlo Jean, pp. 547 & 551. 
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Compounding thls anxiety was a recent proposal by Germany, France and 
Britain that the EU should initiate "separate tracks" on the way towards European 
integration, conspicuously leaving the Italians out of such an arrangement. This 
proposal has, nonetheless, elevated concerns among Italian leaders that Italy might find 
itself excluded from the center of European political, military and economic decisions 
unless it supports American-sponsored initiatives. Marta Dassu and Marco De Andreis 
explain that most Italian political parties favor the position held by the last government, 
that immediate NATO expansion is unnecessary. Like most political parties, 
[The Democratic Party of the Left "PDS"] agrees with the former 
government on the risks of isolating Moscow .. .if NATO enlarges to the 
Visegrad countries ... the Democratic Party of the Left supports a faster 
political integration of the Visegrad countries, whlle the Northern league 
advocates a yet to be defined 'Europe of regions' ... But NATO's short-term 
enlargement toward the East is not seen with favor in Rome, for a variety 
of reasons ranging from Russian concerns, to a reluctance to extend 
concrete defense commitments ... Therefore it should not come as a 
surprise if the Italian diplomacy finds President Bill Clinton's 
'Partnershlp for Peace' a good compromise solution to the thorny 
problem of NATO's relations with its eastern neighbors.205 
F. THE SOUTHERN TIER STATES 
The Southern tier states of the NATO Alliance (Portugal, Spain, Greece and 
Turkey) all perceive immediate expansion eastward as inevitably requiring scarce 
military resources to be diverted away from an area where the threats are far greater in 
number. To enlarge the Alliance immediately would only serve to antagonize Russia 
and direct attention away from the shores of the volatile Mediterranean. Furthermore, 
these countries contend that Central and Eastern Europe is no longer the foremost area 
where NATO's security interests should be focused. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, an expert 
on Mediterranean affairs, cites numerous destabilizing influences that threaten NATO's 
Southern tier. Among the most prominent threats to NATO's Southern flank are cultural 
and religious diversity (Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox Catholics); the Yugoslav war; 
demographlc expansion in Northern Africa; hlgh unemployment; civil war and Muslim 
fundamentalism. De Vasconcelos writes that, ''The stability of the Maghreb is a key 
concern to countries such as Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal, notably because of its 
geographlcal proximity .... "206 Experts insist that the threats along the Maghreb deserve 
205oassu & De Andreis, pp. 5, 10, 11. 
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the lion's share of resources and NATO security commitments as opposed to any 
perceived "security vacuum" in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The United States presence in the Mediterranean, with the exception of 
combating state-supported terrorism, enforcing U.N. naval sanctions and occasional 
displays of naval diplomacy, does not share the same security concerns as the Southern 
tier states along the Maghreb. As a prelude to further American withdrawal from 
Europe, James Lacey predicts a diminished U.S. presence in the Mediterranean. He 
writes, "Economic and political initiatives related to North-South relations in the 
Mediterranean will be left chiefly for Europe, and primarily the Southern Region 
members of NATO, to pursue."207 The process towards greater national and regional 
cooperation on security matters resulted from a diminished Soviet threat. Lacey notes 
that, 
As the former Soviet Mediterranean Fleet diminishes in relevance and 
NATO security in the Mediterranean (traditionally defined) lapses into 
history, the Mediterranean interests of France, Italy and Spain will 
acquire greater prominence .. .In this connection, Italy and Spain have 
urged the establishment of a distinctly Mediterranean approach to 
regional issues .... 208 
While the Southern European NATO allies -- Spain, France, Italy, Greece and 
Turkey -- increasingly view the south as the greatest security concern to NATO and 
their own national security, they do not necessarily conclude that NATO is the sole 
instrument to address the threat. In fact, the threat to NATO's Southern tier - North 
African/Middle Eastern radical fundamentalism linked with nuclear, biological and 
chemical (NBC) weapons proliferation and advanced delivery systems -- will continue 
to exist into the next century. At a recent meeting of NATO defense ministers in Seville, 
Spain, the Defense Minister from Spain, Julian Garcia Vargas, urged NATO to shift its 
historic attention from Central and Eastern Europe to the Mediterranean. Of equal 
importance was the concurrence of American officials. The Defense News reported that, 
206Alvaro de Vasconcelos, p. 29. De Vasconcelos is the Director at the Institute for Strategic and 
International Studies, Lisbon. 
2°7James Lacey, pp. 83-86. The author reinforces his central point by offering an example of Canada's vital 
interest in establishing an "Arctic Zone of Cooperation" and the Southern region's preoccupation with 
establishing a Mediterranean version of the CSCE. Both initiatives, be believes are, "illustrative of a more 
pervasive reality: growing interest in sub-regional constructs as either subsets of or eventual alternatives to 
large structures like CSCE." 
208James Lacey, p. 88. 
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The NATO alliance must shift its strategic focus southward to address 
the potential security problems of political instability across North Africa 
and the eastern Mediterranean region, says Spanish Defense Minister 
Julian Garcia Vargas. Vargas said he wants NATO's political and 
military experts to help define the outlines of a new Mediterranean 
security plan based on confidence-building measures with North African 
countries. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry agreed during an 
informal NATO defense ministers meeting in Seville, Spain, Sept. 29-30 
that NATO's 'main security front has swung away from Central and 
Eastern Europe to its southern flank'.209 . 
While the threat increasingly becomes a "domestic" concern, these nations will 
devote more time and resources to addressing these risks as they pertain to their own 
security.210 Turkey's Prime Minister, Tansu <;iller, reflects the reluctance of NATO 
members to expand membership at a time when the Alliance's Southern tier -- unlike 
Central and Eastern Europe -- is threatened by a variety of non-military and quasi-
military threats. Turkey like the other fifteen members, increasingly sees its security 
concerns from a more national level. <;iller states that, 
Relations with the newly free and newly independent states are matters 
of enormous importance to our Alliance. Yet, there are other matters ... in 
other guises, which demand our attention as well ... Turkey's role in the 
Alliance must increasingly be defined by its position at the geographic 
epicentre of post-Cold War changes profoundly affecting the security 
Alliance members .... 211 
209Defense News, p. 2. 
2lOJeffrey Simon, "Why NATO Should Expand to the East," p. 8. Dr. Simon contends that "Coupled with 
advanced delivery systems-- which have shrunk the air/spatial dimensions of warfare-- North African and 
Middle Eastern developments increasingly will have an impact on European security." 
211Dr. Tansu <;iller, Prime Minister of Turkey, pp. 4-5. 
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V. THE RUSSIAN FACTORS 
A. DOMESTIC FACTORS & RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Russian elite views on Russian foreign policy and NATO expansion fall into 
categories repre.sented by five political factions. In 1994, few Russian officials believe 
that NATO expansion is in Russia's best interest; most contend that in fact enlargement 
is a provocative step by Western and Central European states to isolate Russia.212 Four 
of these five groups have had a noticeable impact on the Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign policy 
regarding NATO expansion vis-a-vis the protection of Russian national interests abroad. 
Evidence suggests that President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev have shifted 
their foreign policy objectives from an "enlightened" pro-Western stance to a more 
pragmatic pro-Russian approach. Alexei Arbatov lists four Russian foreign policy 
groups in a 1993 journal article. According to Arbatov, these groups vary in numbers 
and motivations - political, ideological, institutional - and transcend boundaries of 
civil/military, parliament, academic and cultural communities, media and public 
organizations. The caveat for adhering to such an all-inclusive list is that support for 
specific policies within each group fluctuates as a result of Russia's economic fortunes. 
In essence, as the Russian economy has worsened, members of the more pro-Western 
groups have adopted more conservative and nationalistic positions. 
1. Pro-Western Group 
When Arbatov wrote the article, he placed Boris Yeltsin, Andrei Kozyrev and 
Yegor Gaidar within the pro-Western camp. At the time, these officials and politicians 
advocated "conspicuously pro-Western policies" that favored "economic determinism 
and universal democratic values" while neglecting the "geo-political and strategic facets 
of international relations."213 Between August 1991 and mid-1992, pro-Western ideas 
dominated Russian foreign policy and were reflected in the concessions Moscow made 
on arms control and regional disputes. The perception created- that this pro-Western 
policy acquiesced to Western demands and served Western interests - was linked to 
Russia's declining domestic situation by more conservative elements. In March 1994, 
Richard Nixon noted that, 
212suzanne Crow, 6 May 1994, p. 5. Regarding the integration of foreign policy views, Crow notes that "a 
series of tough choices have been made in Moscow leading to a harmonization of the interests of Russia's 
diplomats, soldiers, and politicians. The achievement of a consensus is borne out by the way agreement was 
reached in the spring of 1993 on a-foreign-policy concept and in the fall of 1993 on a military doctrine." 
213Alexei Arbatov, p. 9. 
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The most disturbing development since the December election has been 
the sea change in Russian's foreign policy. The rhetoric of ... Andrei 
Kozyrev has shifted 180 degrees. Before the election, he was too pro-
American for his own good. Now he has changed his emphasis on 
universal human values and commonality of interests with America to a 
renewed Russian superpower role and the need for Moscow to chart its 
own course. It is without question a change of the head, not the heart. 
He has read the election returns and is reacting like any other 
politician.214 
Arbatov submits four reasons why Russia's foreign policy after the August 1991 
coup began to adopt a more nationalist tone: 
• The policy failed to identify generally or specifically Russian national 
interests and priorities. 
• The leadership concentrated its efforts on relations with the United States, 
the World Bank and the defense of human rights, instead of dealing with its 
relations with its immediate neighbors. 
• The leadership gave an impression of easily conceding on international 
matters like the sanctions in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Libya as well as the 
weapons allowed under START II. 
• The leadership failed to build a domestic consensus for its foreign policy 
initiatives. 215 
Within the past year and a half, President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev 
have adopted policies between the centrist position and the moderate conservative 
group with a nationalistic tone. A change in leadership to a more conservative figure or 
economic collapse could lead Russia to a more nationalistic foreign policy orientation. 
2. Moderate Liberals 
Russian moderate liberals are viewed as being more realistic and pragmatic 
towards Russia and the West than are members of the pro-Western group. They 
emphasize the necessity to promote distinct Russian foreign policy and security 
objectives based not on lofty human rights goals but on Russia's geo-political position 
and the transitional nature of its domestic situation.216 Advocates of this position now 
include Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yeltsin as well as Gregory Yavlinsky, Alexei Arbatov, 
Vladimir Lukin and young general officers. The difference between the moderate 
214Richard Nixon, p. A 19. 
215Alexei Arbatov, pp. 18-22. 
216Alexei Arbatov, pp. 10-12. 
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liberals and the pro-Westerners is that the former place the highest priority on Russia's 
relations with the former Soviet republics. Additionally, this group views Western 
models of economic and political development as acceptable. However, these standards 
must be tailored to address the unique qualities of Russia. Lastly, moderate liberals 
believe relations with the West can be cordial but must include a hard bargaining stance 
and must not always lead to Russian acquiescence. 
3. Centrist and Moderate Conservatives 
Observers also see signs of the centrist and moderate conservative philosophy 
within Yeltsin's current foreign policy. The centrists and moderate conservatives have 
been supported by the military high command, industrial managers and the federal 
bureaucracy. According to Arbatov, centrists and conservatives cannot reconcile 
themselves to the loss of the Soviet Union, though they reportedly do not favor 
reunification by military force. Centrist-conservatives favor relations with the West, but 
not at the expense of Russia's role as a great power within its "sphere of influence." This 
group is suspicious of the West's motives for "assistance" and opposes excessive 
economic and political reliance on Western aid packages. Finally, this group advocates 
the preservation of substantial military power and considers nuclear weapons relevant 
to "the modem international and Russian security agenda."217 
4. Neo-Communists and Nationalists 
Sometimes referred to as "red-browns" or "hurrah-patriots," this faction of nee-
Communists and nationalists is partially composed of former anti-Communists, 
dissidents and fascists. Prominent members of this group include Vladimir Zhirinovsky 
and Sergei Baburin. Linking domestic issues with foreign policy decisions and forcing 
President Yeltsin to take a more conservative stance is their most notable achievement. 
Arbatov writes that, 
... more respectable representatives of this group are quickly gaining in 
political power, taking advantage of President Yeltsin's domestic failures, 
foreign policy weaknesses and, most of all, his reluctance or inability to 
strike a deal with the moderate conservatives, which is pushing them to 
alliance with the right wing.218 
The nee-Communists and nationalists aspire to protect the interests of ethnic 
Russians abroad and to revive the Russian empire and Russia's superpower status role 
not on the basis of Communism but of Great-Russian nationalism. Among their beliefs 
217 Alexei Arbatov, pp. 12-13. 
218Alexei Arbatov, p. 13. 
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is an under-current of fundamentalist Russian Orthodoxy, anti-Semitism and anti-
Westemism. They advocate the reconstitution of the Soviet Union by foreseeable means 
and intervention in Ukraine, Crimea and the Baltics in order to protect Russian 
nationals and Russian interests.219 Nee-communists and nationalists promote alliances 
with outlaw states, the end of UN sanctions against the Serbs, and a crash military 
build-up to support bold foreign initiatives. This is one of the most dangerous factions 
because its popularity is based upon the exploitation of Russia's declining living 
standards. Supporters include: state-industrial labor, lower-middle classes, pensioners, 
Russian refugees from former Soviet republics and military personnel returning from 
Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally, nee-Communists and nationalists have 
among their ranks a large group of supporters in the Ministry of Defense, Security and 
Internal Affairs as well as prominent spokesmen in the Russian Duma.220 
The rise of ultra nationalist elements in Russia during the past three years is 
illustrative of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's recent rise in popularity. This recent phenomenon 
has been important for three reasons. First, Zhirinovsky's message is well received by a 
broad spectrum of Russians, including most importantly the security services and the 
armed forces. Second, though his outrageous remarks have gotten much international 
press coverage, his calls for the annexation of Finland and Alaska are almost as 
appealing to Russian nationalists as his message of reestablishing Russian influence in 
its "near abroad."221 Third, his message is threatening because it contains simplistic 
solutions and antidotes to the Russain imperial malaise that appeals to the "immature" 
Russian voter. One scholar views Zhirinovsky's base support group as, 
... devoted to the goal of revival of the Russian empire and Russia's 
superpower role, not on the premises of communism, but on those of 
Great-Russian nationalism, a fundamentalist version of the Russian 
2I9The Economist, 21 May 1994, p. 61. Reflecting a shift to the right among Yeltsin foreign policy 
advisors, The Economist noted that, "In January [1994] Andrei Kozyrev, Russia's foreign minister, 
announced that it [protecting ethnic Russians] is 'one of Moscow's main strategic interests' to meet this 
responsibility ... Extreme nationalists, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, call for recolonisation. Alexander 
Rutskoi, a volatile former vice-president who also seeks the presidency, argues that the former republics 
which 'call themselves sovereign and independent never had their own statehood, never in their history. 
They were all parts of Russia, a great power.' Ergo, they still should be.'' 
220Alexei Arbatov, pp. 13-14. 
221This Russian euphemism was coined when the Soviet Union broke up into various republics and 
independent states. The term applies to Central and Eastern Europe generally, Central Asia and Russia's 
Southern flank specifically and any other areas along Russia's periphery that were once in the sphere of 
Soviet influence. 
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Orthodox religion, anti-semitism, and a vigorously anti-Western political 
crusade.222 
Vera Tolz, commenting on the strong Russian voter turnout for Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky, wrote that, "The results show too, that society is still immature, with voters 
being seduced by promises of easy solutions to Russia's problems."223 Ms. Tolz stated 
that Zhirinovsky's success will undoubtedly make relations with Eastern Europe more 
complicated. Secondarily, close observers maintain that President Yeltsin has wisely 
used the Zhirinovsky card to induce greater Western concessions, promising cooler 
relations if ultranationalists succeed in coming to power. This Byzantine maneuver has 
been played up by Yeltsin and his Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to help block any 
attempts to expand NATO. Their point is: "If you don't allow us latitude in the "near 
abroad" [and Central and Eastern Europe] then the Russian voting public will elect even 
more conservative elements and jeopardize democratic and market reforms." The West 
for its part seems to have bought off on this "Russia-first" policy fearing the rise of a 
Zhirinovsky-like Russian President, while simultaneously turning a blind eye to 
Russian diplomatic coups in Serbia and Central and Eastern Europe. Pavel Felgengauer 
described the ultranationalist power base as composed of reactionaries from the state-
industrial base, pensioners, impoverished urban lower and middle classes and "tacit 
sympathizers in the ministries of defense, security and internal affairs. n224 
Zhirinovsky's threats have raised expectations among Russian military leaders 
and civilians that Russia might undertake such actions. Though his threats to reclaim 
Finland, Alaska and Ukraine and to partition Poland between Russia and Germany may 
seem too preposterous to warrant foreign concern, history has taught Central and East 
European countries to take such rantings seriously.225 The ramblings of this ''buffoon" 
took on new significance when the Liberal Democratic Party - Zhirinovsky's party -
received 25% of the Russian vote in the December 1993 election and took 64 seats in the 
222AJexei Arbatov, p. 14. 
223Vera Tolz, pp. 2-8. Ms. Tolz also commented that as a demagogue and populist, Vladimir Zhirinovsky 
promised to stop conversion of military-industrial projects and sell 30 billion dollars worth of arms to 
international clients each year to combat unemployment, institute public executions for persons involved in 
criminal activities and provide cheap vodka for Russian businessmen. 
224 Pavel Felgengauer's "Army is Neutral for the Present Moment," in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 October 
1993 cited by Alexei Arbatov, p. 14. 
225Kevin Fedarko, p. 40. Fedarko writes that, "He [Zhirinovsky] has threatened to restore Russia's imperial 
borders, annex Alaska, invade Turkey, repartition Poland, give Germany 'another Chernobyl,' turn 
Kazakhstan into a 'scorched desert' and employ large fans to blow radioactive waste across the Baltics." 
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parliamentary elections.226 The polling data suggest that the Liberal Democratic Party's 
success in December 1993 was actually a protest vote for better domestic policies. Yet 
one cannot separate Zhirinovsky's foreign policy objectives from his domestic agenda 
on the grounds that people voted for him simply to improve their domestic 
condition.227 Even without Zhirinovsky, other demagogues have appealed to this 
disheartened segment of the population. One Russian "right-wing" intellectual quoted 
in a recent issue of The New York Times Magazine, reiterated this view: 
Zhirinovsky is not the point...He is simply a vehicle to express our anger. 
For Russia right now the most important thing is to find a feeling of 
national unity to overcome this crisis. Today the main factor is a total 
decline of national sentiments. We must have a leader who can unite 
Russia and Russians again. Zhirinovsky may disappear, but these ideas 
will not. 228 
Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Andrezj Olechowski stated that Poland 
could not disregard the December elections in Russia because Zhirinovsky's agenda 
includes the "restoration of the former Soviet Empire, and given how many votes he got 
we can no longer write his opinions off as a bad joke."229 Vaclav Havel has been more 
direct, raising the possibility that, 
... in Russia forces still enamored of the imperial ambitions of the former 
Soviet Union would temporarily gain the upper hand: chauvinistic, Great 
Russian, crypto-Cornrnunist and crypto-totalitarian forces. Leaders of 
that stamp would protest vigorously that NATO was admittin~ former 
Soviet satellites and thus moving closer to the Russian borders.23 
226Kevin Fedarko, p. 43. Fedarko adds that in April 1994, at the Fifth Party Congress of the Liberal 
Democratic Party, 340 deputies unanimously elected to give Zhirinovsky absolute power of the party's 
leadership until 2004 and nominated him as Russia's next president. 
227vera Tolz, p. 7. Tolz cited the Moskovsky komsomolets on 18 December 1993 which stated that, "It is 
doubtful that people who voted for Zhirinovsky understood that his program, with its promise of making the 
life of every Russian 'dignified and prosperous,' in fact means a war with Russia's neighbors, mass terror in 
the country, and a return to the distributive economic system." 
228Mr. Shafarevich cited by Michael Specter, p. 56. 
229Dr. Andrezj Olechowski, p. 3. 
230vaclav Havel, p. E 3. 
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5. Nationalist Military Professionals 
This fifth grouping--not mentioned by Arbatov--has the support of both civilians 
and the uniformed services. These military men are seen as pragmatic, anti-Western, 
and opposed to the independence of the Soviet Union's former satellites and republics. 
They condemn institutions and groups that infringe upon Russia's sphere of influence in 
the Baltics and Central Europe and advocate aggressive means if necessary. Lieutenant 
General Lebed is typical of this grouping, whose paternalistic character and brand of 
Russian nationalism are the foundations of his popularity. Additionally, Lebed is 
favored to become the next defense minister by two-thirds of all Russian military 
officers polled in a recent survey, who are "in favour of a strong hand to guide the state 
and evidently feel that such a hand is presently lacking."231 He is viewed as a defender 
of Russia, tested in battle and not corrupted by the growth of capitalist enterprises. 
Lebed is seen as more acceptable and sensible than the bombastic Zhirinovsky. A putsch 
or a victory in the 1996 presidential election might lead Lebed to carry out a Pinochet-
style domestic agenda and a fiercely anti-Western foreign policy. The Economist writes 
that, "The lesson of last October's [1993] uprising is that a disorganised mob nearly took 
over the capital. General Lebed and one of his battalions might well succeed where the 
mob failed. "232 
Lebed supports "stronger" methods to deal with the Baltic States because their 
citizenship requirements supposedly discriminate against Russian-speaking nationals. 
His advocacy of authoritarian solutions applies to areas beyond Russia's "near abroad," 
and into Central and Eastern Europe. His public rebukes against Western diplomats 
and their proposals have made him ever more popular among the military and ordinary 
231 John Lloyd. The poll, conducted by the Sinus polling group surveyed 615 senior officers including 60 
flag officers. Citing the polling data, Lloyd writes that, "Most officers on or above the rank of major 
thought that 'without authoritarian rule we cannot overcome chaos'; that 'western types of democracy are not 
suitable to Russia' and that the 'main foreign policy task must be to re-establish Russia as a great power 
respected throughout the world'." More ominous were the popular views of these officers regarding 
Russia's future. "More than half thought that there would be one of the following alternatives: mass 
uprisings and strikes in different regions; the reassertion of a dictatorship; an explosion in a nuclear power 
station; or a military putsch. Very few believed in successful economic reforms or full co-operation with 
Nato .... " 
232The Economist, 27 August 1994, p. 48. The Economist notes that "A (liberal) newspaper Novaya 
Ezhednevnaya Gazeta, has predicted that he [Lebed] 'may become the front-running candidate in Russia's 
presidential election'." The Economist cites an interview Lebed gave in Izvestia noting that the general 
made clear his role model is Chile's General Augusto Pinochet. Lebed stated, "But what did he [Pinochet] 
do? He saved the state from total collapse ... and put the army in pride of place. With its help, he forced 
people to get back to work. The loudmouths were forced, and forced in a brutal manner, to shut their 
mouths." 
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Russians. His outbursts towards officials like American Ambassador to the United 
Nations Madeleine Albright have become commonplace. Lebed commented on 
Albright's statement that Russia's withdrawal of the 14th Army from Moldova, 
... constitutes 'an issue of primary importance to US foreign policy' .. .I 
[Lebed said] categorically oppose [the idea that] some woman, whatever 
her rank, should make decisions for the Russian state ... [Lebed concluded 
that Albright's comment was] yet another sign that they are openly and 
unceremoniously wiping their feet on us .... 233 
The rise of the ultranationalists in Russia has coincided with the relative decline 
in the economy after the collapse of Communism in 1991. Nationalists seized the 
initiative from government "reformers" by linking the Russian public's outrage over 
what are viewed as "Western" excesses (crime, inflation, unemployment and greed) as a 
consequence of the government's pro-western concessions on foreign policy.234 All of 
these problems were, of course, present under Soviet socialism as well. Russia's 
ultranationalists have championed domestic policies that couple a revival of Russian 
greatness with the adoption of a firm foreign policy posture (i.e., reconstitution of the 
Soviet empire, condemnation of Western leaders and reassertion of Russian strength). 
The moderate-liberals and centrists have influenced the pro-Westerners to the 
point that members of the latter group have been virtually incorporated into the former. 
Because domestic problems have been successfully linked to foreign politics by each of 
the groups except pro-Westerners, the Yeltsin government has had to take a more 
nationalistic posture in order to maintain the support of the public and the rrulitary.235 
Some have compared the ultranationalist revival of the 1990's with the nineteenth 
century movement of the Slavophiles and the debate over Russia's character (an Eastern 
or Western culture), and the role that Western influences should have in creating a 
modem Russian society.236 
233Vladimir Socor, RFEIRL Inc .. 
234Vera Tolz, pp. 1-8. Citing reports in the Obshchaya Gazeta, Tolz writes that, "Most observers have 
viewed the vote for Zhirinovsky as a protest against the economic policies of Yeltsin and ... Gaidar." Tolz 
also notes that "Zhirinovsky's supporters complained about the situation in Russia as a whole. 'If,' Izvestiya 
writes, 'we discount the three problems perturbing the supporters of all parties and electoral blocs --
inflation, rising crime, and the state of the economy -- then 'weak government' is the main worry of 
Zhirinovsky's supporters." 
235Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 37. Mihalka writes that the Yeltsin government, "effectively took 
up the rhetoric and policies of the centrists and moderate-conservatives whom they had ejected by force 
from the parliament building. Foreign policy and Partnership for Peace have now become a stage on which 
Russia's domestic politics are played out." 
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B. RUSSIA'S AGGRESSIVE MILITARY DOCTRINE 
Russia's recently published military doctrine or "purposes" explicitly lays the 
foundations for activities that Russian leaders would consider hostile acts towards the 
integrity of Russia. Its future involvement in international disputes lays out the 
necessary preconditions for Russian intervention. Primarily, Russia's military doctrine 
constitutes, 
... a system of views officially adopted in the state on the prevention of 
wars and armed conflicts, on military organizational development, on the 
country's defense preparation, on the organization of countermeasures to 
threats to the state's military security, and on the utilization of the 
Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops for the defense of the 
Russian Federation's vitally important interests.237 
By their offensive, defensive or deterrent character, doctrines both [military and 
political] affect the probability and intensity of arms races and of wars. 238 While 
proclaiming that the Russian Federation's interests do not, "impinge upon the security 
of other states" and that they are "secured within the framework of equitable and 
mutually beneficial interstate relations," Central and Eastern Europeans with history as 
a reminder are naturally very skepticaJ.239 These statements form a contradictory 
pattern of first stating that they are not in opposition to other countries carrying out 
their own foreign policy--in so far as it does not impinge upon Russia's ultimate veto 
authority. 
The preceding excerpts from the Russian military doctrines are indicative of the 
prevailing Russian wisdom that Alexei Arbatov describes as both aggressive and 
assertive. As Scott McMichael writes, "the doctrine clearly reasserts Russia's historical 
position as a Eurasian land power ... [T]he new Russian draft doctrine retains much of the 
framework of Soviet doctrine .... "240 The Russian military doctrine is an obvious 
attempt to dissuade both NATO and Central European countries from expanding the 
Atlantic Alliance. Most observers believe the doctrine is an implicit warning about the 
236s. Neil MacFarlane, p. 10. MacFarlane observed that the current reaction to pro-Western Russian 
politicians like Gorbachev and Yeltsin before 1993 is, "characterised by a nationalist desire to recapture the 
greatness of Russia and a resentment about the secondary role in world diplomacy played in the late 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin periods." 
237 Detailed Account of Military Doctrine, FBIS-SOV-92-222-S, p. 1. 
238Barry R. Posen, p. 16. 
239 Detailed Account of Military Doctrine, FBIS-SOV-92-222-S, p. 1. 
240scott McMichael, p. 50. 
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expansion of military alliances. McMichael writes that the doctrine's statements about, 
stationing or building up of forces near Russia's borders 
... are intended to discourage any attempts by NATO or the to fill the 
vacuum created by the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe 
or to seek a geostrategic advantage through naval or ground 
deployments. 241 
The following excerpts from the Russian military doctrine illustrate the 
aggressive tone that Russian military-political policy has undertaken during the past 
two years. These extracts, taken directly from the "provisions" of the Russian doctrine 
provide concrete evidence that Russian leaders believe their area of influence extends 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe: 
• ''The basic existing and potential sources of external military danger for the 
Russian Federation are ... 
-the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests 
of the Russian Federation's military security;" 
• "[F]actors which help transform a military danger into an immediate military 
threat to the Russian Federation: 
--... the buildup of groupings of troops (forces) on the borders of the Russian 
Federation to the point where they disrupt the prevailing correlation of 
forces; 
- ... the training of armed formations and groups on the territory of other states 
which are intended to be transferred to the territory of the Russian 
Federation and its allies; 
- ... the introduction of foreign troops in the territory of neighboring states of 
the Russian Federation (if this is not connected with measures to restore 
or maintain peace in accordance with a decision of the UN Security 
Council or a regional organ of collective security with the agreement of 
the Russian Federation)." 
• "Basic Principles of Russian Federation Policy in the Field of Military 
Security .... 
-the maintenance of stability in regions adjoining the borders of the Russian 
Federation, neighboring countries, and the world as a whole;" 
24Iscott McMichael, p. 46. 
104 
• "The aims of military-technical cooperation are: 
-strengthening the Russian Federation's military-political positions in various 
regions in the world .... "242 
The Russians in effect are attempting to carve out a specific area of influence for 
themselves and create a role as sole protector of the Central and East European region. 
Furthermore, American and West European reaction has been virtually mute. Their 
silence signals an almost de facto recognition of Russia's right to assert its sphere of 
influence beyond its borders into its "near abroad."243 Manifest within these excerpts 
are Russian leaders' perceptions, as they were during the Soviet era, of the outside 
world as a hostile threat. Central and East Europeans fear this doctrine not merely for 
what is stated therein, but rather how the Russian military has functioned in accordance 
with its precepts. Russia's involvement in the "near abroad" (Georgia and Abkhazia, 
Tajikistan, Moldova and their disputes with Ukraine over the ownership of the Black 
Sea Fleet) are all substantive events that make Europeans along Russia's Western 
frontiers fear Russian calls for a "right" to a sphere of influence. 
C. RUSSIA'S AMBITIOUS FOREIGN POLICY 
Russian foreign policy has scored numerous victories over the past two years 
that are illustrative of its commitment to regain a position ·as a global leader and 
hegemonic power in what it terms its "near abroad." The insertion of Russian 
paratroopers into Serbia without the consent or forewarning to NATO leaders or the 
United States was substantial symbolism for a country ready to prove its new-found 
role in its self-stated "sphere of influence." Russia's attempts at subverting the 
legitimate sovereignty of its neighbor Ukraine has not gone unnoticed. However, 
American acquiescence to Russian spheres along its southern border has precipitated 
the feeling among Russian diplomats that their aggressive policies in East Europe can go 
unchecked. Karen House wrote in The Wall Street Journal, 
When NATO recently faced an opportunity to extend membership to 
former Soviet satellites such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
it shrank from doing so for fear of upsetting Russia ... Russia seeks to 
embrace the old Soviet empire and insist that much of former Eastern 
Europe remain a neutralist buffer zone. 244 
242Detailed Account of Military Doctrine, FBIS-SOV-92-222-S, pp. 1-10. 
243 Detailed Account of Military Doctrine, FBIS-SOV-92-222-S, pp. 1-11. 
244Karen Elliott House, 24 February 1994. 
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Further, it has been the Russian policy of playing upon President Clinton's 
commitment to Yeltsin's presidency, that they can assert themselves where only a few 
years ago it would have been unmentionable. Russian foreign policy makers have 
relied upon their traditional rhetoric that expansion of NATO would aggravate 
Moscow's traditional fears of encirclement and strengthen Russian opposition to reform. 
There is a renewed realization that the Cold War was not the only conflict that has 
distinguished relations between Russia and the United States. 
A correspondent with The New York Times referred to an 1835 writing by Alexis 
de Tocqueville who observed about the complex nature of Russian-American relations, 
'There are now two great nations in the world which, starting from different points, 
seem to be advancing towards the same goal: the Russians and the Anglo-
Arnericans."245 Moreover, Foreign Minister Kozyrev has on numerous occasions, 
insisted that Russia would not allow itself to be left out of global decision-making.246 A 
Russian intelligence chief recently stated that an expansion of NATO would force 
Moscow into "fundamental" countermeasures.247 Russia's new diplomatic initiatives as 
well as its efforts to end fighting in the former Yugoslavia have prompted Poland to 
request associate membership in the European Union.248 
Russian diplomacy has at times claimed a veto over the foreign policy of its 
former satellites in Central and Eastern Europe. Having in effect acquiesced, American 
policymakers have had at times a myopic focus on the continuing goodwill of Russian 
reformers, being reluctant to embrace a "geopolitical agenda" that might offend Russian 
245Tiwmas L. Friedman, pp. A I & A 2. Friedman also notes that the American-Russian competition has a 
long history of vying for raw materials, economic wealth and security. Friedman's point like that of Senator 
Lugar's, suggests that Americans should not assume that the absence of the Soviet Union means that the 
United States no longer has competing interests or that Russia is no longer an international competitor for 
limited resources. 
246Elaine Sciolino, 15 March 1994, p. A 6. 
247Zbigniew Brzezinski, p. A 19. Brzezinski was quoting comments made by Yevgeny M. Primakov 
regarding Russian elite's (military, foreign affairs and security chiefs) reaction to any eastward expansion of 
NATO. 
248Jane Perlez, 13 March 1994, p. A 6. Most Central European states (Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary) will continue to petition for membership in any Western organization that might help their 
chances at gaining membership in a collective defense arrangement, namely NATO. Russia's bold 
diplomatic initiatives have even prompted former Communist leaders to speak out in favor of expanded ties 
to Western European organizations. Perlez, citing an article on 11 March 1994 in the Wyborcza Gazeta 
that, General W ojciech J aruzelski said that Russia would remain, "a very unstable country" until at least the 
year 2000. He also said that a "Almost all political parties in Poland, whether on the right or left, think that 
the guarantees of our [Poland's] security lie in our close contacts with the West...." 
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sensibilities.249 Russian nationalism has also begun to manifest itself within Russia's 
political-military relations and as the East Europeans view Russia's treatment of Ukraine 
they are increasing skeptical of Russia's benevolence. Antoni Kaminski writes, 
... a lot in the Russian policies toward Ukraine suggests that Russians 
have not accepted the loss of this country and that they plan and work 
toward recovering it. They achieve the aim by using the issue of Crimea, 
by military provocations (some of them with the use of the Black Sea 
Fleet), by efforts to isolate the country internationally, and bring it down 
economically. 250 
Russian foreign policy in essence seems to imply that NATO forces must not be 
allowed to incorporate willing countries while simultaneously Russian defense 
organizations are allowed to go as far West as is possible without actually re-invading 
Central Europe. 
D. RUSSIA'S DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY & ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ITS 
NEIGHBORS 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia's relations with its 
neighbors have been characterized by a series of heavy-handed attempts to reassert its 
lost authority. The West (particularly the United States) has acquiesced to Russian 
demands to "contain" instability along the southern flank from Moldova to Kyrgyzstan. 
Many observers wonder whether Russia will try the same approach to "protecting its 
interests" in Ukraine and the Baltic States. Russia's behavior in the Kaliningrad Oblast 
and its leadership role in the CIS are further evidence that it intends to exert Russian 
influence beyond the current borders to the detriment of other Central and Eastern 
European states. As late as November 1991, NATO still considered Soviet military 
power as the single greatest threat to Alliance security. The New Strategic Concept 
states that, 
249Henry Kissinger, 14 March 1994, p. 75. 
2SOProfessor Antoni Z. Kaminski. Professor Kaminski is the Director of the Department of Strategic 
Studies, Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw, Poland. Professor Kaminski delivered his speech entitled, 
"Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Sources oflnstability" in Washington, D.C. 26-27 April 
1993. His implication is that Russian diplomats have been using the 'Us (Russia) or Them (Central and 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Republics)' strategy to pressure western policy makers into choosing the 
more populated and nuclear Russia over the less-threatening independent states that neighbor Russia. This 
'Russia-first' policy denied to exist by the Clinton administration, has been the general "modus operandi" 
perception shared among CEE states. 
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From the point of view of Alliance strategy, these different risks have to 
be seen in different ways. Even in a non-adversarial and co-operative 
relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including 
its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which 
the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in 
Europe.251 
Since 1991, Russia, though altered in form and name, has continued to possess a 
formidable military capability that poses a threat to NATO members and Central and 
East European countries in the gray zone between Russia and 'The West." The head of 
the German defence staff, General Klaus Naumann, stated that, "even if existing 
disarmament treaties were observed, Russia would still have more than 3,200 strategic 
nuclear warheads and an army of 1.5m men which Mr Yeltsin had promised to supply 
generously."252 
Economic and political ploys designed to keep its neighbors and Central and 
Eastern Europe under Russia's influence are also prominent tactics. To be sure, the 
current Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign initiatives are very similar to the tactics advocated by 
the most nationalistic leaders only a few years prior. Yet, President Yeltsin and Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev increasingly implement conservative foreign policy initiatives under 
the clever ploy of "keeping the ultranationalists quiet."253 Russia's diplomatic and 
politico-military relations with its neighbors constitute a risk to Central Europe because 
the heavy-handed techniques (i.e., use of the Russian military, political subterfuge and 
economic sanctions) displayed in the "near abroad" might soon be used against Central 
and Eastern Europe. Russia's historical imperial legacy and its current maneuvers 
suggest a return to the traditional modus operandi throughout its historic sphere of 
influence. 
251The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 14. 
252 Klaus Naumann cited in Bruce Clark, 22-23 October 1994. Naumann was quoted as describing Russia 
as a country "taking a giant step from feudalism to democracy without ever having gone through the 
experience of enlightenment. Stability and democracy are linked with economic prosperity, and the Russian 
economy .. .is far away from recovery, and hence we should not be too optimistic in our assessment." 
253Suzanne Crow, 6 May 1994, p. 3. Crow writes that Zhirinovsky, "has become a scapegoat for policies 
for which Russian officials would like to avoid responsibility and a foil for those who would like to 
continue calling themselves liberals." Citing Vitalii Portnikov, a commentator for the Nezavisimaya Gazeta 
on 20 January 1994, who mused that, "Were it not for this remarkable person, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, how 
difficult it would be for many Russian politicians to preserve their reputations as 'doves'." 
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1. The Economic Incorporation of Belarus 
Belarusian sovereignty has undergone a transformation which many believe 
spells the end of its status as an independent nation. The action in question is the ever 
closer relations with the Russian Federation and the Belarusian government's less-than-
enthusiastic attitude concerning independence. Two experts on Central and Eastern 
European affairs claim, 
Belarus went much father than other Commonwealth states in 
concluding an extensive alliance with Russia. The alliance, confirmed by 
Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich and Russian Acting Prime 
Minister Yegor Gaidar on July, 20 1992, provided for a unified credit and 
financial system and a unified ruble zone between the republics. The 
alliance was cemented by a treaty regulating the coordination of activities 
in the military sphere, as well as by an agreement on the strategic forces 
that remained temporarily on Belarusian territory. The two states agreed 
to a coordinated budget, tax, and credit policy that would be 
implemented through an interrepublic economic coordination council. In 
part, the alliance was based on Belarus's high degree of integration with 
Russia's economy. As much as 70 percent of Belarus's enterprises were 
said to manufacture products for the Russian market.254 
The recent merger of the two countries' political, military and economic affairs 
has forced Poland to re-analyze its own security interests vis-a-vis Russia. The 
consolidation of Belarusian concerns under the auspices of Russian control has for all 
intents and purposes, extended the Russian federation's frontier westward to the 
Eastern Polish frontier. The same patrimonial attitude that Russia places on Ukraine it 
also impresses on Belarus. Russia sees Belarus and Ukraine as "younger brothers" in a 
long-standing relationship. Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky write, 
A large segment of the Russian citizenry is loath to part with its self-
image as the elder brother, and for them the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, 
Georgia, Armenia, and the Central Asian states, some of which have been 
under Russian patrimony from one to three centuries, will be felt for 
years to come.255 
Poland is paying particularly close attention to the restoration of Russian-
Belarusian union precisely because Russia seems ready to sacrifice economic prosperity 
in order to reconstitute its former-empire. Cooperation with Belarus is the Russian 
Federation's method of satisfying historical feelings of self-pity, fear of encirclement and 
254Diuk & Karatnycky, pp. 263-264. 
255Diuk & Karatnycky, p. 231. 
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loss of empire. Sergey Baburin and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn have been particularly 
active in demanding that Russia reevaluate the current borders and for former Soviet 
republics to rejoin the Russian Federation.256 Belarus's decision to sign a collective 
security agreement with the Commonwealth of Independent States was in direct 
contradiction to its constitution which states that Belarus will remain a neutral country. 
A leader of the Belarusian Council of Ministers Department of Civilian Rights, Civil 
Security and Defense Work stated the following rationale for Belarus pursuing a pro-
Russian policy as it pertains to the economic and military spheres of security: 
• Realignment of "spheres of influence in the world as a result of the collapse 
of the USSR leaves Belarus with no [security] guarantees .... " (An indirect 
reference to Poland and the Visegrad's attempts to join NATO and the three 
Baltic states receiving various forms of aid from Western Europe. Though 
never mentioned the official also recognizes a familiar Polish fear of being 
within the Central and Eastern Europe "security vacuum" being a "buffer" 
between Russia and Western Europe.) 
• "Belarus has enjoyed a reliable security system for the past seventy years and 
its destruction now would be senseless." 
• The "former-Soviet military-industrial complex was a unified whole that 
supplied state-of-the-art technology and arms as well as spare parts to all 
countries party to the [CIS Collective Security Agreement the so-called 
'Tashkent Accord']." (This recognizes the Belarus's inability to provide 
resources or military infrastructure necessary to carry out a complete 
overhaul of the armed forces. The source fails to mention that the Belarusian 
military-industrial complex, though much smaller than Russia's, will also 
benefit from the military alliance and the new markets for Belarusian 
military hardware that other CIS states offer.) 
• "Belarus cannot develop the military sciences on its own." (Ironically, the 
Ukrainians have succeeded in developing their own military science 
department. The Department spokesman would be more correct to state that 
Belarus has neither the will nor any intention of developing its own military 
science department.) 
256Diuk & Karatnycky, p. 245. Diuk and Karatnycky note the recent revival of pan-Slavism, "In early 1992 
Sergey Baburin and other leaders of the large Rossiya faction in parliament joined in challenging the current 
borders of Russia's neighbors, asserting that such borders had been 'arbitrarily set up by administrative and 
bureaucratic methods' and arguing in support of 'the right of any area outside the Russian Federation to 
adopt decisions on joining Russia'." 
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• "Belarus's two military academies cannot meet the country's training needs." 
(This is due in part to the fact that less than 30% of the officers in the 
Belarusian military are of Belarus descent and only 20% of the Belarusian 
Ministry of Defense is Belarus ian. )257 
Though one could argue about the strength of the Belarusian rationale, the 
aforementioned statement makes clear the Belarusian bureaucracy has every intention 
of pursuing a pro-Russian policy regardless of any constitutional conflicts that arise or 
the international ramifications associated with Russian troops once again bordering on 
Poland's Eastern border. Belarus's economic malaise is the main element driving it 
towards a closer union with Russia. This close economic relationship has flowed over 
into other traditional sovereignty factors such as military integration and politico-
military security arrangements. From this aspect, one can see that the closer Belarusian-
Russian relationship is critical within the larger context of security matters vis-a-vis 
Poland because it signals a clear willingness on the part of Russia to reassert an imperial 
destiny regardless of the financial cost of supporting Belarus's economy. It is this 
overly-aggressive willingness to reincorporate Belarus that makes Belarusian-Russian 
relations even more critical than Ukrainian-Russian relations vis-a-vis Poland. 
Alexander Lukashuk notes that as a result of the "less-than-stellar" performance of the 
Belarusian economy, leaders concluded a number of bilateral agreements with Russia, 
mainly economic in content and some conceding military inferiority in exchange for 
Russian assistance. He writes, 
In addition to a close military union, the Belarusian-Russian accords 
embraced very broad economic cooperation, including the setting up of 
an interrepublican economic coordination council ... while Russia 
undertook to pay Belarus's share of the former Soviet foreign debt, which 
amounted to $3.5 billion.258 
Belarus's recent economic agreements with Russia leave it without an 
independent currency, and without its own sovereign money, Belarus has all but ceded 
it sovereignty to Russia.259 The Polish Chief of Mission to the United States, Maciej 
257Henadz Danilou quoted in Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 24 March 1993 cited by Kathleen Mihalisko, 23 
April1993, p. 28. Ms. Mihalisko also cited a report in the Narodnaya hazeta, 3 March 1993 and noted that 
a "substantial part of the officer corps does not accept the defense of Belarus's independence as its moral 
obligation." To the extent that the interests of the arch conservatives coincide with the interests of this 
Russian-dominated military command, Belarusian sovereignty can be seriously undermined. 
258Alexander Lukashuk, p. 68. 
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Kozlowski, noted_ that the dangerous signal sent to Central and Eastern European 
countries is that Russia puts imperial interests ahead of economic interests and that 
Belarus has lost all pretense of independence without the existence of its own 
currency.260 This viewpoint is shared by Poland and other countries that have a keen 
interest in monitoring any forms of Russian nee-imperialism. The experience of Belarus 
will likely serve as the test-case for Russian diplomats concerned with reconstructing 
vital frontiers of the old empire. There is no doubt a large portion of the Ukrainian 
public watching events in Belarus and eagerly anticipating a similar form of Russian 
economic salvation. 
Finally, with Belarus's ratification of the START 1 and Nonproliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons treaties in February 1993 the end result may by very different than 
what Western policymakers had imagined. In a twist of Russian diplomatic 
maneuvering, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from republics of the former-Soviet 
Union has opened an opportunity for Russia to provide CIS members with nuclear 
protection or the so-called "nuclear umbrella." In effect Russia has indiscriminately 
created a de facto alliance that offers a similar NATO Article 5 guarantee to all comers. 
The most alarming aspect for Poland is Belarus's willingness to link acceptance of 
security guarantees in the Tashkent Accord with economic union and the Russian 
Federation's requirement for Belarusian acquiescence to such an arrangement.261 
The maintenance of good Polish-Belarusian relations has historically depended 
on a variety of factors including treatment of minorities in the frontier regions, the 
historical memory within the greater context of a national identity, and the relative 
259Chief of Mission, Embassy of Poland to the United States of America, Maciej Kozlowski addressing the 
Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., 25 Apri11994. 
260Kozlowski, 25 April 1994. 
261The Tashkent Accord created the foundation for former republics of the Soviet Union to join in a 
military alliance to stabilize numerous conflicts on Russia's periphery. This attempt to form a military 
alliance is a classic example of a group of countries (former Soviet Republics) in concert with one powerful 
ally (Russia) to balance against what they believe is a threat: instability along a long frontier as well as the 
Western alliances of NATO and WEU. Most experts see the Tashkent Accord and the formation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States structures as Russia's ftrst attempt to balance and reintegrate the 
former republics of the Soviet Union. The deputy chief of the liberal Moscow News recently remarked that, 
"Reintegration of neighboring countries has meanwhile become the magic formula ... this includes ... Kiev and 
Minsk, and nobody will be able to prevent Moscow from reintegrating them." (from Moscow lnterfax in 
English, 1445, GMT, 18 March 1994). The main points of the accord include: logistical support from the 
expansive Russian military-industrial complex in the form of equipment and spare parts, compatibility with 
other CIS armed forces in terms of communications, weaponry, training and doctrine, and the use of 
Russian training facilities for officers and technicians. Belarus currently possesses only an outdated 
military-industrial complex and will rely heavily on Russia to provide 85-90% of the resources necessary to 
reestablish military forces. 
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balance of power between regional entities. For the past seventy years the Soviet Union, 
as the dominant regional power, maintained cordial relations with Poland through the 
use of the Red Army. With the 1922 annexation of eastern Belarus- the former kresy --
still vivid in the minds of many Belarusian hard-line leaders, there still exists a lingering 
fear of Polish intentions. One expert on the region commented, 
The bitter legacy of the early to mid-20th century lives on in the historical 
memories of ... Belarusians ... Compounding this resentment is the lingering 
fear among these peoples that a Poland free of Moscow's control would 
sooner or later want to regain control of the former kresy.262 
This fear in fact is one argument Poland and NATO officials could leave with 
Russia. That is, incorporation into NATO would quell fears in Belarus of any Polish 
revanchanist claims and would thus be a mitigating factor in making Central and 
Eastern Europe more stable. Any remnants of 'bad blood" between a free Poland and 
Belarus run by old-style nomenklatura can be expected to continue as long as they fear 
friendly Polish overtures as some sort of devious duplicitous plot. Poland's main 
rationale for improved relations with Belarus concerns the large population of ethnic 
Poles in eastern Belarus, the fear that economic ruin, a Chernobyl-like nuclear disaster 
in Belarus or a regional war could result in large numbers of refugees flowing into 
Poland, that better German-Belarusian-Russian relations might threaten Polish interests, 
and finally that Russo-Belarusian relations would further evolve into Belarusian 
acquiescence and thus Russian troops would once again be placed along the Polish 
frontier. 
With territory greater than that of Hungary and a population of 10.2 million 
people, (13% of which are Russians) and more than 30,000 Russian troops stationed 
throughout the country, Belarus has enough contributing elements to constitute a 
security risk to Poland.263 The current reality in Belarus with regard to its international 
policy makes the future of Polish-Belarusian-Russian relations precarious. The prospect 
that Warsaw will soon see Russian troops along its eastern frontier has in fact occurred. 
Belarus is more firmly than ever a willing appendage of a new imperial Russia. As 
Russia continues to dictate the terms of economic aid, Belarusian leaders seem more 
than willing to cede sovereignty in the form of economic, political and military 
262Stephen R. Burant, p. 397. 
263Stephen R. Burant, p. 399. Burant lists the most obvious factors that constitute a Belarusian risk to 
Polish security. The Economist of 21 May 1994, states that Russian troop strength at between 25,000 to 
30,000, though this number will surely rise with the recent military cooperation treaties and the returning 
Russian Army troops from Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics. 
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concessions to secure a place for the old-style nomenklatura. With Belarus's 
concessions, Poland has an even greater case for eventual membership in NATO. 
2. Relations with Ukraine 
The strained relations between Russia and Ukraine are the result of lingering 
Russian memories of, "Russia's imperial legacy and the additional problem that many, if 
not most, Russians do not consider Ukraine a legitimate entity, much less an 
independent, sovereign state:•264 Since announcing its independence after a 
referendum in December in 1991, Ukraine has been under intense pressure by Russian 
nationalists to renounce its separatist claims. The most caustic statements have 
emanated from Russia's outspoken nationalist parliamentarians. Statements from the 
ultra-national portion of the Russian parliament have irritated delicate relations and 
have delayed future negotiations concerning a whole range of bilateral issues. 
The Soviet version and currently-held Russian view of Ukrainian-Russian 
relations is best expressed in a 1954 document glorifying the historical legacy of the 
Ukrainian-Russian union. Though forty years old, the document illustrates the past and 
present "Russian view" that Ukraine has benefited from the union in which Russia 
serves as the "older brother." The Theses on the Three-Hundredth Anniversary of the 
Reunion of the Ukraine with Russia (1654-1954) elaborates on the common heritage of the 
two slavic nations and implies that the imperial identity of Russia is linked to union 
with Ukraine. As stated by the Russian-dominated Communist Party: 
Three hundred years ago, by the powerfully expressed will of the 
Ukrainian people at the Pereiaslav Rada in January 1654, the union of 
Ukraine with Russia was proclaimed ... the Soviet Union is an inspiring 
example of a country which, for the first time in history, has solved the 
national question ... By linking their destiny forever with the fraternal 
Russian people, the Ukrainian people freed themselves from foreign 
subjugation and ensured their national development...The reunion of the 
Ukraine with Russia in 1654 was the natural corollary of the entire 
preceding history of the two great kindred Slavic peoples - the Russians 
and the Ukrainians ... these peoples ... sprang from a common stock- the 
ancient Russian people who set up the ancient Russian State of Kiev 
Rus·.265 
Not only do most Ukrainians disagree with the Russian version of historical 
relations vis-a-vis Ukraine, they believe this mindset makes it impossible for 
demagogues like Vladimir Zhirinovsky or Alexander Rutskoi to accept the idea of an 
264Roman Solchanyk, p. 27. 
265John Basarab, pp. 270-288. 
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independent Ukraine. The Ukrainian-Russian dispute has been most vividly illustrated 
by both countries' contention over the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea Fleet. As 
one observer note, "By mid-1992 a dynamic driving the evolution of the dispute had 
already been established; claim, counterclaim, crisis and compromise."266 The imperial 
Russian view has still not reconciled the fact that Ukraine is independent or will remain 
a separate sovereign entity. Russia's inability to come to grips with the loss of Ukraine 
and for that matter parts of the old-Soviet Empire, continue to haunt its emergence as a 
confident Eurasian power. The failure to move on to more pressing agenda items 
continues to leave Russia's western and northwestern neighbors fearful of future claims 
of a rightful sphere of influence. It is no wonder then that the three Baltic states as well 
as Poland and the other Visegrad countries watch Russian policymakers gradually 
reassert themselves where they were previously voted out in the 1991 move towards 
independence. 
The contentious issues dividing Russia and Ukraine since Ukrainian 
independence have centered on the status of the Crimean Peninsula, Sevastopol and 
Simferopol, including Black Sea Fleet assets; the failure to resolve Ukraine's multi-billion 
dollar debt for the consumption of Russian oil and gas; the status of nuclear weapons in 
Ukraine; and the inability of Russian leaders to abandon their imperial mindset and 
repudiate the myth of a common Russian-Ukrainian bond. Russia's unwillingness to 
accept Ukraine as an independent state provides an illustration of how Russia might 
threaten its Central European neighbors.267 The recent election of Leonid Kuchma 
signals Ukraine's first step back into Russia's sphere of economic influence. Kuchma's 
victory in July 1994 also signifies a willingness on the part of Ukrainian voters to 
enhance relations with Russia, end the cultural estrangement with Russia and cease the 
isolation from the Russian/Eurasian world.268 Moreover, his victory is viewed in 
266John W.R. Lepingwell, 9 July 1993, p. 51. 
267Fiona Hill, pp. 66, 70-71. Hill writes that "Russia has a number of specific strategic objectives in the 
republic, which include: preventing Ukraine from becoming a rival power center; keeping Ukraine in its 
sphere of influence and within the CIS trading bloc; preventing Ukraine from creating new trading networks 
that will bypass Russia; stopping Ukraine from claiming its share of the immovable and movable assets of 
the former Soviet Union; securing the total transfer to the Russian Federation, or the dismantlement, of 
Ukrainian nuclear weaponry ... To ensure its objectives, Moscow has exerted pressure on Kiev on three 
fronts: economic, security and territorial." The author detailed a few examples of Russian economic tactics: 
selling crude oil below world prices if Ukraine remained in the ruble zone; and Russia's Central Bank 
freezing all payments to Ukraine for its issuing credits to Ukrainian firms. 
268Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, p. 12. 
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Central Europe as a harbinger of westward Russian influence. Michael Mihalka 
recently wrote that, 
Poland's fear of a resurgent Russia can only be enhanced by the electoral 
victories in Belarus of Alyaksandr Lukashenka --who had been endorsed 
by the Russian ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky ... - and in Ukraine 
of Leonid Kuchma, a former missile-plant boss, whose support came 
mainly from the Russian-speakers in the eastern part of the country. 269 
An advisor to the Ukrainian parliament says that, "Kuchma's vision of Ukraine 
makes him prone to deepening Ukraine's relationship with CIS security institutions and 
to accepting a long-term Russian presence in Crimea." In return for Ukrainian 
acquiescence, Russia might agree to sell oil and gas more cheaply or to subsidize 
Ukraine's entry into the ruble zone.270 
3. Relations with the Baltic States 
Russia's relations with the three Baltic states -- Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia --
throw light on its possible future behavior towards CEE states. Russia's agreements 
with each of these Baltic states differ, depending upon the issue, though the common 
attitude throughout the Baltics is that Russia continues to coerce the states in order to 
preserve its influence.271 The common disagreements that each Baltic state has had 
with Russia since the early 1990's concern the status of Russian troops and bases within 
the Baltics; the treatment of Russian-speaking nationals and military pensioners, and the 
difference between Russia's low living standard and the ever-increasing standard of 
living throughout the Baltics. 
Russia's relationship with these three countries is important within the context of 
greater European security because it reflects the pathological nature of Russian coercion 
vis-a-vis these states.272 If Russia uses heavy-handed economic, diplomatic and 
269Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 35. Mihalka adds that, "These events illustrate clearly that internal 
developments within Russia and the CIS can have a profound effect on security concerns throughout 
Eastern and Central Europe." 
270The Economist, citing Ian Brzezinski, 16 July 1994, p. 42. 
271 Allen Lynch, p. 12. Lynch writes that, "The foreign-policy debate is not so much over the content of that 
policy as over what constitutes foreign policy for a Russia that is hardly accustomed to thinking of either its 
immediate neighbors in the ... (CIS) or the Baltic States as truly foreign countries." 
272Fiona Hill, pp. 18, 20. Hill notes that "Russia has used the discriminatory legislation to undertake 
punitive action, ostensibly to force the amendment of the legislation but also to exact greater political 
concessions from the republics ... [Former Lithuanian President Landsbergis'] ... pro-Western stance was met 
by a prolonged shut-off of Russian oil and gas supplies ... As a result of his perceived failure to manage the 
economy and conduct negotiations with Moscow ... Landsbergis was ousted." 
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military tactics to cajole the Baltics into submission, what prevents it from doing the 
same to Central and Eastern Europe?273 Russia considers the Baltic states as "newly 
independent" only since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Baltic countries all 
dispute this and consider themselves the same states that existed de jure since 1918.274 
Russia has maintained a consistent policy requiring the Baltic republics to give 
automatic dual citizenship for Russians abroad, to make Russian one of the official 
languages, and to support treaties guaranteeing rights of Russian-speakers outside of 
Russia. Additionally, disputes have arisen from Russian bases and territorial questions 
over border disputes and the right of free passage through Lithuania to access the 
Kaliningrad Oblast. 
The issue of Russian access through Lithuania is still a problem because evidence 
suggests Russia has disregarded agreed-upon norms of passage. Recently, in several 
incidents, Russian military transports transited Lithuania without the permission of the 
Lithuanian govemment.275 Lithuanians view the incidents as a reminder that Russia 
will continue to operate throughout the Baltics with impunity. As in Estonia, nearly 
25% of Latvia's population consists of non-natives left over from the Soviet era.276 
These two Baltic states have demanded that their inhabitants learn to speak the 
indigenous language and become citizens within a certain period of time. Russians saw 
these demands as a provocation and used these issues to stall troop withdrawals and 
commence punitive economic and political actions.277 Russia was allowed to keep a 
273Dzintra Bungs, p. 28. Bungs writes that, "Many government officials and politicians in Moscow still 
tend to think of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as part of the 'near abroad' and as a 'sphere of Russia's vital 
interest'-- designations that Baltic leaders find disturbing, since they suggest that the three countries remain 
under Moscow's dominance and tutelage. Even more disturbing from the Baltic viewpoint are statements by 
Russian politicians, such as the ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who are in favor of Russian 
hegemony over the former Soviet republics in order to revive some kind of empire." 
274Dzintra Bungs, p. 25. 
275Dzintra Bungs, p. 31-32. Citing the BNS and Interfax on 22-23 February 1994, Bung writes that on 22 
February 1994, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister summoned the Russian Ambassador to Lithuania, "to 
discuss 'a gross violation of the established procedure of transit through the territory' of Lithuania ... The 
Russian military had not obtained authorization for the transport, nor had permission been granted for the 
soldiers to carry weapons on Lithuanian territory." 
276The Economist, 5 February 1994, p. 51. According to the most recent figures, the percentage of the 
population born outside the country include: 10% in Lithuania, 25% in Latvia and 26% in Estonia. 
277Saulius Gimius, p. 30. Girnius writes that, "Russia treated all the Baltic States equally, decreasing or 
suspending oil and gas shipments ... The Duma subsequently decided to place the Baltic States, beginning on 
1 July 1994, in the category of countries paying the highest duties on imports of agricultural products and 
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radar site in Skrunda, Latvia, and two nuclear reactors at the submarine base in Paldiski, 
Estonia, in exchange for removing all troops by the end of the surnrner.278 Finally, the 
territorial issue is also a problem that Russia has used to threaten unilateral 
solutions.279 Reflecting Baltic and CEE states' concerns, the President of the Republic of 
Estonia outlined hls country's favorable view of NATO as a guarantor of European 
stability. He wrote, 
We in Estonia firmly believe that NATO is now, and will be in the future, 
the primary guarantor of security on the Continent...Any suggestion that 
NATO has outlived its usefulness, and that the United States and Russia 
would form a condominium, jointly assuming responsibility for 
guaranteeing the security of Europe, represents naivety at best and Cold 
War era thinking at worst.280 
The Baltics and Poland in particular and Central and Eastern Europe in general 
still perceive the greatest risk to their security from Russia and thus they believe NATO 
is vital to their security interests. Within one month of the Brussels Summit in January 
1994, all three Baltic states and Poland had signed the Partnershlp for Peace Framework 
Document.281 Outlining the main concerns of the Baltic states and Central Europe, the 
Lithuanian Minister of National Defense recently detailed the future threats: 
• The growing "instability on the territory of the former Soviet Union: inter-
regional, ethno-religious and territorial conflicts as well as social conflicts 
provoked by a declining economy);" 
• The growing "tendencies of authoritarianism and nationalism in the territory 
of the former Soviet Union above all in Russia;" 
said that it would ratify the most-favored-nation trade agreement only if Lithuania agreed to comply with its 
demands on Kaliningrad transit." 
278The Economist, "Leaning on the Balts," 27 August 1994, p. 48. Though the Skrunda agreement allows 
Russia access to the radar site for four more years, The Economist pointed out that, "In theory, these bases 
could provide an excuse for Russian military pressure on the Baltic states." 
279Dzintra Bungs, p. 30. Citing Interfax, 14 and 15 February 1994, Bungs writes that a Russian negotiator, 
Lieutenant-General Konstantin Pleshko, stated that, "Russia would soon go ahead unilaterally with the 
border demarcation, because a delay 'would above all harm the interests of Russia'." 
280unnart Meri, p. 7. 
281 NATO Review, June 1994, "Focus on NATO, Signing of Partnership for Peace as at 6 June 1994," p. 6. 
Lithuania signed the Framework Document 27 January, Poland 2 February, Estonia 3 February and Latvia 
14 February. 
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• The growing threat of crime and "possible disasters at industrial and energy 
facilities, [including] the smuggling of drugs, guns and radioactive materials 
and the illegal transportation of certain other goods."282 
Defense Minister Butkevicius stated that Lithuania, can be drawn into these 
conflicts when they involve its neighbors. He writes that, 
Instability and a turning-away from democracy in Russia would not, 
perhaps, be perceived as directly threatening in Western Europe and 
North America but merely as alarming. But to us in Lithuania they 
would definitely appear to threaten us in a most direct way. 283 
4. The Impact of the Kaliningrad Oblast on Regional Security 
Russia's continued use of the Kaliningrad Oblast as a detached appendage of 
Russia is another sign of its willingness to play a major role as a geopolitical force in 
Central Europe.284 Kaliningrad is a potential destabilizing factor because of its relative 
strategic-military importance and because its economic difficulties might precipitate a 
massive flow of economic immigrants into Western Europe. Russia maintains a strong 
presence in the oblast for several reasons: a reminder to Poland of a nearby Russian 
presence, a continual Russian military presence on the Baltic Sea, and an opportunity to 
receive hard currency from Western European investors. One defense expert noted that, 
Few governments wish to discuss the subject of East Prussia and its 
capital Konigsberg. Germany insists that it has no interests in the region 
and, therefore, refuses to discuss the subject. Lithuania and Poland do 
not want to upset the Russians by negotiation, and Russia simply says 
that there is nothing to discuss. They are all wrong. As one senior 
German diplomat has noted, 'this is an issue that is going to jump up and 
bite us all on the backside because we refuse to face if.283 
The Kaliningrad Oblast is symbolic of Russia's attempts to maintain a strategic 
presence in Central Europe and the Baltic Sea. The Russians perceive Kaliningrad at 
least for the near future as a substitute for its lost bases in the Baltic states.286 Despite 
282Audrius Butkevicius, p. 8. 
283Audrius Butkevicius, p. 8. 
284John W. R. Lepingwell, Autumn 1994, pp. 83-84. Lepingwell, citing the 22 March 1994 issue of the 
Komsomolskaya pravda writes that, "On a visit to the region in March 1994, Grachev stated that 
Kaliningrad would become a 'special defensive region', suggesting that it will receive special funding and 
supplies. This build-up of forces is causing concern in the Baltic states and Poland, but does not contravene 
the CFE limits." 
285Phillip A Petersen and Shane C. Petersen, p. 59. 
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the withdrawals back to Russia, Polish leaders continue to question the necessity of such 
a large force. Former Polish Defense Minister Parys asked "why Russia needed such a 
large concentration of troops in the Kaliningrad oblast when Poland has only 220,000 
troops to defend its entire territory."287 Kaliningrad's large military capability 
continues to expand because of the withdrawal of forces from Germany, Poland and the 
Baltics. In February 1993 the approximate numbers were: "620 tanks, 940 armoured 
combat vehicles, 695 artillery pieces, 95 rotary-wing and 155 fixed-wing combat 
aircraft. "288 The Lithuanian Defense Minister stated that Lithuania, "is greatly 
concerned about the presence and reinforcement of enormous Russian military 
contingents ... whlch surpass defence needs by far and hinder a peaceful development of 
thls territory. "289 
E. OTHER POTENTIAL SOURCES OF INSTABILITY 
The risks of civil war, economic catastrophe or a nuclear accident are all 
possibilities that cannot be ruled out as threats to Central and Western Europe. Though 
the magnitude of each risk depends largely upon the ability of democratic and market 
reforms to prevail, one cannot rule out such events occurring. Leaders of the Baltic 
states consider these risks inherently threatening to their independence and believe they 
originate in Russia.290 The risk of civil war breaking out along Russia's periphery has 
already been confirmed by the battles being fought in Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia-
Abkhazia, Tajikistan and Moldova. Containing these conflicts to the immediate area 
will continue to be a major focus of Russian foreign policy. Civil war has already 
broken out in the Chechnya region of Russia. 
The one-day drop in the value of the Russian ruble by 25% in October 1994, is an 
example of how economic factors might very well determine the success or failure of a 
democratic Russia.291 Many experts claim that the risk of economic collapse in Russia 
286philJip A Petersen and Shane C. Petersen, p. 59. 
287Phillip A Petersen and Shane C. Petersen, p. 62. 
288petersen and Petersen, p. 60. The authors note that, "The figures cited above clearly understate the 
present militarization of the Kaliningrad region. The Polish Defense Ministry has noted that, in addition to 
the above mentioned units, some of the former Soviet air and ground units withdrawn from Poland have 
been relocated to the Kaliningrad region ... [ln Kaliningrad] there are thought to reside some 900,000 to I 
million people ... Estimates of the military portion of the total is anywhere from 20 to 30 per cent." 
289 Audrius Butkevicius, p. I 0. 
290Audrius Butkevicius, p. 8. 
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is the single greatest threat to Russia's political future and the whole of Central and 
Eastern Europe.292 They tie the success of political, economic and institutional 
transformations directly to the progress of economic reform. Some Russian leaders 
understand the necessity of maintaining a vibrant economy because of the drastic 
consequences that economic failure would have in Russia and its neighbors. President 
Yeltsin's main economic initiatives -- avoiding political tensions by preventing wide-
scale unemployment and spiraling inflation -- reflect his unwillingness to conduct 
drastic reform measures. According to Alexander Rahr, Yeltsin has become hesitant to 
enact necessary reform policies because of this latent fear.293 Lastly, Fran<;ois 
Heisbourg recognized the risks associated with economic collapse, writing in 1991 that 
the "breakdown of governance in parts of Eastern Europe and the USSR would also 
create massive displacement of minorities within the affected areas."294 
There also remains a risk of a nuclear accident not only in Russia but also in 
Ukraine and Belarus. Soviet-era nuclear plants, not known for their elaborate safety 
systems, have not received regular maintenance in years. Additionally, poor nuclear 
weapons handling and weapons storage practices increase the possibility of a 
catastrophic accident. Fiona Hill cites numerous Russian claims that called into 
question Ukrainian procedures for storing and maintaining nuclear weapons. She 
writes that on 2 March 1993, 
Russia announced that Ukraine's nuclear missiles were leaking as 
Ukraine had refused to permit Russian technicians to gain access to the 
weapons for maintenance purposes (Financial Times, 3 March 
1993) ... [Russian experts] ... alleged that Ukraine was trying to retarget its 
nuclear weapons and was seeking to override the blocking devices 
preventing the unauthorized launch of the missiles (Boston Globe 15 May 
1993) ... Kozyrev warned that a 'tragedy worse than the one in Chernobyl' 
291Richard W. Stevenson, p. A 1. Stevenson writes that, "in the last several weeks, the ruble had been made 
vulnerable because of fears that inflation would come roaring back if the Government responded to political 
pressure to increase spending and dispersed cheap loans to ailing factories, mines and farms." 
292Jan Brzezinski, p. 27. The author notes that, "From Warsaw's perspective, Ukraine presents both risks 
and opportunities. Political and economic failure in Ukraine could unleash a potentially uncontrollable 
influx of refugees who would be attracted to Poland's relative stability and prospenty. At the very least, 
they would use Poland as a halfway stop to the West. In the worst case scenario, political and economic 
failure in Ukraine could lead to its reintegration into Russia; this is likely to involve some form of regional 
conflict. Hence, Poland would once again find itself alongside an imperial Russia." 
293Alexander Rahr, p. 5. 
294Franr;ois Heisbourg, p. 35. Heisbourg concluded that, "Economic and even environmental prospects in 
Eastern Europe will play a key role in provoking population movements to the prosperous West." 
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that was possible if nuclear weapons were not withdrawn from Ukraine 
by January1, 1994 (lnterfax 5 November 1993).295 
The Russian comments must be taken within the context of Russia's attempts to 
manipulate world opinion to make it appear that the Ukrainians are not competent to 
safeguard nuclear weapons. These pronouncements illustrate the danger associated 
with neglected Soviet-era facilities, poor weapons storage techniques and alleged 
attempts to bypass missile security features. 
F. RUSSIAN VIEWS ON NATO EXPANSION AND THE FUTURE OF POLAND 
AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
Most Russian leaders define their interests and their response to potential NATO 
expansion, based on a number of objectives and initiatives. Suzanne Crow writes that, 
... there has been a virtual consensus among Russian officials that East 
European membership in NATO is undesirable and should be 
avoided ... Some officials confine themselves to the argument that Russia 
will be isolated. Others express concern about the intentions of the West 
and the possible threats posed by the unhindered expansion of the 
Atlantic alliance.296 
The most noticeable change to occur in Russia's foreign policy in the last two 
years has been the shift from a pro-Western view to a more pragmatic opinion of the 
world. To be sure, Kozyrev and Yeltsin no longer refer to Russia's neighbors as "a 
civilized international community, that has learned to value human interests above all 
else and that is open to mutual association and cooperation."297 In setting a new 
course, Andrei Kozyrev defined the two "pragmatic premises" of Russian foreign policy: 
primarily, that "Russia is destined to be a great power not a junior" partner; and second, 
that Russian partnership with the West does not "negate a firm, even aggressive, policy 
of defending one's own national interests."298 In conjunction with this pragmatic 
295Fiona Hill, pp. 76, 77, 82. 
296Suzanne Crow, 15 October 1993, p. 23. 
297Andrei Kozyrev in Izvestia, 2 January 1992, cited by Bruce D. Porter, pp. 46-47. Porter writes that in 
January 1992 while addressing the United Nations, President Yeltsin referred to the Western powers as 
being Russia's "natural allies." 
298Andrei Kozyrev, The New York Times, 18 March 1994, p. A 11. Kozyrev mistakenly refers to NATO's 
main purpose as security against Communism. Rather, NATO's main purpose -- during the Cold War and 
after 1989 --bas been to safeguard freedom and promote stability of the Atlantic Alliance against any threat 
regardless of its substance. He writes that, "NATO is inadequate, for two simple reasons: it no longer 
confronts Communism as its main enemy, and it does not have Russia as a member." 
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approach, Stephen Foye listed three concessions that President Yeltsin granted the 
military leadership for their support in the October 1993 coup attempt: 
• More assertive policies in Russia's "near abroad;" 
• Calls for alterations in the CFE Treaty; 
• Consistent opposition to Central and Eastern European or former Soviet 
republics from joining NATo.299 
Central and Eastern Europeans view NATO's acquiescence to Russian aims in 
the "near abroad" as the first step in a process to reincorporate former Soviet satellites 
into Moscow's sphere of influence. Zhirinovsky and Lebed have both succeeded, at 
least in part, by highlighting any perceived attempt by the West to subjugate Russia. 
Zhirinovsky recently referred to the Partnership for Peace initiative as a "pro-American, 
pro-Israel, pro-Zionist" plot.300 General Lebed has been similarly straightforward 
regarding the former republics and satellites - the Baltics, Germany and Poland - and 
Russia's perceived loss in stature. He stated, "Apparently we had to withdraw. But we 
pulled out of the Baltic states in a rush, abandoning our compatriots without any legal 
protection." Referring to the Russian Army's exit from Central Europe, Lebed 
continued, "And they left Germany like beaten dogs, when their grandfathers entered it 
as victors."301 Lebed's pro-Russian and anti-Western views are held by a large segment 
of the population. Erlanger points out that, 
He [Lebed] praises the former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet for 
bringing order, but denies any possibility in Russia of a military coup. 
He thinks Russia's new borders are arbitrary and won't last, but is vague 
on where he thinks they should be. He deplores the manner of the 
Russian withdrawal from Germany and the Baltics -- would he rather 
have stayed?302 
The Russians, conversely, view NATO expansion as the West's first step to 
dominate decisions in Russia and the other former Soviet republics. Vladimir Lukin, 
former Russian ambassador to the United States, equated NATO expansion to the "rape" 
of Russia. The Nezavisimaya Gazeta echoed the ambassador's concern, suggesting, "that 
299Stephen Foye, p. 4. 
300Celestine Bohlen, 5 Aprill994, p. A 6. 
301General Alexander Lebed cited by Steven Erlanger, 9 October 1994, p. E 5. 
302steven Erlanger, 9 October 1994, p. E 5. 
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Washington was intent on 'methodically ousting Russia' from Central Asia and the 
Caucasus."303 
1. Russian Foreign Policy Objectives 
Russia's current foreign policy objectives and initiatives are a reflection of the 
domestic political shift from "enlightened humanism" to pragmatic and nationalistic 
geo-politics. Suzanne Crow lists several reasons why Russia objects to NATO 
enlargement: (1) Germany's "high-profile" attempt to incorporate the East; (2) suspicion 
that NATO as an "international gendarme," under the aegis of a UN mandate, might 
attempt peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in regions of the former Soviet 
Union; (3) Russia's interests in its historic area of influence in Central and Eastern 
Europe would be subverted.304 One Russian Defense Council member proposed that 
Russia retain the "Right to first use of nuclear weapons" was to insure Russia's 
neighbors were discouraged from joining NAT0.305 Based on the author's research 
and interviews, a compilation of Russian foreign policy objectives includes efforts to: 
• Maintain domestic support for foreign policy initiatives by adopting an 
aggressive-conservative tone; 
• Maintain the perception internationally and domestically of Russia as a great 
power; 
• Overcome the psychological loss of the "empire" by reestablishing its 
influence in Central and Eastern Europe and the "near abroad;" 
• Protect Russian interests - economic, political, military and ethnic -- in 
Russia, the "near abroad" and Central and Eastern Europe; 
• Prevent NATO from interfering with Russia's arms-exporting business and 
CIS actions; 
• Maintain the "near abroad" and Central Europe as an area of historical 
Russian influence and prestige; 
• Prevent the West from creating a ''buffer zone" of Central Europe, thereby 
isolating or weakening Russia; 
303Fred Hiatt, citing Nezavisim.aya Gazeta, 19 March 1994. 
304Suzanne Crow, 15 October 1993, p. 24. 
305 Allen Lynch, p. 15, citing a 4 November 1993 !TAR-TASS report which reported that Lieutenant General 
V alerii Manilov, the deputy secretary of the Russian Defense Council, had stated that, "one of the purposes 
of Russia's retention of the right to ftrst use of nuclear weapons was to 'hasten the accession to the 1968 
[Nuclear Non-Proliferation] Treaty by the states of the CIS and Eastern Europe and ... keep them out of the 
orbit of NATO and the [Western European Union]." 
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• Fight any effort to make Russia a junior partner in NATO or any other 
European security institution; 
• Obstruct any attempt to incorporate Central and Eastern Europe into NATO; 
• Nullify NATO's political autonomy and military power. 
Since the issue of NATO enlargement first arose in 1991, Russia has appealed to 
the West not to expand NATO for fear that nationalists would use this to lend credence 
to their xenophobic fears of Western encirclement. Some say this is a tactic designed to 
protect Russian interests and that it gives Russian diplomats a convenient nationalist 
bogeyman to hide behind.306 NATO expansion, so the theory goes, would aid hard-
liners in proving that the West has a goal of establishing a sphere of influence "as close 
as possible to Russia's borders."307 The Yeltsin government, under pressure from 
nearly all major political factions, will increasingly define its role in the "near abroad" 
and Central and Eastern Europe as the central protector of Russian national interests 
and Russian nationals. Paul Goble writes that leaders in Russia will "constantly be 
tempted to use these 'new minorities' as a lever against the other republics-- both as a 
threat to political elites and economies and as a group that might be withdrawn and 
thereby hurt those republics."308 Yeltsin and Kozyrev view their political position as 
directly linked to their advocacy of an aggressive foreign policy. "Anything that 
attenuates Russia's influence in the region-- including the expansion of NATO-- will be 
strongly opposed." An editor for The Wall Street Journal wrote that "Mr. Kozyrev has 
reaped public support by hardening his line -- a lesson he is unlikely to forget between 
now and the 1996 elections."309 In order to out-flank ultranationalists who exploit any 
sign of foreign policy weakness, Yeltsin and Kozyrev have incorporated a moderate 
form of nationalist rhetoric. Adrian Karatnycky writes, 
... the Yeltsin team faces a stiff internal challenge from popular and 
powerful anti-Western forces. Support for the restoration of the Soviet 
306Celestine Bohlen, 6 January 1994, p. A 4. President Yeltsin's press spokesman warned that, "any moves 
to expand NATO could 'trigger military-political destabilization in the region. The President of Russia is 
concerned over the tendency of expanding the bloc. Promotion of such a tendency would contradict the 
proclaimed intentions to build relations on principles of trust, partnership and balance of forces'." 
307 Alexei Pushkov, NATO Review, February 1994, p. 22. The hard-liner argument is that "the West wants 
to use Russia's weaknesses to take over at least politically and militarily, the countries which used to be in 
the Soviet sphere of influence .... " 
308Paul Goble, p. 64. 
309Therese Raphael, 22 June 1994. 
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Union is widespread in the Russian military, and the Parliament is 
dominated-by anti-Western rhetoric-- from Vladimir zrnrinovsky's nee-
imperialist rantings to the vituperative speeches of Communist leader 
Gennadi Zyuganov, whose party seeks to revive the U.S.S.R. and attacks 
the U.S. for seeking to impose a worldwide 'military dictatorship·.310 
To stern these threats, Russian foreign policy objectives in the future will be less 
"enlightened" and more "realistic." Within the last year, Andrei Kozyrev has implored 
the West to grant Russia privileges associated with its "superpower" status, and in effect 
to give it a veto over possible unilateral actions by NATO in areas like the former-
Yugoslavia.311 According to the newly converted centrist-conservative Andrei Kozyrev 
NATO expansion would endanger Russia's status as a great power and ergo its national 
interests. Kozyrev stated that Russia's present policy, 
... embodies the genuine national and state interests of a great power 
which recognizes and is implementing its responsibilities as a permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council .. .It is also obvious that 
the entire geographic area of the former USSR is a sphere of vital interest 
to us .. .The future of Eastern Europe lies in its transformation -- not into 
some kind of buffer zone, but into a bridge linking the East and West of 
the continent...If, however, we began to be seen in Western capitals as 
something 'unnecessary' or 'dangerous' this would only encourage our 
'national patriots' to increase their attacks on current Russian policy and 
would sustain their chauvinist desires to close off Russia in pseudo-
superpower isolation.312 
Part of the attempt to revive the perception of Russia as a great power has been 
the psychological process of accepting the loss of empire. Instead of weaning Russia 
from this "dependency on empire," Kozyrev and Yeltsin have gone about reconstituting 
the Soviet Union through less belligerent means. According to the centrist politician 
Oleg Rurnyantsev, Russia "retains the psychological detritus of a superpower." The New 
York Times reported that in a recent poll conducted in Russia, with a sampling of 3,500, 
68 percent regretted the breakup of the Soviet Union and the same number believes a 
union between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine is possible.313 Russia's foreign minister 
310Adrian Karatnycky, 30 August 1994, p. A 13. 
311Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 43. Kozyrev, quoted in an !TAR-TASS (in English), 17 April1994 
as cited by Mihalka. Kozyrev said, "Wbat is clear is that we want a more serious and substantive agreement 
adequate to the relations that should exist between NATO and the superpower of Russia ... especially an 
agreement which will exclude unilateral actions, particularly military ones, in areas where we have to 
closely cooperate." 
312Andrei Kozyrev, NATO Review, February 1993, pp. 3-4. 
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said that, "a 'major psychological adjustment' would be necessary before his fellow 
citizens could accept the idea of countries like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
joining the alliance."314 Russia's status as a great power, the effort of its leaders to 
overcome the psychological affects of the loss of empire and Yeltsin's successes in out-
flanking more extreme elements are illustrated in a recent article by a former American 
ambassador to the CSCE. He writes that Russia's attempts to regain its great power 
status are "motivated by old-fashioned Russian nationalism and the political necessity 
for Russian leaders to reclaim their country's world power image following a period of 
devastating national humiliation."315 
In Russia, the "near abroad" and Central and Eastern Europe protecting Russian 
interests includes safeguarding Russian nationals, protecting arms markets and raw 
materials markets, ensuring border defenses and maintaining influence in regional 
matters. These objectives are manifest in the efforts to subordinate NATO to the CSCE, 
legitimize the activities of the CIS, and coerce the Baltics and Ukraine. John Maresca 
mused that, "Now Russia is once again seeking the diplomatic instruments to confirm 
what President Boris Yeltsin has unashamedly called Moscow's 'sphere of influence,' 
and to obtain a recognizant 'Great Power' role in the West."316 Moscow wants to stall 
NATO expansion for fear that the Alliance and Central Europeans could take over 
lucrative arms markets and that NATO standardization would render the Russian arms 
industry obsolete. Furthermore, NATO enlargement would threaten unilateral actions 
taken by Russia and the CIS in the "near abroad." In February 1994, Kozyrev said that 
Russian foreign policy priorities included 
... to eliminate hotbeds of armed conflict along Russia's borders, to 
reinforce arrangements relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and the latest military technologies, and to increase the 
accountability and transparency of the international arms trade, while 
unconditionally safeguarding our commercial interests in this sphere.317 
313Steve Erlanger, 21 October 1994, p. A 6. 
314Bruce Clark, 23 June 1994. 
315John J. Maresca, 6 September 1994. 
316John J. Maresca, 6 September 1994. 
317Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 38. Mihalka cites Andrei Kozyrev in "The Guideline Is Russia's 
Interests," Rossiiskie vesti, 9 February 1994. 
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In essence, Moscow wants to maintain trade in arms (competition with Central 
Europe) and competition with the rest of the world with its energy resources.318 In 
addition to arms competition with the West, Suzanne Crow offers other compelling 
reasons why Russia wants to discourage any Western "encroachment" in Central and 
Eastern Europe. She writes that, 
... arms sales mean income; bases in the near abroad mean that Russia 
need not devote huge amounts of resources to re-creating a border 
defense - a seemingly impossible task; bases mean that Russia need not 
search for housing and occupation for returning troops; and 
peacekeeping, ostensibly to protect ethnic Russians in the near abroad, 
serves the same purpose as bases and offers the additional attraction of 
perhaps stemming return migration to Russia.319 
Moreover, by contradicting the efforts to overcome the psychological affects of 
the loss of empire, enlargement of NATO would damage Russia's historical grip on 
Central and Eastern Europe. Russia wants to prevent the United States and the West 
from establishing a buffer in Central and Eastern Europe because of the fear that Russia 
would then become isolated and weakened. Both Andrei Kozyrev and Pavel Grachev 
have continually emphasized the importance of not isolating Russia. Grachev said that 
it "would be unfortunate if the former Warsaw Pact states joined NATO in the near 
future, because this step would relegate Russia to a much more isolated position. "320 
Other prominent Russians have argued that NATO's role as the supreme 
guarantor of European security would substantially undermine Russia's economic and 
political interests and weaken and isolate Russia.321 Two senior Russian military 
officials supported this perception that the West was attempting to isolate Russia, 
writing in a military journal that the, 
318Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, pp. 44-45. One of the Russian military's objections regarding 
membership in PfP and eventually NATO was the issue of standardization of equipment and weaponry. 
Mihalka writes that, "Some parts of the military thought the program would require the country to scrap its 
current weapons ... " (Andrei Apostolov, "Oleg Lobov: Bulgaria Is Not Interested in Most Modern Russian 
Weapons Systems," Kontinent, 2 June 1994) "in any case standardization among other countries could 
deprive Russia ofits arms markets, an important source of hard currency." (Tamara Zamyantina, "Russia-
NATO: Will Partnership Come About?" Rossiiskie vesti, 26 May 1994). 
319Suzanne Crow, 6 May 1994, p. 5. 
320Jbe Russian Defense Minister quoted in Reuters, 1 October 1993 and cited by Suzanne Crow, 15 
October 1993, p. 22. 
321Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 41. 
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American leadership's attempt to use another approach to preserving the 
U.S. position on the European continent is quite logical. Its basis may be 
the 'buffer idea,' the essence of which is the creation (with the dominant 
influence of the United States) of zones of integration activity in 
geographically limited regions of Europe. The goal of such actions, on 
the one hand, will be to fill the 'vacuum of 
influence' that formed after the breakup of the USSR and Warsaw Treaty 
Organization and ... create the prerequisites for intensifying possible 
American military intervention if crisis situations worsen ... [T]he Baltic 
region is becoming an arena of foreign policy activity of the United 
States. The main objective [is] to establish military-political control over 
a flanking area important for Europe.322 
Russia's perceives closer Polish-Ukrainian relations and their bilateral trade -
300 million dollars in 1992-- as another attempt to isolate it.323 Furthermore, according 
to Russia, NATO expansion could trigger political and military destabilization in the 
CEE region. Instead, the Russians insist, NATO expansion should be gradual and not 
endanger Russian interests. One member of President Yeltsin's Presidential Council 
outlined the conflict between joining Pf? and the Russian objective not to be isolated: 
• Russia isolates itself by agreeing to "participate, since NATO controls who 
becomes a full member and when" they can join; 
• Russia "cannot afford to be constrained when its own interests do not 
coincide with NATO's or with those of the Partnership for Peace;" 
• Russia "cannot be left out in the hallway while important decisions are 
made on issues critical to its security;" 
• PW "includes an attempt to block the former Soviet republics' ability to 
consolidate militarily and politically;" 
• "Central European countries and former Soviet republics, in joining the 
Partnership for Peace and eventually NATO, will push Russia out of their 
markets as an arms supplier, dealing a serious blow to [the] military-
industrial complex. "324 
322Maj.-Gen. A. Meshkov and Col. A. Nikolayev, pp. 9-11. 
323Jan Brzezinski, p. 30. Citing a report from Chrystia Freeland in the 12 March 1993 edition of The 
Financial Times, Brzezinski writes that, "many Russians still regard close relations between Poland and 
Ukraine as a Western -- if not a solely Polish and Ukrainian - effort to isolate Russia." An advisor to 
President Yeltsin, Sergei Stankevich, said that "Ukraine falls within Russia's sphere of influence and warned 
against excessively close political and military relations between Poland and Ukraine." 
324Andranik Migranyan, 24 June 1994. 
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Russia will continue to insist that it be treated not only as a superpower but 
also an "equal partner." This objective is associated with Russia's aspiration to protect 
interests, revamp its world status, out-flank nationalists and subjugate NATO. Suzanne 
Crow writes, 
Russia's complaints about being forced to play the role of a junior partner 
reveal a sense of humiliation. Bereft of the ornaments of empire (the 
Soviet republics and Eastern Europe) and mission (communist ideology) 
and struggling with economic, political, and military difficulties, Russia 
feels downtrodden and supplicant.325 
Raphael points out that Kozyrev, "must convince the West that Russia is no 
longer a threat, while convincing Russians that his policy can restore their sense of lost 
pride and the country's status as a great power."326 Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin 
stated his concern over allowing the Visegrad countries into NATO because of what he 
described as the detrimental effects it would have on European security. He was quoted 
as saying that "not all the consequences of such a step have been calculated."327 
According to Mihalka, Russia regards Polish attempts to join NATO, and NATO's 
attempts to expand in the following ways: 
• Central and Eastern Europe should be the bridge between Western Europe 
and Russia; 
• NATO expansion East should only occur if Russia is allowed to join; 
• NATO in any future form should subordinate itself to the United Nations 
and the CSCE.328 
325suzanne Crow, 6 May 1994, p. 5. 
326nlerese Raphael. Raphael writes that Kozyrev "has perceived that it is domestic forces more than 
international ones that will shape his future. Where he once argued against politicizing the issue of Russian 
minorities in the newly independent countries, he now has become one of the sharper defenders of Russian 
minority citizens in the 'near abroad'." 
327Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 38, citing Churkin's interview in Narodna obroda, 12 January 
1994. Churkin thought it would be impossible to ensure additional European stability while some states 
[Russia] would be harmed. He thought expansion would require the CFE Treaty to be reopened and that 
Russia's current domestic situation "dictated temporizing on NATO entry." 
328Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, pp. 35-36. 
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John Maresca affirms this objective, writing, 
Thus the Russians are claiming the exclusive right to deal with problems 
on the territory of the former USSR through the C.l.S., while 
simultaneously seeking a major voice on matters in other parts of Europe 
through a specially recognized Great Power role in the CSCE.329 
2. Russian Initiatives to Prevent NATO Expansion 
Russian foreign policy objectives have been promoted through a number of 
initiatives designed by Russia's leaders. Although they have not publicly articulated 
them as policies, evidence suggests that these are the most prominent elements. Thus 
Russian foreign policy initiatives include: 
• Use of coercive economic and political tactics on neighbors to protect 
Russian interests; 
• Use of the CIS to balance against NATO and reassert Russian national 
interests; 
• Use of peacemaking, Russian style, forces as an instrument of Russian 
foreign policy in order to gain international sanction and funding; 
• Bargain for a "special status" for Russia in NATO; 
• Attempt to make NATO subordinate to CSCE; 
• Subvert NATO from taking on new members by joining Partnership for 
Peace and any other NATO organizations; 
• Establish a separate leading role in the Bosnian War talks in order to 
reassert Russian interests and protect future ventures in the "near abroad." 
The centerpiece of obtaining these foreign policy objectives is the use of the CIS 
organization to weaken NATO's influence in the European security envirorunent.330 
Kozyrev, in an attempt to prevent CEE states from joining NATO, asks incredulously, as 
if CEE states have no historical memory: 
We are not allergic to NATO, but we do not understand discussions to 
the effect that NATO must give security guarantees to the countries of 
Central Europe and, in the long term, take them in as members of the 
alliance. How are these states threatened and by whom?331 
According to Kaminski's authoritarian scenario, 
329John J. Maresca, 6 September 1994. 
330Andrei Kozyrev cited in Allen Lynch, p. 14. 
331 Andrei Kozyrev quoted in Diplomatichesky vestnik, nos. 5-6, March 1993, originally cited by Suzanne 
Crow and presently cited by Allen Lynch, p. 14. 
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Russia may remain on good terms with the West while isolating and 
eventually subjugating the Ukraine to the point of forcing it to accept a 
'federate' relationship. Meanwhile, it could try to isolate Central Europe 
in European politics. This development could be accepted by the West, 
as a 'second best' solution. From the point of view of central [E]uropean 
security concerns this would equal to another Yalta.332 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is the foremost security 
institution used by Russia to reassert its influence in the "near abroad," particularly 
along its Southern flank. The CIS is the formal politico-military structure that Moscow 
has exploited to promote pro-Russian security policies. Simultaneously, Russia uses the 
CIS to balance NATO and Western influences in the Baltics and Central Europe. 
Suzanne Crow writes, 
From the Russian perspective, the attempt to gain acceptance of the CIS 
as an international organization is an important defensive measure aimed 
a[t] preventing the deployment of other international forces for 
peacekeeping or peacemaking in what Russia considers its exclusive 
sphere of vital interests.333 
This attempt to manipulate the CIS to offset NATO's authority is a debatable 
proposition. However, Adrian Karatnycky identified Moscow's intention to use the CIS 
organization to offer nuclear guarantees to former Soviet Republics (excluding the 
Baltics) and create an institution, similar to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and 
the Partnership for Peace proposal, that imitates NATO programs and conducts 
peacekeeping and peacemaking operations under the aegis of a Russian-controlled 
security arrangement. Karatnycky writes, 
In recent weeks, Russia and other former Soviet republics have pressed 
forward with plans to create a military alliance that mocks President 
Clinton's Partnership for Peace, doing precisely what that froposal was 
designed to avoid: creating new Eastern and Western blocs. 34 
332Antoni z. Kaminski, p. 7. Kaminski's "authoritarian solution" is one of four possible outcomes of 
Russia's future towards a market economy. The others are: a "muddling through," an "autocratic regime" 
and "further disintegration." 
333Suzanne Crow, 18 March 1994, pp. 37-38. Ms. Crow adds that through "peacekeeping" efforts, Russia 
is attempting to recapture its influence by maintaining military bases abroad. Therefore international 
recognition of the CIS would have the following implications: (1) The CIS would become an "organization 
of consequence in the world." (2) The CIS would serve as an "additional platform" for the promotion of 
Russian foreign policy objectives. (3) The CIS, pending UN and CSCE sanction, "would be given a free 
hand, plus funding and support, for the conduct of peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet Union .... " 
334Adrian Karatnycky, 30 August 1994, p. A 13. The author notes that a draft security proposal for the 
CIS, "calls for the eventual creation of joint armed forces, collective peacekeeping forces and a joint air 
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In effect, Russia hopes to gain international acceptance utilizing the CIS -- an 
organization made up of other former Soviet states but dominated by Russia -- to re-
Russianize former Soviet republics. Russia is pursuing a Soviet-style domination 
strategy by stationing thousands of troops beyond its borders and maintaining 30 bases 
outside Russian territory.335 Russia is also conducting "peacekeeping operations" 
beyond its borders in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia-Georgia, Tajikistan and Moldova in 
an effort to contain fighting and ensure Russian solutions. By giving legitimacy to the 
CIS as an international organization, the world community would be granting Russia de 
facto permission to conduct Russian foreign policy under the guise of the CIS along its 
Southern periphery. Therefore it is quite difficult to distinguish legitimate Russian 
security concerns from historical imperial designs on "lost" territory. Estonia's 
President, Lennart Meri looks at the CIS as less of a collective defense organization and 
more of a Russian attempt to reassert itself in its so-called "near abroad." President Meri 
suggested that, 
In intra-CIS disputes ranging from Moldova through the Caucasus to 
Tajikistan, the intervention of Russian Federation troops may have 
exacerbated armed conflict or may have aggravated already existing 
tensions to the detriment of overall stability. This does not sound like 
collective defence to Estonia.336 
The CIS was initially designed to be a common association of former Soviet 
republics sharing a common military infrastructure and common consumer supply; it 
has become apparent that Russia will dominate the institution's purpose and activities. 
Specifically, Russia, has successfully pushed through its initiatives using "peacekeeping" 
and CIS legitimacy as its international sanction. Russia will continue to use the CIS to 
gain international sanction for operations along its perimeter, and most importantly to 
reestablish a balance of influence and power against the Atlantic Alliance. However, 
taken in toto, the manipulation of the CIS- if unchallenged by the West and NATO-
represents an acquiescence to Russia conducting affairs as it sees fit, where it sees fit. 
The disparity between what the West views as peacekeeping and what the Russians 
defense system. In short it seeks to restore .a cohesive, coordinated military force under unified protection--
a defense arrangement resembling that of the Soviet Union." 
335suzanne Crow, 6 May 1994, pp. 2-3. Crow writes, "But substantive actions, in addition to more 
nationalistic posturing and rhetoric, are also features of the new foreign-policy approach .. .Moscow's 
progress toward maintaining or establishing some thirty military bases on the territory of the newly 
independent states, Russia's promotion of itself as the frrst among equals in the ... CIS, and its increasing 
emphasis on the protection of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in the former Soviet republics." 
336Lennart Meri, p. 9. 
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regard it as is striking. Therese Raphael points out that the Russian word for 
"peacekeeping" missions "mirotvorchestvo," 
... literally means 'peace creating,' or what the West calls peacemaking. 
When the Red Army 'secured' Central Europe after World War II, it was 
called rnirotvorchestvo. This is settlement through force. These 
'peacekeeping' missions may be run under the banner of the C.I.S., but 
almost all peacekeeping troops are Russian, and there is little enthusiasm 
from the other members for the engagement.337 
In using the CIS to go southward, Russia has displayed a willingness to exert 
influence to effect a positive "Russian" outcome. "Encouraging Russia to be the only 
peacemaker in the former Soviet Union weakens prospects for its political and economic 
recovery .... "338 Obviously balancing against NATO and Western institutions does not 
necessarily have to take the form of weapon and manpower parity. Instead, NATO is 
seen as an instrument of political influence in addition to its military functions. Though 
balancing is not in itself a deliberate attempt to coerce neighbors, it suggests a 
willingness to assemble a conglomeration of resources against another power (NATO) 
for some substantive purpose. 
If Russia uses the CIS to assemble multiple states under its nuclear guarantee, 
where does it draw its Western-most borders? Such, a balance between CIS and NATO 
leaves Central Europe in a gray area -- a modem day cordon sanitaire. The act of 
balancing a Russian-led CIS against NATO to resolve political ambiguities in itself does 
not increase a threat. The danger comes from a future Russian leader or the current 
Russian leaders adopting policies that use the CIS organization to coerce smaller states 
beyond its immediate influence (i.e., the Baltics and Poland) and the West cedes this 
area to Russia in deference to Russian strategic interests. 
The Russians have joined PfP with a special status more elevated than that of 
their former satellites in CEE and the former Soviet republics.339 The specific reasons 
for lobbying for a "special role" and joining the PfP initiative were articulated by Deputy 
Foreign Minster Churkin. He said joining PfP would enable Russia to: "influence NATO 
decision-making, so as to avoid unpleasant surprises such as the organization's 
337Therese Raphael, 22 June 1994. 
338Dr. Andrezj Olechowski, p. 11. 
339Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 35. "Throughout negotiations with NATO on Partnership for 
Peace, Russia pressed for recognition of its special status --the more formal, the better. It returned time and 
again to the theme that is should be treated commensurate with its status as a great power ... Basically, Russia 
wants a say equal to NATO's in European security matters." 
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ultimatum on Sarajevo;" stimulate modernization of the Russian armed forces; and 
enhance cooperation between NATO and the Cis.340 Alliance members did not grant 
Russia the "special relationship" it was seeking, but Russia did receive a concession for 
more consultation. One defense correspondent wrote that the foundation of "Moscow's 
extra security relationship with the West will be founded on an idea proposed by 
Douglas Hurd ... he suggested .. .'no veto (by Moscow), no surprises (by Nato) and 
substantive co-operation'."341 Russia's desire to obtain a veto over NATO military and 
political decisions worried many NATO officials who thought this would lead to 
obstructionism. This fear was realized at the June 9, 1994 Istanbul meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council. According to a NATO diplomat, 
... the Russians 'used their elbows' to prevent any reference in the final 
statement to the possibility that the Partnership for Peace program would 
lead to NATO membership. One senior NATO diplomat was disgusted: 
'It was a pretty bloody affair. It was absolutely a Soviet exercise, a 
disastrous performance by the Russians, and it does not augur well·.342 
The dispute since January 1994 over a special role accorded to Russia as payment 
for its participation in the Partnership for Peace activity is obviously seen by Central 
and Eastern Europeans as a tactic to dilute NATO. The president of Estonia, Lennart 
Meri wrote that, 
If last December's parliamentary elections in Russia are any indication, 
however, it may take longer than we would hope to establish in Russia 
the kind of domestic political culture consistent with NATO PFP 
standards. Above all, NATO cannot afford to accord a 'special role' to 
any state in which election results could alter the very direction of 
democratic change. To do so would not only weaken the Alliance, but 
would also call into question an axiom of collective security, namely that 
democracies tend not to go to war among themselves.343 
On one hand, Russia is building up the CIS. On the other, it would like to 
subordinate the CIS and NATO to the CSCE in order to lessen the power of NATO and 
receive monetary compensation for actions in its "near abroad." Kozyrev proposed that 
the "CSCE should be aimed at coordinating activities of the NATO, the European Union, 
340Cburkin quoted in Radio Mayak, 2 April 1994 and cited by Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 42. 
341Michael Evans, 22 June 1994. 
342Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 45. 
343Lennart Meri, p. 8. 
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the Council of Europe, the WEU and the CIS."344 Secondarily, the Russians want 
NATO and the CIS to jointly administer Central and Eastern Europe.345 Kaminski 
claims that the goal of Russia is to, 
... keep NATO away from Central Europe while bringing its own defence 
arrangements [including the Kaliningrad enclave] as close to it as 
possible. Thus, even facing a catastrophy, Russia may seem to follow its 
old strategy of using Western resources [to] pursue its struggle with the 
West.346 
One additional way in which the Russian Foreign Minister has repeatedly tried 
to nullify NATO is his reference to the CSCE as the institution which "won the Cold 
War."347 These initiatives accomplish two goals. First, Kozyrev's revision of history 
soothes the psyches of Russians who may have felt they lost the Cold War to the West. 
Second, it suggests that NATO has been a marginal institution since its inception. If this 
was true, why is it that Kozyrev and Yeltsin seem so worried about NATO's role in 
European security matters? 
Finally, by subordinating NATO and reasserting Russian interests throughout 
the "near abroad" and Central and Eastern Europe, Russia has made the Yugoslav crisis 
an arena in which to exercise its regained influence.348 Moscow's membership in the 
"contact group" (Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany) as well 
as its intervention in February 1994 on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs are indications that it 
is serious about regaining lost influence in Central and Eastern Europe.349 Many 
344 Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia and NATO ... ", pp. 3 & 5. In addition to subordinating NATO and the CIS, 
Kozyrev is brash enough to expect NATO to pay for Russian-led "peacekeeping operations." He suggests, 
"a possible contribution by our NACC partners to financing peacekeeping efforts by Russia and her CIS 
partners. Our Western partners could cover a part of expenses for logistical back-up and training of our 
peacekeeping units." 
345Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 36. 
346 Antoni Kaminski, p. 8. 
347 Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia and NATO .... ", p. 3. 
348Michael Mihalka, 26 August 1994, p. 36. "Bosnia provides the stage on which Russia's and NATO's 
role in the emerging security order are played out." Russia's "success in securing the withdrawal of the 
Serbian heavy artillery from around Sarajevo after the NATO ultimatum in February seemed to 
confirm ... [Russia's special status] .... " 
349 Allen Lynch, p. 10. Lynch writes that, "By interceding on behalf of the Serbian cause and announcing 
the dispatch of Russian 'peacekeeping' units to Sarajevo, Russia has for the moment achieved a level of 
influence in the former Yugoslavia that had been denied the USSR after Josip Broz Tito and Joseph Stalin 
severed links in 1948 ... Russia and the West seem to be exercising equal influence .... " 
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observers believe Russia's involvement in the Yugoslav war since mid-1992 and its 
conduct in the "near abroad" foreshadowed, "the rapid resurgence of Russian interest in 
Eastern Europe since mid 1993."350 John Maresca's reflections about the Russian 
proposal in Istanbul in June 1994 are noteworthy in this regard. He writes that Russia's 
new collective security proposition to meet each foreign policy objective, 
... would subordinate NATO to the CSCE, thus giving Moscow a veto 
over NATO actions through the CSCE's consensus procedures and giving 
Russia the right to be consulted on issues of concern. It also entailed 
recognition of the Russian dominated ... (C.I.S.) ... The consistency between 
the Russian proposals in the CSCE and their previous effort at NATO 
suggests the main objectives of Moscow's new European policy: to 
establish the CSCE where they have a veto as the most authoritative body 
in Europe; to give Russia a privileged role in that group; to achieve 
acceptance of the Russian dominated C.I.S. as a legitimate international 
organization and to obtain international blessing and financing for 
Russia's 'peacekeeping' role in the former Soviet space.351 
The proposal put forth is that several "Russian risks" still pose security problems 
for Central and Eastern Europe and NATO. This assessment is based upon several 
illustrations of Russia's foreign policy being dictated by an increasingly conservative-
nationalistic posture. In its relations with its former satellites and former Soviet 
republics, Russia has displayed a willingness to reaffirm its historical role. In the end, 
CEE states perceive a Russian risk because the objectives and initiatives of Russia's 
current foreign policy are guided by domestic circumstances that require an aggressive 
approach. The increasingly nationalistic tone of the political and military officials 
serves as a divisive factor with respect to Russian relations with Central and Eastern 
Europe. Fiona Hill writes, 
Russia has a clear but unstated motive for all of these interventions: to 
reassert control of its former empire. Because of its economic problems, 
Russia cannot afford the burden of financially supporting its empire, as it 
has done in the past. Similarly, a weakened Russian Army (and 
guaranteed Western opposition) 
35°Ailen Lynch, p. 11. Citing Suzanne Crow in theRFEmLResearch Report, No. 50, 17 December 1993, 
Lynch adds that Russia's diplomacy in Bosnia "reflects a broader effort by Russia to reclaim part of the 
Soviet Union's foreign-policy mantle in Eastern Europe as well as along the borders of the Russian 
Federation." 
351John J. Maresca, 6 September 1994. 
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precludes it from using the military to forcibly reconquer the region. 
Instead, Russia has discovered that exploiting existing regional conflicts 
and grievances is a very cost effective and convenient way of 
destabilizin~ its neighbors and quickly reestablishing Moscow's 
authority.3 
352Fiona Hill, p. 86 
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VI. A PRESCRIPTIVE APPROACH TO ACCELERATE MEMBERSHIP IN NATO: 
GUIDELINES FOR POLISH MEMBERSHIP 
With all of the discussion concerning the expansion of NATO, it seems fair to 
speak briefly about the numerous steps that must be undertaken by Central and Eastern 
European countries that want NATO membership. 
• - Acceptance of current borders 
• -Peaceful resolution of disputes 
• -Equal treatment to all minorities 
• -Fair elections with democratic transfer of power 
• -Civilian control of the military 
• -Cooperation of security policies with neighbors 
• -Publicly disclosed defense budgets 
• -Reconstruction of territorial defense-(updated and integrated weaponry 
and military doctrine) 
Based on these several well-established criteria, Poland is the most qualified 
applicant to join NATO. However, these countries' expectations for inclusion into the 
Atlantic Alliance have been met with stiff opposition throughout NATO. Of primary 
concern to NATO planners and leaders is the prospect of offering security guarantees to 
Central European countries that have been ruled by proxy from Moscow. Furthermore, 
these security guarantees would promise a nuclear umbrella and the prospect of 
stationing troops that would border Russian territory. Along with these geopolitical 
concerns, the tactical considerations for a greater NATO would be costly, requiring 
great expenditures to modernize every aspect of the Polish and Czech defense 
establishments. The Czech Republic has taken substantive steps towards meeting 
requirements for inclusion in the NATO Alliance, pledging a one percent budget deficit 
to finance much-needed military improvements to bring them up to NATO 
standards. 353 
Another problem for these two countries was the action of President Yeltsin. In 
August 1993, he said that Russia had no objections to Poland joining NATO. Later, he 
rescinded his statement, sending letters to the American President and other Western 
leaders claiming that Russia could not support NATO expansion unless Russia was also 
asked to join. Analysts widely believe that Yeltsin was forced to take back his 
353Jane Perlez, 11 January 1994, p. A 6. Ms. Perlez notes that the "Czech Republic's defense budget will 
rise 12 percent" to over $1 billion annually in 1994. 
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statements by conservative military leaders for whose support he counted on prior to 
the October purge of Russian extremists in parliament. As the official spokesman for 
Polish foreign policy, Lech Walesa has been very critical of a lack of Western resolve to 
incorporate Poland into NATO or even the European Union. Though some positive 
steps have been taken on the latter, Polish leaders are neither happy with nor satisfied 
with the hollow Partnership for Peace initiative. Lech Walesa recently remarked that 
along with the Partnership for Peace proposal, 
There is Russia, which threatens; there is the organized West, which is 
afraid, and there are those of us in the middle who say: there's nothing to 
be afraid of, one should only try to increase the potential of Western 
Europe, both physically and technically.354 
A. ADHERENCE TO NATO'S GENERAL PREREQUISITES 
One of the dilemmas of enlargement is the issue over whether or not NATO 
should delineate specific criteria for future members. To do so, some NATO observers 
believe, would deal a blow to the legitimacy of Article 10. The rationale goes that 
establishing criteria would leave NATO open to two outcomes: (1) Countries that 
NATO might not want to join the Alliance might complete all requirements for 
membership and demand an invitation. (2) Countries that NATO prefer to be let in 
would be unable to fulfill the requirements and be prevented from joining. In reality, 
most observers believe requirements should and will be issued but that attainment of 
such criteria would not make such countries automatic members. The theory is that the 
decision to allow new members to join under Article 10 will be a political one, made at 
the highest levels of government without regard to a country's attainment of specific 
criteria. However, it remains well within the purview of NATO and any ambitious CEE 
states to adequately prepare one's country for eventual membership by vigorously 
attending to the four most touted tenets: Civilian control of the military, economic 
stability and infrastructure improvements, military force adaptability and economic 
stability. Though NATO will be most likely forced into conceding a set of specific 
criteria for CEE states, Poland would benefit from improving in these four areas. 
1. Civil-Military Relations Similar to NATO Members 
Poland still has a relatively long way towards establishing civilian control of its 
military forces to anything remotely resembling that of Western Europe. To say that the 
"civilian" defense minister merely exchanges his uniform with a suit is qualification for 
354Jane Perlez, 11 January 1994, p. A 6. 
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civilian control is ludicrous. An additional problem however, is that Poland has a lack 
of experienced civilian leaders in defense matters. Generally speaking, Communist 
countries kept their military knowledgeable elite within the confines of military leaders. 
The most recent sacking of the Defense Minister, Kolodziejczyk, is indicative of the 
ambiguity of the constitutional powers between the president and prime minister. The 
sacking of the civilian minister, prompted in part by the military's dissatisfaction, also 
illustrated the dominance the Polish General Staff. Moreover, it displayed a failure of 
politicians and military officers to resolve the civil-military conflicts. 
The Economist, in a recent survey of Poland, concluded that the current 
constitution is a revised version of the 1952 Stalinist modeJ.355 Presently, the stop-gap 
constitution called the "small-constitution" has yet to resolve the critical issue of who 
has jurisdiction over the maintenance of the military assets. Polish military leaders have 
found it difficult adjusting to the new "democratic" norms of post-Communist society. 
During the Cold War, military officials requested a set amount of money based on their 
projected budget and were rarely turned down for their requests. With a freely-elected 
parliament, Polish military officials are forced to justify their expenditures and defend 
ongoing projects to parliamentarians with little or no experience in military matters. 
The problem of an out-of-date constitution is that it pits the pro-president military 
against the anti-military parliament. Furthermore, the absence of a mechanism for a 
systematic yearly budgetary policy, a lack of resources, a mistrust of the military by the 
Sejm and a group of parliamentarians tasked with overseeing military projects they do 
not understand lead to a precarious situation. All of this friction creates democratic 
instability and distrust that inevitably leads to a decline of the military's effectiveness. 
The Polish defense minister in a televised interview in March 1994 concluded: 
What happened to the Armed Forces' budget this year [sharply 
decreased] smacks of a scandal. There occurred far-reaching interference 
by the legislative branch with the powers of the executive branch. That is 
unacceptable. If the [defense] ministry's chief is supposed to bear 
constitutional responsibility for the Armed Forces' readiness and the 
readiness of the country's defense system, one must not tie his hands 
with decisions on where and how money should be spent because this 
way one will not succeed in creating anything that would make sense or 
be a logical whole.356 
355"A Survey of Poland." The Economist, April16, 1994, p. 13. 
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Additionally, Poland's defense minister agrees that the Sejm is dominated by a 
coalition of parties opposed to the President, there is no clear delineation of budgetary 
authority. The competing claims of budgetary authority is characterized as, the 
coalition regards the Defense Ministry as the President's protectorate, one part of 
parliament regards it as under the control of the coalition, another faction sees it as 
"representative of the old, postcommunist military cadre."357 Kolodziejczyk added 
that, 
... putting in order the legal framework for the Defense Ministry's 
functioning, and also of the General Staff ... requires great effort and is a 
very urgent issue ... in the eyes of the West, we may well be perceived as 
[a military] that failed to accomplish anything in terms of reform because 
it continues to be headed by a minister with powers provided for by a 
1967law .... 358 
2. Military Force Adaptability & Armed Forces Transparency 
Military force adaptability --what is often times referred to as "interoperability" -
- is a goal the Poles should strive to attain, even though NATO has failed to achieve 
complete or even partial interoperability among its members. Most experts agree that 
the first step to interoperability and the most critical factor in Poland's successful 
accession into NATO is the ability to communicate between forces. At the basic level, 
this means having the capability to speak the same language as NATO forces (English, 
French and German as primary languages). Secondarily, it requires Poland to purchase, 
lease, and obtain by any means, communications equipment that will allow its forces to 
communicate in non-secure and secure environments. Attempting to obtain NATO 
armaments, aircraft and heavy weapons will be a long process regardless of Poland's 
time frame for membership. Outfitting airfields, port facilities and military bases with 
NATO standard fixtures will also be a gradual progression. In the interim, Poland must 
continue to stress the basics: communications equipment and language skills. 
absence of responsibility for the authorization and appropriation of the defense budget. In this sense his 
frustration is illustrative of the Polish military's desire to resolve the constitutional question and get on with 
the task of rebuilding the military and integrating with NATO. 
357Marek Henzler and Marek Ostrowski, p. 7. Kolodziejczyk stated that, "When it comes to parliamentary 
opposition, they exploit some decisions that are made, for the purpose of political games and making 
excessive complaints ... [T]he military, without its own will or guilt, was maneuvered into a dispute about the 
country's political system. The debate on the structure of managing the country's defense system must lead 
to a preliminary solution .... " 
358Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk appearing on Polish national television, 26 March 1994. The minister 
stated that he expected the Sejm to, "make a decision on reaching a certain flxed level of GDP within a set 
time limit, to be spent on the defense budget, and that, thanks to that, we will be able to arrange our 
implementation potential in a way that would make sense, taking into account our financial capabilities." 
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The term interoperability, though vague, can be defined generally as the ability 
of one force to have the capability to talk with another. Whether or not this translates to 
common armaments and machines is not so much the issue since NATO itself has never 
achieved perfect interoperability between the sixteen members. A successful 
communications effort in interoperability between multinational forces, the Allied 
operation during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, proved that communicating 
between national forces can be achieved. Robert Staley writes, 
Multinational command, control, and communications was made as 
effective as possible through the use of Secure Telephone Units (STUs), 
personal computers, fax machines, shared national and commercial 
satellite resources, and the exchange of liaison teams to overcome 
language and technological problems ... But communicating with 
Soviet...vessels could be accomplished only by International Mobile 
Maritime VHF voice links and visual signaling.359 
At the most basic level, language education is the foundation for any armed 
forces to achieve interoperability. Reportedly, the Poles are emphasizing a number of 
Western European language courses to be set up for military personnel. Informed 
sources suggest that among other proposals, Poland will establish programs in order to 
meet the long-term demand for more qualified Western language fluency: 
• Language and specialist training of military and civilian personnel; 
• 3-month long language courses in Poland (200 persons); 
• 6-month long language courses in Poland (100 persons); 
• 4-month long courses abroad for English language instructors (60 persons). 
The general feeling among western naval experts during the recent Baltops '94 
was that Polish naval personnel had an adequate grasp of English, and what they lacked 
in English skills they made up for in diligent efforts. To be sure, Poles had enough 
personnel qualified to carry out basic communications drills to operate with thirty-five 
other naval vessels during Baltops '94. The modus operandi for communication amongst 
the Baltops '94 participants was accomplished via a modified version of VHF, bridge-to-
bridge basic communications. This will no doubt change with an infusion of 
inexpensive commercial and western communications. Acquisition of satellite 
communications and encrypted systems have not yet been discussed, at least not at an 
unclassified level. NATO's Conference Armament Directors (CNAD) will be one of 
many instruments used by the Atlantic Alliance to enhance Central European 
interoperability. CNAD meetings, 
3S9"Gulf: Mines a Major Problem," cited by RobertS. Staley II, pp. 48-49. 
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... examined the equipment implications of peacekeeping operations, 
procurement collaboration with the former Warsaw Pact members now 
associated with NATO in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PFP) ... Poland [has already received] 
NATO documents on standardization and quality 
assurance ... participating in workshops on topics such as communications 
and data handling. 360 
Both programs have been devised to forge closer cooperation, consultation and 
integration of former-Warsaw Treaty Organization members. 
3. Economic Stability 
Maintaining and improving the Polish economy is one of the most critical 
aspects of Poland's attempt to join western institutions including most importantly, 
NATO. In order to integrate Central and Eastern countries into western institutions, 
Alliance declarations have underlined the importance of converting the centralized 
economy to a market-based economy. The foundations of any thriving market-
economy, so goes the current wisdom, is to vigorously enforce low inflation and 
unemployment rates, privatize state-owned enterprises and increase foreign investment. 
All of these reforms would theoretically occur in an atmosphere conducive to free-
market reforms through the implementation of institutional and legal reforms. 
Carrying out reforms to ensure low inflation rates has been the cornerstone of 
Poland's economic recovery. The main tenets of this effort to harness triple digit 
inflation rates include: tightening the money supply and terminating state subsidies. 
Preventing double-digit unemployment rates has been the hardest task for Polish 
economic planners. In September 1994, The Economist wrote that, 
More than half of Poland's GDP is produced by the private sector, which 
employs six out of ten people. Growth last year was 4% and is likely to 
be 4.5% this year. Exports are booming, up, on central-bank figures, 
almost 20% in the first half of this year compared with the same period 
last year, with well over half going to the European Union. Even 
unemployment has stabilised at around 16% -- still too high, but lower 
than Spain and not much more than in Belgiurn ... Half the value of debts 
to western governments was written off three years ago ... "London Club" 
of bank creditors will nearly halve the value of commercial-bank debt [14 
September] .. .Despite progress, the Polish economy is only precariously 
stable and its transformation is incomplete. Inflation is still too high. The 
goal for this year is to get annual price increases below 24%, which is bad 
enough.361 
360Jane's Defense Weekly, 14 May 1994, p. 18. 
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The Catch-22 arises when inefficient state-run enterprises are closed because of 
their poor performance while workers are laid off. Poland, unlike the Czech Republic, 
conducted "Big Bang" economic measures in the late 1980's. As a result, unemployment 
rates have remained between 12% and 17% for the past few years. This has the effect of 
creating an aura of unease among Poland's working force. Most economists, however, 
feel that by conducting bold economic measures up front, Poland has staved off an 
inevitable long-term malaise associated with maintaining inefficient industries. 
The Economist also mentioned that Poland was indeed assisted by the PHARE 
Project (Polish-Hungarian Assistance Recovery) and that PHARE helped finance the 
multitude of foreign law firms and banking institutions needed to help Poland 
privatize. In any event, Poland's "Big Bang" shock therapy and the resulting four factors 
of transformation have been instrumental in sparking an economic turnaround in only 
five years. This approach seems to be the most promising for Poland's economic future 
and one of a plethora of positive steps taken to assist in its bid for NATO membership 
and full European Union membership. 
NATO members and Western European institutions have encouraged Poland to 
undertake legal reforms to encourage foreign investment. However, there is a 
substantial segment of the Polish Sejm that fears foreign investment will lead to the 
foreign ownership of Polish business and submit Poland to the whims of foreign 
investors. Western European leaders contend, however, that the majority of Western 
aid will come not in the form of grants but foreign investment and business ventures. In 
order for market-reform measures to take hold in Poland, legal and constitutional 
reforms must be institutionalized in order to ensure standardization throughout the 
economy. Legal reforms must take the form of laws and codes designed to encourage 
market economy. The key reason that the economic sector is discussed so thoroughly 
with regard to Poland's entry into NATO is the relation between a good economy and a 
stable, democratic alliance member. The Economist also observed that, 
Privatisation -- slow to begin if you compare Poland with the Czech 
Republic or Russia - has slowed further under the new government. .. two 
big problems have emerged. First, Mr Kolodko [Poland's finance 
minister] is too keen on the state interfering in the running of 
businesses ... The second problem is the Peasant Party ... [it] is openly 
hostile to privatisation ... These two problems will not only slow Poland's 
economic transformation, but could also threaten its precarious 
macroeconomic stability.362 
361The Economist, 3 September 1994, p. 52. 
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One cannot look just solely at military improvements nor political attempts at 
reform without taking into account the nature of Poland's economy. Additionally, the 
necessity to finalize a post-war constitution is a necessity not only in defining the clear 
roles of the executive and the legislative branches as they apply to civil-military 
relations but also how the constitution supports free markets and the emergence of a 
capitalist class. Finally, an in-depth look at Poland's economy is essential because of the 
Catch-22 that Polish leaders must deal with regarding the perseverance of an improving 
economy and defense spending adequate enough to convince NATO officials of the 
Polish military's willingness to westernize its forces. 
4. Infrastructure Improvements 
Before Poland can answer the most pressing questions of NATO integration, the 
issue of cleaning up the environmental waste left by fifty years of poor Communist 
industrial practices must be addressed. The task of cleaning up polluted bases where 
former-Warsaw Pact troops were stationed will cost billions of dollars over the next 
twenty years. Thousands of chemical and biological weapons as well as the by-
products of nuclear weapons were improperly handled and stored and now pose a 
serious threat to the health of Central Europeans, especially the Poles. Recent 
discoveries uncovered abandoned chemical and biological warfare weapons 
haphazardly disposed of and buried on the site of former-Soviet military installations. 
These weapons once buried have begun to leak and have leeched into the soil and the 
underground aquifers of Poland. This problem presents a risk to any NATO forces 
either stationed in Poland or conducting exercises in areas contaminated with 
hazardous materials. Again, this problem must figure into the final political calculus for 
allowing Poland and other CEE countries membership in NATO. The problem poses a 
few questions: First, will complete cleanup be required before Poland can gain 
admittance? Second, taking into account that Poland's economic recovery could not 
handle the full financial burden associated with full cleanup, will NATO nations be 
required to pay the lion's share of the costs? Third, will NATO troops be billeted or 
required to conduct exercises in the vicinity of known hazardous dumps? In light of 
these questions, NATO officials have already begun efforts to assist in the cleanup. 
NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Scientific and Environmental Affairs, 
Dr. Jean-Marie Cadiou writes that the, "heavily polluted military sites formerly occupied 
by Soviet troops [are] .. .located very close to urban areas." Furthermore, the high levels 
"of soil and groundwater contarnination ... [are a result] of the seepage of chemical 
362The Economist, 3 September 1994, pp. 52-53. 
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weapons or radioactive materials."363 Only the most serious accidents have yet to 
addressed because of the vast extent of the problem and the lack of money and trained 
personnel necessary to conduct a proper cleanup. Though everyone involved in the 
cleanup effort considers the CEE problem to be a disaster, to date, only modest sums of 
financial support from Western countries have been forthcoming. Not surprisingly, the 
area's worst polluter, (the former-Soviet Union) has offered neither money nor trained 
personnel to assist in the cleanup. Most of the information regarding these specific 
cleanup efforts remains classified because of the possibility of political repercussions as 
a result of revelations that aquifers are radiated or that agricultural land is 
contaminated. The two most prominent international organizations that have provided 
most of the financing and technical support for cleanup are NATO and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. 
Some of the more prominent chemicals found in great quantities in the soil, 
water and air are: airborne particulate matter by-products (ammonia, nickel, cobalt, 
beryl, lead, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen chloride, lead aerosols, 
phenol, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, carcinogenic benzopyrene, cadmium, fluorine 
gas and hydrofluoric acid). Waterborne pollutants consist namely of the by-products of 
raw sewage, mercury, formaldehyde, nitrates associated with livestock manure, and a 
plethora of dissolved and suspended pesticide solids. Ron Taylor writes that in Poland 
lead levels in apples and lettuce exceed United Nations health standards by a factor of 
10. Over half of Poland's river water is too acidic for industrial use.364 
The problem for Poland again is that it lacks the allocation or capital and money 
to commence a comprehensive cleanup of its polluted areas. The dilemma of 
developing less environmentally damaging energy sources is neither cheap nor within 
the strict cost outlays of an emerging economic reform package. Therefore, if NATO 
does expand east before the cleanup is complete, it can expect to import higher rates of 
mortality, birth defects, lung ailment and overall physical maladies in greater numbers 
than currently occur throughout North American and Western European populations. 
Georgii Golitsyn, vice president of the Russian Academy of Sciences, detailed a 
categorization of the link between pollutants and public-health hazards: 
363Dr. Jean-Marie Cadiou, p. 33. 





• Phenol, formaldehyde, sodium dioxide and hydrogen sulfide-
• circulatory illnesses, respiratory and digestive tract diseases; 
• Particulates, nitrogen dioxide, and carbon monoxide-
• respiratory, skin, heart and blood vessel diseases; 
• Benzopyrene (one of the most toxic substances known to exist)-
• major carcinogen related to numerous forms of cancer; 
• Various chemicals-
• cadmium-thinning of the bones; 
• fluoride-thickening of the bones; 
• lead-anemia and mental retardation; 
• organic solvents-lower IQ's and liver disease; 
• Heavy metals-
• immune system disorders. 365 
For Poland, the most challenging aspect of correcting their environmental 
disasters is in forming agreeable policies that accumulate capital and monetary grants, 
as well as trained personnel to lead the cleanup. Their task must be further clarified by 
a two-step approach: First, how to clean up the waste that currently exists. Second, how 
to create post-Communist industrial complexes without adding substantial amounts of 
pollution. NATO's Science Committee and the Committee on the Challenges of Modem 
Society, the European Union's "Polish and Hungarian Assistance for the Reconstruction 
of Europe (PHARE) and the International Atomic Energy Association have all begun to 
address the most pressing ecological questions. A recently sponsored NATO pilot 
study: "Cross-Border Environmental Problems Emanating from Defence-related 
Installation and Activities" evaluated the problems, "caused by the discharge of 
radioactive as well as hazardous chemical waste into a number of land-locked seas and 
their drainage areas. "366 
B. USE OF NAVAL AND LAND FORCES TO EXPEDITE WESTERN 
INTEGRATION 
The former-Warsaw Pact countries that share the Baltic Sea as an outlet to the 
Atlantic Ocean have all begun a transformation of their naval forces in response to the 
end of the Cold War. Among the most formidable naval forces was the combination of 
365Georgii Golitsyn, pp. 39-40. 
366NATO Review, April 1993, p. 34. 
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Soviet Baltic fleet assets and Warsaw Pact units, that were stationed from Leningrad to 
ports in East Germany. The members of the Warsaw Treaty used their naval assets in 
the Baltic Sea in order to protect the Northern flank of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet 
Union from invasion. 
The former Warsaw Pact navies, bereft of the support mission to the 
Soviet theater offensive strategy that shaped their forces, are trying to 
deal with block obsolescence of their naval technology, a lack of 
budgetary support, a need to enunciate a new mission, and a desire to 
establish alliances or bilateral contacts with the West - all at the same 
time. These small and generally obsolescent navies are reconfiguring for 
coastal defense and economic exclusion zone policing missions ... [T]he 
major units (corvettes and submarines) of the Eastern European navies 
will probably not be very active in the next few years due to the cost of 
operating them, and they are unlikely to be replaced due to the marginal 
economic situation in Eastern Europe that leaves few funds available for 
military acquisitions.367 
Both the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet coup in 1991 forced a 
fundamental restructuring of naval forces throughout the Baltic region. From 1991 to 
the present-day, Russia, the three Baltic states, Poland, Sweden and Finland have all 
implemented policies to reduce and restructure their naval forces. NATO members, in 
accordance with declarations made in London and Rome, instituted precepts of the 
Alliance's New Strategic Concept that fundamentally altered the way NATO viewed the 
Soviet Union and its former-Eastern European satellites. NATO's London and Rome 
Declarations and the New Strategic Concept stated that the Soviet Union and Central 
and Eastern Europe would no longer be regarded as hostile. The intention of the 
Atlantic Alliance would be to convert from large, cumbersome, function-specific forces 
of the Cold War to highly mobile, versatile weaponry and strategies that could better 
accommodate defending against more diverse threats. 
The fundamental absence of a clearly defined threat- like the one that existed 
during the Cold War -- has altered the maritime security in the Baltic region. The 
significance to the United States, NATO and Western Europe is the relationship 
between what the Polish navy wants and what resources it will need to achieve its 
goals. Poland is modifying its naval missions and force structure to defend the coast 
and eventually use the navy as a conduit to forge closer integration with western 
security institutions. This change in the size and mission of the Polish navy will alter 
the European security balance as well as the Baltic regional balance. 
367Director of Naval Intelligence Posture Statement 1994, p. 7. 
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The West will play a large role in assisting Poland to achieve this naval revival 
by furnishing money, technical support and equipment and technical expertise. The 
poor material condition of Poland's fleet and the absence of predictable budgetary 
funding makes the execution of a naval doctrine and new force structure much more 
difficult. In order to justify its future existence, Polish naval leaders are left trying to 
define new military and political missions that will ensure the Polish navy's survival 
into the next century. Poland's efforts to convert its state-run economy to a market 
economy has forced the Polish parliament to divert most government resources to the 
most critical parts of society. 
The Polish navy has undertaken several measures to promote justification for the 
maritime service with a coastal defense mission and as a participant in future 
multinational naval operations. Polish naval officials hope that by engaging the navy in 
cooperative naval exercises with European states and NATO members, the navy can 
help Poland attain membership in European institutions faster. Therefore, the 
revitalization of the Polish navy can be viewed as both a military function of providing 
immediate security along Poland's coast as well as providing numerous political 
benefits associated with closer state-to-state relations. In the absence of an existential 
threat, uncertainty and more diffuse threats have become the substitute. Ken Booth 
states, 
The reduced risk of East-West conflict has made clearer the extent to 
which the daily lives of people in many parts of the world are threatened 
by economic instability, political oppression, terrorism, drugs, refugees, 
and the spread of modem weaponry to the Third World.368 
Since 1991, the Polish navy's two main tasks have been to address the navy's role 
as a coastal defense force and make preparations to become part of NATO's integrated 
command. Poland's current maritime issues are: reassembling their navy without 
Soviet-era ships, reorienting the naval strategy away from the Warsaw Pact doctrine, 
establishing a credible coastal defense to protect its coast while simultaneously 
promoting security in the Baltic region and using the navy to facilitate Poland's 
membership in European institutions. As with any successful club, Poland, in order to 
become a member in NATO, must prove that it offers tangible benefits to an alliance. 
Baltic regional security will be fundamentally altered by a renovated Polish navy. 
Poland's contribution to a wide range of regional and international naval operations 
significantly benefits collective security agreements. The transition of Poland's navy 
368Ken Booth. "The Role of Navies in Peacetime: The Influence of Future History on Sea Power," p. 151. 
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concerns the United States, NATO and Europe because the resources (material, financial 
and technical expertise) necessary to upgrade Poland's naval forces and integrate the 
forces and policy along Western European and NATO standards will come from 
Western nations. 
The regional stability in the Baltic area will be considerably altered with a 
revamped Polish navy. On the positive side, a vibrant Polish navy can be an asset to 
multinational operations conducted under the auspices of the UN, NATO and the WEU. 
To be sure, Poland continues to upgrade and modernize its navy by acquisitions of not 
only American technology and weaponry but also arms from other western European 
nations. This is not to say that Polish land forces, currently participating in several 
United Nations operations, cannot also be used to help speed up western integration. 
The use of naval forces is advocated as a means of providing coastal defense and also as 
a cost-effective, highly visible avenue for entry into western defense institutions. 
As Polish naval leaders attempt to bring naval standards in line with NATO 
requirements, there is an increasing urgency to defend their annual budget outlays from 
a parliament increasingly seen as hostile to the armed forces. The need therefore to 
redefine military forces and naval forces in particular is especially relevant for Poland. 
This dynamic has occurred namely as a result of the tight fiscal policy Poland has been 
forced to carry out in order to bring its economy in line with western European free-
markets. Poland's Deputy Foreign Minister, Robert Mroziewicz, stated that Poland's 
goal was to, "make our defense system fully compatible with NATO standards," in order 
to gain full membership by the year 2000. Additionally, Poles were to expend 250 
billion zlotys (approximately 10 million dollars) on "Partnership" activities and 
maintenance of their mission at NATO headquarters.369 
The collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in 1989-1990 
spelled the certain end of the postwar Soviet military presence in 
Europe ... Military retrenchment was accompanied by political and 
diplomatic withdrawals and adjustments as well.370 
The cataclysmic events occurring over such a short period of time have created a 
degree of uncertainty and thus instability. Certainly there was no place where this was 
more true than the Baltic region. The precipitous demise of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the WTO in turn caused a security vacuum where Central and Eastern European 
states occupy a strategic no-man's land between Western Europe and Russia. 
369Mroziewicz cited by Edward Krzernien, p. 8. 
370James Lacey, p. 65. 
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"Overnight, the countries of the former Warsaw Pact found themselves without any 
concept of their own security policies."371 While each of these countries is attempting 
to fundamentally transform their economy from a highly centralized command 
economy to a market one, fewer and fewer resources have been made available to 
revamp the outdated military. Herein lies the dilemma: Poland is required to adhere to 
strict budgetary policies in order to satisfy requirements for western loans, grants and 
financial aid. Simultaneously, this tight fiscal policy prevents government expenditures 
on military forces that are required by western military officials to spend a required 
percentage (1-3 percent) of the GDP on defense. Failure of military leaders to comply 
leaves western officials skeptical about the Polish military's willingness to gain 
membership in NATO. The Polish navy during its years in the Warsaw Pact was 
characterized as composed of Soviet ships with a heavy emphasis on mine warfare and 
amphibious operations. The 1994 country study of Poland noted that, 
During both the communist and post communist eras, the Polish navy 
received less emphasis and funding than other combat branches. 
Because the Polish navy usually purchased the simplest and cheapest 
equipment offered by the Soviet Union, all other navies on the Baltic Sea 
were considered superior to Poland's.372 
Since 1991, the two warfare areas of the naval forces (amphibious craft and 
rninelaying vessels) that Poland had invested much of its naval budget in was de-
emphasized. With the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Poland's raison d'etre (conducting 
amphibious and mine warfare operations) vanished and there no longer seemed to be a 
political will or the economic resources to encourage its existence into the 1990's. In an 
effort to prevent obsolescence, Polish naval leaders attempted to restructure what 
remains of their forces. Primarily, the amphibious naval assets and rninelaying vessels 
to be used in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion of western Europe have been phased 
out. Second, large surface combatant ships have been eliminated in favor of smaller, 
more agile coastal patrol craft and fast attack craft. Third, auxiliary units have been 
dramatically downsized to provide limited resources to the remaining combat-ready 
vessels. Even with a much smaller fleet, Poland is in the early stages of seeking out 
missions to justify its continued presence. 
371Piotr Kolodziejczyk in an interview conducted in July 1994, by Marek Henzler and Marek Ostrowski, 
Warsaw Polityka, p. 7. 
372Poland: A Country Study, p. 263. 
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The Polish fleet has been the hardest hit by the "Big Bang" economic techniques 
used to radically alter Poland's central economy in a relatively short period of time. 
Soviet-era ships - that still make up 95 percent of the fleet -- have not received regular 
overhauls to update or replace faulty equipment since the mid-1980's. Polish naval 
leaders used the Security Policy and Defense Strategy of Poland, published in November 
1992, as the basis for rehabilitating the naval service. It states: 
In the event of a war which goes beyond a local conflict, Poland's strategy 
will be the longest possible resistance in order to repel invasion by 
inflicting the largest possible casualties on the aggressor, demonstrating 
the determination to continue our defense, and gaining time for reaction 
by other countries and international organizations. In the event of a 
conflict of lesser intensity, military actions will be conducted in order to 
assure that the invading enemy force will be contained, halted, and 
destroyed in the shortest time possible. Patrol, security, blockade, anti-
diversion and anti-terrorist activity will also be undertaken.373 
This strategy has been the foundation upon which the navy has begun to 
rebuild. The key elements are providing for Polish security first and then transforming 
the navy into a force that NATO would see as a beneficial addition to its force structure. 
According to Polish strategy, Poland "will be able to gain membership in the European 
Communities after ... bringing [its] level of development closer in line with that of 
Western countries."374 The Polish navy within this context is designed primarily to, 
"defend the country's sea border, to protect shipping and economic interests in Polish 
territorial waters and to defend the seacoast in cooperation with the other types of 
troops."375 According to the current Polish doctrine, 
... a small, closed body of water such as the Baltic requires the use of fast 
powerful weapons systems, as well as compact units, small submarines, 
enhanced mine-warfare forces, and modern naval aviation. 
Unfortunately, [the Poles] ... can only dream of creating a real naval 
aviation force.376 
373security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, November 1992, p. 16. 
374security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, November 1992, p. 13. 
37Ssecurity Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland, November 1992, p. 18. 
376Andrzej Szafranski, p 7. According to the author, Polish naval aviation assets include: ten Mi-14 PL 
antisubmarine helicopters, four Mi-14's and four Anacondas plus several obsolete Mi-2 RM's for search and 
rescue. Because of budgetary restraints, the Polish navy cannot maintain a rotary-wing SAR unit. 
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Poland has undergone a remarkable transformation of its naval forces in a 
relatively short period of time. Granted, most of the changes since the collapse of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization are the result of decommissioning antiquated vessels. The 
decrease in Poland's amphibious and minelaying forces, signals the intent of the Polish 
coastal defense forces to do without a strictly offensive capability. While submarine and 
destroyer strength remain constant, the strategy is a future navy made up of smaller 
vessels, with an ability to conduct submarine operations. The Warszawa, equipped with 
western electronics, can be used as the command ship for the embarked commander, for 
training, diplomatic initiatives and as a symbol of a strong Polish navy. The most 
important trend is the increase in quality and quantity of fast attack craft with missiles, 
large patrol craft and coastal patrol craft. This is evidence of Poland's realization that 
smaller is not only cheaper but the only feasible means to carry out new missions. 
Lastly, both figures illustrate an overall trend to cut vessels from the Polish navy that 
have exorbitant maintenance costs. The Polish navy is leaner but its remaining fleet 
assets are not in the best condition because of the meager defense funds available. A 
Polish defense expert gave his assessment of the Polish fleet, stating the navy is: 
... the branch of service with the largest shortfall in technical investment. 
Almost half of the 70 combatant units and about 60 auxiliary units have 
by all possible yardsticks exceeded their service lives, and, with an 
average age of 18 years, the shock core of the force makes the Navy ... the 
oldest in the Baltic. 377 
In personnel strength, it ranks only behind Germany and Russia but it ranks next 
to last in equipment strength ahead of Finland and not counting the three Baltic 
states.378 Poland's surface assets include the Warszawa, which is equipped with 1950's 
electronics and weaponry. As a recommissioned Soviet mod-Kashin, the Warszawa has 
outlasted most of its Russian counterparts. The Polish submarine fleet is composed of 
one submarine too large to operate effectively in the Baltic (Kilo class Orzel) and two 
antiquated Foxtrot class submarines too old to go to sea. The shortages of spare parts 
from Russia and the CIS as well as substandard equipment and a shortage of trained 
specialists make all three of these submarines very difficult to get underway. The most 
recent addition to the surface fleet, the motor torpedo boat Orkim, lacks anti-ship 
missiles because its supplier, East Germany, has since reunified with West Germany. Of 
the twenty-five minesweepers in the fleet, fifteen cannot operate in sea conditions 
377 Andrzej Szafranski, p. 7 
378Andrzej Szafranski, p. 7 
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exceeding 3 on the Beaufort Scale.379 Fortunately, "the force of search-and-rescue, 
auxiliary and special-purpose ships is relatively new and fairly well equipped" in 
comparison to the surface and sub-surface combatants.380 
1. Defining New Roles and Missions 
The ability of the Polish navy to adapt to the fiscal limitations while 
simultaneously upgrading and integrating its naval forces will be the determining factor 
in whether or not it exists into the twenty-first century. Machiavelli wrote, 
.. .it happens that Fortune varies for a single man, for she changes the 
times while he does not change his ways. The downfall of cities also 
arises from this fact, for republics do not modify their methods with the 
times ... rather, they are slow since it is more difficult for them to 
change.381 
The Polish navy in the twenty-first century has replaced its Soviet-era offensive 
strategy and like other democratic countries in the Baltic region focused on defensive 
capabilities of a coastal navy. By protecting Poland's interests in the Baltic, the Polish 
navy must adapt a Swedish approach to its new naval role: "The Naval Forces' mission 
is to make sure the enemy cannot make a landing, to keep our waterways free from 
mines, and to protect our shipping and fishing trade."382 Poland's attempt to be 
included in European security organizations will require it to look beyond its coastal 
defense strategy and participate in multinational operations. 
2. Three Missions for the Future Polish Coastal Navy 
The Polish navy can take on a variety of future roles that could ensure the navy's 
existence: deterrence at sea, power projection from the sea, cooperative naval diplomacy 
and constabulary functions. There are three missions that the Polish navy can 
undertake in order to justify a future purpose and assist Poland in attaining other 
political aims. These missions are important not solely because they offer stability but 
also their potential political benefits. By properly maintaining a limited number of high 
quality naval assets, Polish naval leaders can justify their existence, receive more 
funding and elevate Poland's international prestige by being a regional leader and 
379 According to the Watch Officer's Guide, p. 253. A number three on the Beaufort Scale consists of winds 
between "7-10 sea miles per hour (knots)," with a "gentle breeze." The effect at sea, "Large wavelets. 
Crests begin to break. Glassy-looking foam. Perhaps scattered white horses." 
380 And.rzej Szafranski, p. 7. 
381Machiavelli, The Discourses, chapter IX, p. 383. 
3821he Swedish Armed Forces, p. 14. 
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supporter of multinational operations. Fulfilling these three missions will enhance 
Poland's coastal defense and increase the prospects of gaining membersrup in NATO. 
Primarily, the Polish navy must be prepared to carry out specific military 
objectives that correspond directly to wartime operations including search and rescue, 
mine operations, surface to surface engagements and surface to air operations to protect 
Poland's coast. Second, there will be political and multinational functions where the 
Polish navy must be prepared to engage in various peacekeeping and peace-enforcing 
operations (i.e., showing the flag and naval diplomacy). Third, the Polish navy must be 
capable of conducting constabulary functions throughout the Baltic region that are a 
means of enhancing Polish security but do not correspond to a direct military threat. 
These "peacetime operations" include interdicting drug and human smuggling, 
pollution abatement and monitoring environmental sensitive areas. 
The first mission of Polish naval presence will be a strictly military function 
based upon the premise that exercising and carrying out a warfighting capability is still 
essential to any coastal navy in order to provide a deterrent effect. The Poles employ 
patrol craft and fast attack craft to deter a seaborne invasion as the primary means of 
establishing a credible coastal defense. The three main objectives for Poland's future 
navy in a wartime environment are: (1) Maintaining small vessels (surface-to-surface 
and surface-to-air missile craft, attack craft and coastal patrol craft), auxiliaries and one 
or two submarines in order to provide a credible defense wrule simultaneously not 
provoking its neighbors. (2) Defending the 461 kilometers of Polish coastline with 
various seaborne assets as well as mobile, semi-mobile and in-place coastal defenses. (3) 
Possessing a force structure and naval doctrine that enhances Polish coastal security, 
Baltic regional security and makes available assets to be used in multinational (UN, 
WEU & NATO) operations. 
The military missions correspond to improving Polish coastal security and using 
these assets in other "out-of-area" operations. A cornerstone of Polish naval policy is 
using the benefits of a coastal state to Poland's advantage. The successful employment 
of a balanced defense: (using mines and controllable minefields; missile torpedo boats; 
naval air assets; mobile, semi-mobile and non-mobile coastal artillery; missile 
emplacements; and small diesel submarines perhaps bought from Germany,) can only 
come about by reliance on a coastal state's assets. Poland's coastal state status derives its 
strength from what Jacob Berresen describes as three assets: 
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• The coastal state has the benefit of knowing the local coastal terrain and 
using it to his advantage; 
• The coastal navy has the benefit of operating close to home and having 
available resources within a relatively short distance; 
• The coastal navy has the benefit of operating close enough to home to 
employ Army and Air Force assets as well as coastal artillery. 
The Polish navy in tum can offer numerous assets to Polish land forces in the 
event of hostilities and is thus a major reason for maintaining and continuously 
upgrading the fleet. By securing the flanks and rear of the army, especially during an 
amphibious assault on Polish territory, the navy can delay and obstruct the enemy by 
acting as the forward line of defense. The navy also provides the army with sea-
mobility and can prevent hostile land forces from maintaining a logistical supply. 
Finally the navy can secure the enemy's lines of communications and prevent 
reinforcements and supplies.383 In Poland's case, to provide the best territorial-coastal 
defense, it is necessary to have a well-rounded defensive fleet instead of a function-
specific fleet. Numerous examples from the recent past warn Poland not to rid itself of 
its primary defensive capabilities. Moreover, to plan a fleet around the certainty of 
NATO membership would be folly. Instead, a well-rounded balanced defense is 
Poland's best choice for ensuring against invasion as well as eventual membership in 
NATO. 
There is a vital necessity to maintain and revive Poland's coastal artillery system. 
Jacob Berresen offers several elements that comprise a coastal artillery defense. 
According to Berresen, coastal artillery should be composed of a mix of, "fixed, semi-
mobile and mobile elements," with a primary task of defending against an invasion 
from the sea. As a result of the emphasis on amphibious forces in the 1970's, according 
to Andrezj Szafranski, "during the latter half of the 1970's the coast guard removed the 
coastal artillery batteries deployed ... [along the entire Polish coastline]."384 As financial 
resources become more plentiful, the Polish navy must rebuild the coastal artillery in 
order to augment the balanced coastal defense. The promotion of the coastal artillery 
will be a contributing factor in a combined act of deterrence. Berresen states that, 'The 
383Jacob Bt<'rresen, pp. 150-151. Mr. Bt<'rresen's list is helpful in promoting possible uses of the navy in the 
event that a land war commences. Being the junior service in Poland, the navy must continually create a 
role for itself amidst the mindset of a certain land campaign as the single threat. Additionally, these are 
tasks that Poland could carry out as a member of NATO. 
384Andrzej Szafranski, p. 7. 
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contribution of the Coastal Navy to deterrence consists of its demonstration of sufficient 
will and ability to act against aggression in terms of violations, infringements or 
attacks. "385 
Poland's expertise in search and rescue and mine warfare have the benefit of 
providing a wartime and peacetime naval assets that provide tangible asset to the 
NATO naval force structure. By continuing to train and practice these warfare skills, 
Poles maintain a coastal defense capability that could be used in the event of an 
international or multilateral operation. The recent ferry disasters along the heavily-
traveled ferry routes between Sweden-Poland and Sweden-Estonia (e.g., Ferries ]an 
Heweliusz and the Estonia) provide obvious justification for maintaining a viable search 
and rescue unit. Western observers who took part in Baltops '94 were unanimously 
impressed with the day-long SAR operations using airborne and surface assets that the 
Poles orchestrated. 
The second level where Polish naval assets will play a decisive role is as part of 
multinational operations and political purposes. These missions include possessing a 
force structure and naval doctrine that encourages the navy to act in multilateral 
operations and in conjunction with alliance missions to involve the entire spectrum of 
military actions including war, showing the flag, demonstrating expertise in specific 
warfare areas during multilateral exercises, and preparing personnel and fleet assets to 
provide naval peacekeeping forces for future multilateral operations under the auspices 
of the UN, WEU and NATO. Berresen states, 
Participation in multinational naval operations overseas requires 
specialised training, and emphasises the need for the Coastal Navy or 
having at least some units at its disposal with an open-ocean capacity 
and which are equipped and trained to co-operate with the navies of the 
Naval Powers.385 
"Showing the flag" as a component of Polish naval diplomacy is used to 
demonstrate a willingness to engage in collective Baltic Sea security measures. This will 
take the form of port visits, exercises and exchanges and will underscore Poland's 
commitment to Western institutions, Baltic security and NATO solidarity. Skeptics who 
suggest that only large surface vessels like the Warszawa command respect of 
adversaries need only look at the Swedish navy model to be impressed by the small but 
lethal patrol craft and the expertise of the crew. In selling the idea to the Polish Sejm 
385Jacob B0rresen, p. 170. 
386Jacob B¢rresen, p. 169. 
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concerning the need of a fleet, there are several reasons why naval forces can function 
better than ground forces. Ken Booth offers seven assets that naval forces possess in 
accomplishing politically sensitive missions. Polish naval leaders, in justifying their 
budget outlays, would be clever to differentiate methods where naval for~es could 
function more decisively than land forces: 
• Versatility- warship's ability to perform a wide-range of tasks; 
• Controllability - warship's escalatory potential and withdrawal ability 
potential; 
• Mobility- warship's ability to move quickly and independently; 
• Projection ability - warships as bulk carriers of firepower, troops and 
equipment; 
• Access potential- warship's relative access to all littoral areas; 
• Symbolism - warships as signifiers of a country's intentions and 
commitments; 
• Endurance - warship's staying power within visible range or over the 
horizon.387 
Justifying a purpose for Polish naval forces in politically important multinational 
operations, naval forces perform various functions to enhance a collective effort. In the 
execution of naval diplomacy, Booth offers five tactics that are well within Polish naval 
proficiency to conduct: 
• Standing demonstrations of naval power- Poland would use this tactic in tandem 
with an international force or as part of an alliance strategy against a 
belligerent; 
• Specific operational deployments - The Polish navy must be prepared to conduct 
long-term naval commitments, as part of a greater multinational force; 
• Naval aid - Polish naval assets could assist greatly. With expertise in search 
and rescue and mine clearing operations, Poland's contribution in a hostile 
environment could be a substantial asset to a peacekeeping or peace 
enforcing operation; 
387Ken Booth, "Naval Diplomacy," pp. 33-36. 
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• Operational calls - Operational calls serve to enhance Poland's prestige vis-a-
vis other Baltic states as well as demonstrating their professionalism to other 
NATO nations; 
• Specific goodwill visits - Visits to the eight other Baltic countries promote 
regional security through confidence building measures and good 
neighborliness. 388 
Robert Staley II offers numerous alternative roles that naval assets can carry out 
while conducting peacekeeping operations. Naval peacekeeping operations will take 
many forms: surveillance, interdiction, coastal sea control, protection of offshore assets 
and harbor defense/port security and search and rescue. The Center for Naval Analysis 
listed a number of operations that could come under the tittle of United Nations naval 
missions. These operations mentioned do not necessarily have to come under the 
auspices of the United Nations but could rather be done under the control of WEU or 
NATO command authority. These activities could be performed by Polish naval units 
in order to improve regional and international security and bring prestige to Poland and 
increased funding to the navy. They include: 
• Providing humanitarian assistance; 
• Intervening for humanitarian purposes; 
• Conducting maritime peacekeeping; 
• Enforcing maritime agreements; 
• Protecting sea and air traffic; 
• Interdicting sea and air traffic; 
• Making a show of force; 
• Responding to aggression; 
• Controlling armaments/Conducting demilitarization.389 
Other activities might include disaster relief, evacuation of nationals and 
assistance to refugees fleeing war zones. These self-explanatory operations represent a 
new era of Polish naval activity that would seek to emphasize extending military 
operations out-of-area on behalf of international fiat. In the most recent example of 
Polish officials taking a pro-active stance in promoting international order under the 
auspices of the United Nations, Poland will be among a group of volunteering nations 
that will enforce United Nations' mandates in Haiti. President Clinton, in his address to 
388Ken Booth, "Naval Diplomacy," pp. 41-45. 
389Jeffrey I. Sands, p. 9. 
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the nation on 15 September, stated, that the United States agreed to, "lead a 
multinational force to carry out the will of the United Nations. More than 20 countries 
from ... as far away as Poland, which has so recently won its own freedom ... [has] agreed 
to join us [the United States]."390 Peacekeeping in the form of surveillance missions 
within a designated area will namely take the shape of identifying all contacts as either 
friendly, neutral or unfriendly surface, air and subsurface targets. 
For this role, Polish naval assets, with the use of coastal patrol craft, ASW assets 
and the limited air assets, will be able to perform a limited role. Peacekeeping 
operations will include interdiction in the form of intercepting, diverting, disrupting or 
delaying naval vessels suspected of aiding the designated hostile force. Poland's 
shallow-draft, fast attack craft and coastal patrol craft fleet could play an important role 
in monitoring operations near the coast or in tidal zones. The recent grounding of a 
U.S. navy coastal patrol boat in the Haitian bay of Port-au-Prince illustrates the need for 
Poland's shallow-water draft vessels as another improved dimension to an enhanced 
peacekeeping force.391 The purpose of detailing the various roles that the Polish navy 
can undertake in a world absent the Warsaw Pact and a single main threat: (1) Justifies 
the future existence of a Polish navy to skeptics in Polish society and the Polish 
parliament (Sejm) (2) To make the point that Poland's future integration in Western 
European society (a goal most Poles want to achieve) can be accomplished by using 
naval assets in a political way that most Poles are unaccustomed. As one naval expert 
states, 
... naval forces have important support functions, such as the 
transportation and provision of materials and personnel required to 
undertake basic peace-building ... a sea route is frequently the only 
feasible means of transportation ... Naval forces have the capacity, if 
consent is granted, to impose less drastically on a host nation's culture 
and sovereignty than territorial forces.392 
The third mission of the future Polish navy will be to combat non-military 
threats that will consume the majority of the Polish naval leadership's attention during 
peacetime. "The smallest navies of all will have the least problem in justifying their 
existence in the years ahead. Policing what in some cases may be extensive EEZs will be 
390Pfesident Clinton's address to the nation on Haiti recorded by The New York Times, 16 September 1994. 
391Robert Staley II, from Charles A. Ayers, Peacekeeping Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, pp. 51-53. 
392Jeremy Ginifer, pp. 344-345. 
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an expansive task for some navies ... 393 This so-called constabulary function will consist 
of numerous actions designed to ensure lawfulness within the 12 nautical mile Polish 
territorial sea, throughout the entire Baltic region, and on the high seas. As A.B. 
Donaldson notes, "Several types of maritime activity are identified in the [UN 
Convention on The Law of the Sea] ... as threats to the maritime security of all states. 
Piracy, illegal trafficking in drugs ... and unauthorized broadcasting from the high 
seas .... "394 There are other threats that can be added to Donaldson's list: 
• Instability caused by the flight of refugees; 
• Illegal operations run by organized crime; 
• Illegal transportation of humans, radioactive materials and narcotics; 
• Damage to environmentally sensitive areas; 
• Pollution to the marine environment. 
Observing the mandate from the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the Polish 
navy has the authority to enforce the preservation and protection of the Baltic marine 
environment. Concerning the Convention's authority A.B. Donaldson states, 
[It] ... has done more than any other instrument to set out broad 
responsibilities and enforcement mechanisms ... [The convention] ... also 
provides a clear legal basis for a state to deny the use of national ports by 
vessels which fail to comply with relevant pollution or safety standards, 
and also for arresting violators within territorial and contiguous 
zones.395 
With a Polish fishing fleet that relies upon a constant supply of fish, the Polish 
naval leadership, could again portray the navy as vital (like the Swedes do) in order to 
protect the industry. Poland's thriving fishing industry in the Baltic comprised nearly 
"25 percent of the total catch" in the 1980's, but pollution has seen these numbers drop 
drarnatically.396 Therefore, as a matter of maintaining this important domestic and 
export market, the Polish navy could justify an increase in defense spending to go 
towards vessels (like the Flex 300) that contain pollution abatement and monitoring 
equipment as well as hydrographic devices. Geoffrey Till makes a case for maintaining 
navies because far from being of singular importance during wartime, their role in 
393Ken Booth, "The Role of Navies in Peacetime," p. 160. 
394A.B. Donaldson, p. 3. 
395A.B. Donaldson, p. 6. 
396po[and: A Country Survey, p. 155. 
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maintaining, "Good Order at Sea" will increasingly be viewed as an integral part of 
Poland's national interests. Till writes that, 
Sea-based resources (oil, gas, fish) have become crucial to the economic 
success of littoral states and so must be supervised and 
administered ... Domestic societies are increasingly vulnerable to the 
threats posed by drug-smugglers, illegal immigration ... lncreasingly it is 
argued that resource depletion and environmental pollution are the real 
long-term threat to global security.397 
The responsibility to define the Polish navy's future rests with its leaders. By 
listing the three missions and the way in which the navy's participation can influence 
political decisions, Polish integration into western security institutions is in part due to 
naval efforts. Therefore, the rationale for a well-equipped, highly trained and highly 
mobile force is put forth by the Swedish Defense Ministry, who states that: 
The Swedish Armed Forces preserve peace through their very existence. 
They are intended to convince every nation that an attack would cost far 
too much to be worth the effort. However, if we are attacked, our armed 
forces will counter every violation of Swedish territory and prevent the 
attacker from gaining a foothold on Swedish soil. 398 
Attaining these goals and the specific three missions of the future Polish navy will not 
only serve Poland's immediate security concerns and fulfill its constabulary duties, they 
will add a convincing argument to its list of benefits it brings to western institutions. 
3. Altering the Naval Force Structure to Meet the Mission 
''The development in weapons technology" Jacob B0rresen writes, "has made it 
possible to pack enough firepower into even the smallest craft, so that small vessels or 
craft of minor navies may ... threaten even the strongest naval units of the Naval 
Power."399 Not only will this thought be the driving vision of the future Polish navy, it 
corresponds with the New Strategic Concept for NATO members. In order for Poland 
to be successful in providing a respectable defense of its coastline and a formidable 
partner in an expanded Atlantic Alliance that stresses highly mobile and flexible assets, 
there is a necessity to emphasize small and lethal ships. Maintaining the flagship 
Warszawa as a command ship for the Polish Baltic Sea commander and as a prestigious 
397Geoffrey Till, pp. 194-195. 
398The Swedish Armed Forces 1994, pp. 14-15. 
399Jacob B0rresen, p. 149. 
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symbol is justified. The Kilo-class submarine Orzel, as well as the two outdated Foxtrot 
models, are more of an economic burden than any side benefits they accrue. 
Of the three Polish submarines existing in 1992[and still in 1994] all built 
in the Soviet Union, the one Orzel vessel is the most advanced; two Wilk-
class submarines are older and noisier ... Because they were designed for 
ocean combat, the three submarines maneuver clumsily in the Baltic Sea 
in comparison with the smaller submarines of the other Baltic nations.400 
In order to keep Polish submarine sailors proficient in submarine tactics, it is 
necessary to keep at least one while trying to obtain smaller, more efficient western 
models. As a coastal navy, Poland needs a submarine force to discourage offensive 
attacks. However, the current conscription limit of 18 months creates a critical shortage 
of knowledgeable servicemen. Poles must take another lesson from the Swedish 
experience: 
For operations in [the] littoral environment the conventional submarine 
has proved and will prove its great effectiveness. The requirements that 
comes out of operating in shallow waters and the Economic Exclusion 
Zone can be met by great margin .. .In low level conflicts the conventional 
submarine can be used effectively in surveillance or monitoring missions, 
thus performing it's task undetected and unhampered by bad 
weather.401 
Poland continues to decommission its old submarines and antiquated patrol and 
coastal patrol craft over a phase-out period. By concentrating attention and resources 
on smaller more efficient craft to make up the backbone of the Polish fleet, Poland can 
effectively pursue its three future missions. 
4. Danish Flex 300: A Model for Poland's Future Fleet? 
One possible approach that Poland could take in order to upgrade and 
modernize its naval forces while maintaining proficiency in warfare areas would be to 
buy mission modular ships like the Royal Danish Navy Flex 300 model. With declining 
state revenues, the Danish Navy was forced to restructure its naval forces in the 1980's. 
Flex 300 proponents claim that the program enhances long-term procurement planning 
while fulfilling many different operational requirements specific to the Baltic Sea region. 
The Flex 300's strongest point - highly flexible, mobile and highly armed -- reflects 
Poland's emphasis on small forces and NATO's New Strategic Concept.402 The 
400po[and: A Country Survey, p. 263. 
401Rear Admiral Frank Rosenius, Royal Swedish Navy, p. 12. 
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modular ship concept was founded on a single hull type outfitted with varying modular 
packages to accomplish an assortment of missions. According to its proponents, the 
Flex 300 could respond to any number of threat scenarios by simply replacing different 
modules. The Danish Minister of Defense, Knud Enggaard stated, 
In these times of changes in the European security situation almost all 
countries are seeking to trim their defence spending ... By designing and 
fitting the Standard Flex 300 ships in such a way that role-dedicated 
equipment can be quickly changed, the Navy can meet operational 
requirements with a smaller number of ships than would be needed 
using single-role (traditional) ships.403 
The Flex 300 concept fits perfectly with Polish naval strategy: a ship with various 
missions at an affordable price. 
Standard Flex 300 Flyvefisken concept of building multi-role patrol boats 
that can be reconfigured for ASW, minesweeping, fast attack craft or even 
environmental tasks, thanks to highly modularised weapon and sensor 
fits, is attracting some interest, since it offers the prospect of affordable 
flexibility.404 
Accentuating the strengths of historical Polish naval expertise is one way you 
fulfill the three future missions. The other way is to examine areas in which the Polish 
navy could make a substantial contribution to Polish security, Baltic regional stability, 
and prove to be an asset to NATO, UN and WEU naval peacekeeping operations. As 
part of Poland's closer cooperation with western defense ministries and defense 
contractors, Jane's Defence Weekly reported that the Polish Defense Minister would like 
to see the Polish "defence industry manufacturing some Western hardware or even 
producing equipment under licence. "405 There is much discussion in Europe regarding 
402Reiterating NATO's New Strategic Concept, reflects the absence of a Soviet threat and the necessity to 
restructure NATO's forces and policies to reflect the changes to the European security system. Poland 
would do well to heed the sea change in NATO force structure since 1990. The message from the New 
Strategic Concept: "Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the 
territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the 
serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which 
are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe." Therefore, with the threat more diffuse, 
overall size and readiness of the Allies' force is to be reduced while flexibility and mobility would be 
increased. In the spirit of this new concept, future forces would require "enhanced flexibility and 
mobility ... to permit measured and timely responses." From The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 7-8 
November 1991, paragraphs 10 and 47, 47C. 
403 Standard Flex 300-The True Multi-role Ship, p. 2. Enggaard states that in addition to military missions, 
the Flex 300 can be converted to civilian uses like hydrographic survey and pollution abatement. 




the possibility that a consortium of nations and industries would converge on Poland to 
build a vessel similar to the Flex 300. Polish military officials have encouraged an 
extended range of such contacts. 
5. Developing a Relationship with Parliament 
In order to justify their continued existence to the Sejm, the Polish naval 
leadershlp must continue to participate in and organize high visibility operations. 
Involving the navy in exchanges with wealthier European neighbors and providing 
national television coverage will increase support among the public and parliament. 
Naval leaders must establish close liaison with Polish parliamentarians by creating 
programs designed to foster a better understanding of the navy's purpose. This could 
take the form of political and media officials invited on over-night cruises to familiarize 
visitors with a display of basic operations. An analogy that some Polish naval leaders 
offer to skeptical Polish parliamentarians in order to justify expenditures for the naval 
budget is the axiom that, "It is wise to build a firehouse before a fire occurs." Part of the 
task of appealing to parliament has been the responsibility of President Walesa. 
He recently gave conspicuous support for the naval services by meeting with all 
senior national representatives after Baltops '94 and appealing on Polish national 
television for more multinational exercises to enhance regional Baltic stability. One 
element that links a military organization to the civilian public and freely elected 
parliament is public disclosure of the armed forces' intentions and what it sees as its 
tasks. The United States Department of the Navy used the publication of a naval 
doctrine as a public relations tool to justify its projects. For military leaders long-trained 
to guard all aspects of the military, including mission roles and force structure, the idea 
of promoting transparent military budgets and publicly stating military goals and 
intentions continues to be an alien concept. The greatest contribution publishing of a 
naval doctrine can have is clarifying complexities of naval strategy and articulating a 
concise vision of the future. The American naval doctrine clearly spells this out with a 
series of chapters. The Poles might offer a similar publication for instance: 
405Torn Bogdanowicz, p. 32. 
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• What the Naval Forces Are: The Nature of Naval Service The 
establishment and character of naval forces (subsurface, surface, air and 
coastal artillery); 
• What the Naval Forces Do: Employment of Naval Forces - deterrence, 
forward presence, naval operation other than war, sealift for army assets, 
joint operations and naval operations in war, international prestige 
associated with a forward deployed navy; 
• How the Navy Fights: Naval Warfare- preparation for war and forms of 
naval warfare; 
• The Future of the Navy: Command, Control and Surveillance, Power 
Projection, Force Sustainment - multinational naval participation, Baltic 
cooperation and coastal defense; 
• Why the Naval Forces are Critical to Poland's Future: Prestige, Non-Military 
(Constabulary) Functions, Improving Regional Security, Contributing to 
European and International Security.406 
6. Closer Cooperation with Western Europe and NATO 
The future success of the Polish Navy rests on the leadership's ability to integrate 
into western military institutions and gain international recognition for its part in 
multinational operations. The International Defense Review recently reported that Poland 
and the Netherlands recently concluded an agreement to enhance naval cooperation, 
joint naval exercises, and exchanges of personnel and technology. Among the specific 
areas of cooperation agreed to were: joint mine-countermeasures, search and rescue, 
bilateral naval maneuvers in the Baltic, exchange of officers to observer national naval 
exercises as well as maintaining regular working contacts between the Hydrographic 
Office of the Polish navy and the Dutch naval forces. Lastly, and perhaps most 
important, the Dutch defense electronics firm Hollandse Signaalapparaten expanded its 
contacts with Polish naval officials for the purpose of possibly upgrading of the 
Warszawa's antiquated electronic suite.407 
406nte Department of the Navy's Naval Doctrine Publication 1 Naval Warfare, p. 1. The publication lists 
four general topic areas. The last set is specific to Polish naval interests, employed within the context of an 
all-inclusive public document. Printing such a document is a practical application of establishing a 
transparent military structure. Post-Communist societies and their leaders are not familiar with such 
practices and are thus very skeptical about letting one's friends and enemies know the details of their forces. 
This is a mindset that forestalls better relations with the West and presently with the already-weary 
parliament that continues to have an adversarial relationship with the military. In effect this is one way that 
the military can "bridge the gap" between the Sejm and the armed forces. 
407Joris Janssen Lok, May 1994, p. 6. 
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7. Participation in NATO/WEU/ UN Naval Operations 
Geoffrey Till explains that, "Politicians use navies to service alliance systems, 
whether these alliances are permanent or ad hoc, bilateral or multilateral."408 The Polish 
navy can play a critical role in fostering closer contact with NATO while serving as a 
conduit for further military cooperation. As Jacob B0rresen asserts, "it pays for the 
Coastal State in the form of increased international prestige, 'diplomatic currency', to be 
able and willing to contribute to multinational peacekeeping or peace-enforcing 
operations under the auspices of the UN."409 Other Polish proposals to foster closer 
naval cooperation with NATO countries include: continued participation in future 
Baltops (including phase II which is reserved solely for NATO countries); Polish, Danish 
and German mine-sweeping exercises; Polish and French anti-submarine warfare 
exercises; tactical exercises combined with the visit of Dutch naval vessels; tactical 
exercises combined with the visit of Belgian naval vessels; SAR exercises between 
German and Polish naval forces; and peacekeeping training and exercises with Dutch 
units at the Military Training Center for UN Peacekeeping Forces in Kielce. 
Additionally, the Polish Defense Ministry recently hired a high-ranking former-
NATO official, German General Henning von Ondarza, who recently retired in March 
1994 as the commander in chief of Allied Forces Central Europe. He now advises the 
Polish government on actions necessary to forge closer integration with NATO. Hiring 
former-NATO officials as well as having the former admiral of the Polish navy as the 
Defense Minister greatly assists the Polish naval leadership in promoting its causes in 
Warsaw and Brussels. 
8. Participation in Operations with NATO & The U. S. 
In conjunction with an altered naval policy and reduced force structure, Poland 
sees a future in NATO and western European institutions only through on-going 
participation in multilateral exercises as a necessary prelude to multilateral operations. 
Subsequently, Poland has used the annual naval exercises in the Baltic Sea (Baltops) as a 
mechanism towards forging closer contacts with the West. Baltops '94 was the most 
recent example of Polish naval assets participating in western exercises while 
demonstrating its expertise in several warfare areas. In Baltops '94, the Poles 
contributed two of the thirty-seven ships: ORP Kaszub F240 and ORP Lech A282. 
Observers noted that the Poles conducted an impressive and professional show of naval 
408Geoffrey Till, p. 191. 
409J acob B~rresen, p. 171. 
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force throughout the week-long event. One entire day was dedicated to Polish 
demonstrations in the area of search and rescue. Polish navy SAR assets conducted an 
exercise (covered by Polish national television) which included helicopter and 
waterborne personnel recovery and towing a disabled ship. According to informed 
American sources, the Poles performed the SAR activities in an exemplary manner, 
impressing both the American and Western European staffs. Consistent participation in 
Baltops and exercising basic NATO warfare skills is an important part of Poland's 
attempt to improve interoperability and closer integration. It should be noted that 
Polish naval assets have conducted operations with NATO forces nearly a year before 
land forces. 
9. Recommendations 
• Continue democratic and economic reform, emphasize human rights and the 
rights of national minorities; 
• Be an example and incentive to other regional actors, including Russia; 
• Disclose whether or not Poland intends to station German or any other 
foreign troops in Poland, or if Polish troops could be subordinated under 
foreign commander; 
• Prove to be a net contributor of Alliance security; 
• Follow through on democratic and market reforms and finally settle the 
constitutional problems. 
At times, Poland seems to be its own worst enemy in its bid to integrate into 
Western institutions. The continued inability to resolve the constitutional questions and 
the resulting power struggles between the president and the prime minister have cast a 
serious shadow over Poland's efforts to become a vibrant democracy. Second, by 
fostering good relations with Russia and its neighbors, Poland's actions as a stable 
regional actor will help convince Russia that ensuring its security is vital to NATO's 
success. Proving it can be a net contributor to the Alliance's security will enhance 
Poland's membership chances. This objective takes on many forms. Polish leaders must 
resolve the constitutional questions prior to entry in any military alliance. Second, 
Polish leaders must be willing to publicly advocate any arrangement that NATO 
requires of its other members, including stationing of foreign troops and subordinating 
its troops under foreign commanders. Though there might be an assumption that 
Poland can enter or exist within the Alliance on its own terms - like the special status of 
France or Spain -- the environment that allowed such previous arrangements does not 
warrant "special treatment" now. 
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Additional recommendations for utilizing the Polish navy include: 
• Scrap the big, old ships; buy and build small to reflect Poland's coastal 
defense strategy and the necessity to reflect NATO's New Strategic Concept; 
• Buy and build modular mission ships; 
• Involve the Navy in all types of exchanges with European neighbors and 
provide national television coverage; 
• Justify existence with high visibility regional and international operations; 
• Cooperate and consult with NATO and western navies in all aspects of: 
training, exercises, multilateral and bilateral operations; 
• Volunteer the navy for all naval peacekeeping operations under NATO, UN 
& WEU auspices; 
• Train with the NATO Tactical Publications and invite NATO observers to 
critique maneuvers; 
• Hire retired high ranking NATO leaders to facilitate closer relations with 
NATO; 
• Participate in and host regularly scheduled naval exercises; 
• Provide basic western language training for all service personnel, institute 
language programs on a national level for all grades; 
• Increase interoperability by buying western communications equipment; 
• Procure communications equipment, American aircraft, ships and 
armaments; 
• Establish closer liaison with Polish parliamentarians by offering 
familiarization tours; 
• Establish programs to take political and media elites on over-night ship 
cruises. 
Poland cannot continue to operate like a Warsaw Pact-era navy in an age of 
fiscal responsibility, parliamentary over-sight and vastly diffuse threat. Polish naval 
officials can no longer justify force levels and grandiose ships of an outdated theory of 
power projection and prestige. To their credit, Polish military officials and naval leaders 
is in particular have been pro-active in adapting to the new environment. However, 
more can always be accomplished and the skill of naval leaders in not only adapting to 
change but anticipating change before it occurs in order to stay ahead. Poles cannot be 
expected to launch Madison Avenue-type marketing campaigns to win the support of 
the public and parliament overnight. Indeed, one of the many lessons Poles have 
learned since the break up of the Warsaw Pact is the necessity to justify one's existence 
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by continually seeking out new roles and missions and appealing, like never before, to a 
legislative body that does not automatically grant the military its budgetary requests. 
The necessity to redefine a naval mission and create a force structure that reflects 
political and military realities will do a great service to both Poland and the maritime 
service Rather than reinventing the wheel, Poles will find it increasingly useful to look 
beyond Poland's borders and perhaps beyond the confines of Europe to find models 
implemented by successful naval staffs. Finally, by redefining the Polish navy to 
provide a coastal defense, security and international stability are not sacrificed but 
enhanced by the additional operations Poland's naval force can undertake. B0rresen 
states, "An efficient and well-run Coastal Navy makes an important contribution to local 
and regional stability not least because it is, by definition, inherently defensive in 
orientation."410 
410Jacob B~rresen, p. 174. 
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VII. NATO EXPANSION: WHAT IS THE BEST POSSIBLE OPTION? 
Throughout its forty-five years of existence, NATO has continually evolved in 
order to meet its stated goals of protecting and promoting stability and democracy 
within the Atlantic Alliance. It has also been maintained that NATO not only possesses 
the means to alter its mission and membership, it is almost incumbent upon the 
organization to change in order to keep its relevancy. Konrad Adenauer once remarked 
that Germany's fragile democracy and market economy after World War II succeeded 
because NATO offered it a security guarantee. The same argument is the single greatest 
argument for admitting Poland, the other three Visegrad states and perhaps Bulgaria, 
Romania and the Baltic states. 
Lastly, it has been charged that because NATO needs to adapt to stay relevant 
and Central and Eastern European States need security guarantee to ensure the 
continued flourishing of democratic and market reforms, NATO expansion is necessary. 
Regardless whether Russia approves or believes that such an enlargement of the 
Atlantic Alliance would further support nationalists claims of western encirclement, it 
seems that to do nothing or hold off making tough decisions only creates a security 
vacuum and destabilizing realm throughout Central and Eastern Europe. In order to 
gain a proper perspective of the entire debate, it is important to examine some of the 
more prominent arguments for and against Polish membership. If Poland is admitted 
or not into NATO, what will be the ramifications for regional security? 
A. NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO: 
• Regional cooperation decreases between Poland and other neighbors left out 
of NATO expansion as resentment towards Poland by other members left out 
of expansion grows; 
• Resentment towards Poland by Russia; 
• Russia's nationalists use NATO expansion as a sign of western aggression 
and a good reason to begin the second Cold War or a "Cold Peace;" 
• Russia will perceive Poland's inclusion and any Eastern European countries' 
exclusion as the limit to which the West considers its easternmost influence; 
• The cost of Polish integration into NATO will be great; 
• Cohesion among NATO members will suffer with any new members; 
• Successful collective defense becomes questionable collective security; 
• Polish expansion into NATO will require 16 nations approval as well as the 
support of 16 parliaments and senate support; 
• Likelihood that the United States would offer a nuclear guarantee; 
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• Polish interests will inevitably differ from NATO's and the United States on 
some issues; 
• Expanding NATO to the East will only increase the number of ethnic and 
national troubles similar to Bosnia; 
• The financial aspects of Polish membership in NATO: Who will pay? Who 
will pay in what amount? How far will improvements go? How will NATO 
members divide up other resources to non-members? 
Eastern expansion of the Alliance to include Poland would most certainly bring 
more initial negative side effects than positive results. At the outset then, it would seem 
as if eastern expansion could not rationally take place. The tangible benefits of 
enlarging the Alliance (i.e., those benefits any national leader would have to justify to 
taxpayers and parents of children sent to defend a onetime foe) are realistically not 
present. Most members of the NATO staffs and American policy experts contend that 
besides extending the zone of Alliance stability, providing Germany with a friendly 
frontier, and contributing a 200,000 plus army to the NATO force structure. The issue of 
extending western style democracy, market economies and hence western stability can 
be examined from two opposite positions. First, that these western institutions most 
notably NATO could stabilize potentially destabilizing areas is a reasonable 
proposition. 
On the other hand, extending NATO to these areas might in fact infect the west 
with all of its Byzantine intrigues. No one can discount the possibility that such a 
scenario is possible. This will be one of the "leaps of faith" that NATO members will 
eventually be forced to undertake when they make the decision to enlarge. Therefore, 
the plethora of problems the Alliance is likely to encounter is very much on the minds of 
the international staffs at NATO headquarters. The question is all the more vexing from 
the standpoint of NATO policymakers who generally see expansion as inherently good 
and inevitable but only after a long process of integration. They view quick expansion 
(like that now proposed by the United States and within some circles in Germany) as 
inflaming the negative attributes. Therefore, the issue seems to be based most explicitly 
on the timetable for eastern expansion. This reflects not only a realistic attempt to 
maintain Alliance cohesion but also to preserve the privileged lifestyle of Western 
Europe. This suggest a certain degree of cynicism towards NATO members who only 
want to retain their "piece of the pie" and discourage any new states from joining the 
elite club. In this sense, Western Europe (including North America) like Central and 
Eastern Europeans have failed to adequately alter their perceptions in a post-Cold War 
world. 
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Among the most contentious debates over eastern expansion is what this will 
mean to regional security. It has been suggested that NATO would do well to take on 
new members as a means of balancing against Russian interests, enhancing its mission, 
providing American engagement on the European continent into the twenty-first 
century and ensuring eastern stability. However, by including Poland in a first wave of 
new members, what signal will this send to Russia about how far East NATO is willing 
to make defensive and political commitments.? To include Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary while leaving out Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria and the Baltics is de 
facto acquiescence for Russia to reassert an historical influence. It is no wonder then that 
many NATO policymakers see an immediate drive for new members as inherently 
destabilizing along Russia's Western periphery. As a by-product of considering some 
Eastern members and not others, NATO has precipitated a schism in the cooperation 
between new members and those left out. Polish leaders have long advocated an 
expansion of NATO to include all of Central and Eastern Europe with the implied 
exception of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. This point of view fails to adequately 
respond to the realization that such a move would transform NATO from a collective 
defense organization into something of a collective security organization. 
Furthermore, resentment would follow by Russia whose leaders have 
consistently challenged any Polish or NATO attempt to expand the membership. 
Irrespective of the claims that NATO or the United States is attempting to placate the 
Russians with a "go slow approach," Western leaders must consider the ramifications 
that such a move would mean to Russian relations and the Russian domestic situation. 
Some argue that regardless of how it looks to Russians or what the nationalists might 
do, NATO must expand based on its interests and in the interests of resolving the 
security vacuum that now exists. Others insist that such a move made now while 
Russia is "down" would single-handedly create another Cold War division most 
Europeans would like to avoid. 
It is also claimed that enlarging NATO while Russia's domestic situation is 
tenuous would only aid ultranationalist and nationalist forces in their campaign to 
prove to Russians that the West is attempting to humiliate and subvert Russia. This is 
an argument used by both the Yeltsin-Kozyrev camp and some policymakers in the 
Clinton administration. The other side of this argument is that regardless of what 
actions the West takes towards Russia - foreign aid, NATO expansion, CFE Treaty 
negotiations- elements within Russia's political strata (namely the ultranationalist and 
military hard-liners) will try to associate it with a Western scheme to keep Russia down. 
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Another negative aspect of NATO expansion is the dilemma over who to offer 
membership to and who to ignore, thereby signaling the extent of Western interest in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The natural reaction of Russia will be to assume that if 
NATO offers membership to the Visegrad four, that all other countries like Romania 
and the Baltics will fall under Russian influence. Though many observers and 
policymakers stay clear of expressions like "spheres of influence," one cannot ignore that 
this is precisely the question that will be resolved in the next few years. To minimize 
the impact of "drawing new lines" and ceding a pro forma "sphere of influence" to 
Russia, NATO must, when it announces the list of prospective new members, offer 
future membership to others and offer new bilateral agreements between them and 
NATO. 
Although Polish officials tactfully avoid mentioning the cost associated with 
Polish membership in NATO, there is every reason to believe that such expansion will 
cost the Alliance's more wealthy neighbors billions of dollars. At a time when nearly 
every NATO member is cutting its defense budgets, now seems a hardly appropriate 
time to convince the electorate that greater defense budgets are required to bring Poland 
up to speed. No one expects that if Poland is offered membership in NATO it will be 
able to fund programs necessary to make it a formidable ally. Observers who watch the 
Polish Sejm draw similar conclusions that Polish parliamentarians are not likely to 
advocate greater state resources to be allocated to defense budgets. While the creation 
of a new constitution continues to be debated and control of the military is yet to be 
defined, defense projects are likely to suffer the consequences of the unresolved 
ambiguity. 
Inevitably, cohesion will decrease with the addition of any new members. 
Regardless of who the new members are, cohesion at all levels of decision making will 
suffer. Any decisions to be reached by unanimous consent will be further clouded. For 
instance, a decision to take a more aggressive role in Bosnia will be impacted by the 
large number of Serbs now residing in Hungary. Cohesion is the single greatest NATO 
asset that will suffer the most. Most NATO experts contend that the loss of cohesion 
among the NATO members will throw the Alliance into constant turmoil, unable to 
carry out even the most minor changes. As a solution, some see changing NATO's 
unanimous consent rules to two thirds majority on most procedures and only 
unanimous consent on Article 5 decisions. 
Some also see immediate expansion as the death sentence for collective defense 
as it is replaced by collective security. By adding any new members, NATO loses its 
"exclusive club" aura and becomes an organization similar to the CSCE. Polish 
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membership in NATO in the near term would also require the unanimous consent of 16 
countries and 16 different parliaments-senates. This is seen as a negative aspect because 
it precipitates a forum whereby Alliance members are forced to take sides on this 
contentious debate. No one expects, however, that small countries like Portugal or 
Spain could derail the wishes of the United States or Germany. However, the issue of 
expansion could raise the specter of NATO members squabbling amongst each other at 
a time when other issues like the war in Bosnia have already strained Alliance cohesion. 
Other experts insist that expanding NATO would require the United States to 
give a nuclear guarantee to Poland in order for Article 5 to have any substance. This 
would require the President of the United States to go before the American people and 
justify the reasons for such a guarantee, when most Americans are convinced the Cold 
War is over. Other skeptics of immediate expansion insist that Poland will bring to the 
Alliance a specific agenda which will inevitably clash with other NATO members. This 
worries some who believe a Polish agenda would include advocating a confrontational 
stance with Russia or, at the very least, a more proactive role for NATO throughout the 
entirety of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Most NATO experts and enlargement skeptics believe that by including Poland 
and the other Visegrad states, NATO will import the by-products of Eastern instability -
-ethnic war, hyper-nationalism and territorial disputes. In Poland's case, these issues 
are inconsequential. Poland has a relatively homogenous society and a well-publicized 
minority policy. Poland has also resolved all of its territorial questions and has no 
outstanding territorial disputes with any of its neighbors. The financial aspects of 
enlarging the Alliance is another major obstacle for proponents of expansion. Including 
only Poland will be a multi-billion dollar proposition, requiring already financially-
strapped Western governments to set aside adequate amounts of resources. While most 
NATO members are in the process of cutting military expenditures, it seems unrealistic 
to effectively convince the Western electorate that they must contribute more to the 
defense of former-Warsaw Pact countries 
B. POSITIVE ASPECTS OF POLISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO 
• Expansion of NATO will enhance stability to the East. Expansion will give 
Poland guarantees to allow it to develop its democratic and market reforms. 
Expansion gives NATO it twenty-first century raison d'etre. 
• Expansion will move NATO's Eastern frontier and provide the Alliance with 
a large land army and small navy for combined joint operations. Poland has 
land and offers the arena of the next possible war. Poles offer a greater 
177 
"collective bloodletting" for peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. 
Poles offer the West peacekeeping forces in the form of land forces and naval 
forces for future multilateral and multinational operations. 
• Expansion of NATO provides more room for the Alliance to maneuver in the 
event of an eastward migration of refugees or Russian land forces. 
• Expansion is necessary because Poland is part of the West. Expansion is 
necessary because the West is morally obligated to bring in Poland. 
• Expansion keeps the Americans engaged on the European continent. 
• Expansion now is less risky because it will occur during a time of relative 
peace, during the time of crisis in the East, expansion eastward would be 
viewed an escalatory move by the West. 
• Expansion secures a large Polish consumer base, billions of dollars of foreign 
investment and a highly educated working force. 
• Expansion will facilitate resolution of minority and territorial disputes are 
best solved by the Alliance's consultative mechanisms. 
The most widely-touted reason for extending NATO guarantees is that 
immediate expansion will enhance the security situation in Central and Eastern Europe 
by exporting stability. This is by far the most plausible reason for enlarging NATO 
during a relative time of peace. It is hard to imagine how Western policyrnakers can sell 
such a proposition to the electorate. However, the proposition that NATO membership 
for Poland helps establish the continuity of democracy and free markets is accepted 
among most European security experts. 
Another benefit that Poland would bring to the Alliance is frontier territory that 
would significantly increase NATO's defensive posture and be used to fight a future 
land war in Europe. The Poles unabashedly acknowledge that Poland offers the West 
and particularly Germany an initial buffer zone. Some have suggested that this is a 
cynical reason to offer Poland membership in NATO, yet the fact remains that Germany 
would prefer to extend the borders of stability further East. Expansion gives Poland 
security guarantees that will help protect democratic and market reforms. Polish 
officials point out that Konrad Adenauer credits NATO guarantees to the Federal 
Republic of Germany in the 1950's as instrumental in its efforts to revitalize the German 
state after World War II. 
Poland should also be admitted into NATO because of the West's moral 
obligation to right past wrongs of the earlier twenty-first century. Moreover, the 
argument that Poland as it now exists has a legitimate claim to being a "Western" 
country. Failing to resolve the perceived security vacuum would run counter to 
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NATO's post-1989 commitment to enhance stability to the East. Polish membership in 
NATO would increase the number of troops made available to NATO and other 
Western-sponsored multilateral and multinational operations. The so-called "collective 
bloodletting" that the Poles would bring to the Alliance would surely enhance NATO's 
peacekeeping and war fighting capabilities. Furthermore, Poland has demonstrated a 
willingness and an acumen for such operations through the use of well-trained troops. 
Extending NATO also extends the borders farther East where NATO troops in 
conjunction with Polish armed forces could combat waves of immigrants from the East 
as a result of civil war, nuclear accident or economic catastrophe. NATO's extensive C4I 
capabilities could be deployed further East to head off or at least signal early trouble. 
Expanding NATO's frontiers under the aegis of an American-sponsored 
initiative would be a substantive sign to Europeans of a U.S. commitment on the 
Continent into the twenty-first century. American leaders could derail any European 
notion that American retrenchment on the European continent if advocated expanding 
the Alliance within the next five years. Planning to expand the Alliance within the next 
five years would be fundamentally more stable than attempting to expand after a 
Russian provocation. Expansion in this regard would be viewed as threatening Russia 
but as stabilizing the Central and Eastern European region. Most experts agree that 
expanding during a time of war would be seen as an escalatory maneuver. Security 
guarantees should be extended to Poland because of the substantial (Western) 
investment and the large consumer base for Western goods that would be at risk if 
Eastern instability infected Poland. 
C. GEO-STRA TEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF NATO EXPANSION 
• Which western countries would benefit from NATO expansion and how 
would this affect the gee-strategic position?; 
• NATO membership after EU and WEU membership; 
• Tell those uninvited on first round that they can continue to work towards 
eventual membership; 
• Force Hungary to sign an agreement promising not to veto Romanian 
membership in the future; 
• Increase the importance of the CSCE consultative body in order not to freeze 
out Russia and its neighbors not asked to join. 
Along with talk about expanding NATO to include Poland are the inevitable 
questions which are raised concerning which specific countries will be asked to join the 
Alliance. Polish officials generally advocate NATO expansion in a first round to include 
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the Visegrad Four with some apprehension about including Slovakia. Poland has seen 
itself as the leader of the four, based primarily on its large population and prominent 
lobbying position in the United States. The major problem with including only the 
Visegrad countries is the signal it gives to Russia over the extent to which NATO is 
willing to protect. The Romanians and Bulgarians, as well as the Baltic States, insist that 
to expand within the next five years to only the Visegrad, would be tantamount to 
ceding them to Russia's sphere of influence. Furthermore, these countries see new 
members of NATO as the primary obstacle preventing their membership in the future. 
To list but a few examples: Romania is concerned that Hungary would block its 
membership request in the future. Lithuania is also quietly questioning whether the 
Poles would endorse its membership in the future. Once expansion has been agreed 
upon by the Alliance members, the future European security architecture will have been 
initially cast. Whether or not the members intend it, declaring which countries will be 
offered membership and those left off the list will automatically create new political 
fault lines. 
The NATO member to benefit directly from Eastern expansion is Germany. 
Projecting stability East would enhance the security along the German Eastern frontier. 
Additionally, NATO-sponsored expansion would mean that Germany would not be the 
sole country to take on the financial and political burden of integrating the East. 
Moreover, Germany's geo-strategic position would inevitably make it the regional 
arbiter among the smaller Visegrad states. The United States would also benefit from 
the standpoint that it would have more influence in the direction of political, military 
and economic decisions of Poland and the other Visegrad states. 
Extending NATO's borders before full European Union and Western European 
Union membership is extended to Poland would have to be examined. The two 
arguments are that: (1) Poland must have security first and then economic integration; 
(2) Poland must have established a sturdy economic infrastructure prior to offering it 
any security guarantees. Regardless, the issue of NATO enlargement cannot be 
resolved without considering Poland's membership in EU and WEU. This is not to say 
that NATO expansion should happen after EU and WEU membership - only that 
discussions about NATO membership should take place considering each of the 
different Western European institutions. 
For those countries left out of the initial call for new members, Alliance leaders 
should also issue a set of general guidelines to be met over an extended period of time, 
with no promise of eventual membership if these countries attain the goals. The 
acknowledgment that they would not be considered for early NATO membership 
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should accompany a statement confirming their importance to NATO and offering 
"substantial" assistance in the event they were attacked or threatened by a neighbor. In 
order not to leave countries like Romania and Bulgaria isolated from NATO, PfP could 
still be the best mechanism to encourage these states to adopt Western-style institutions. 
Hungary might also be forced to sign an agreement promising not to block a Romanian 
membership proposal if other NATO members thought Romania was ready for 
membership. Finally, to offset the impending criticism and alarm from Russia, NATO 
leaders could strengthen the CSCE body to display a continued willingness to consult 
and debate European security issues. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
• A Leading role in the expansion issue will lead to an American presence in 
Europe into the twenty-first century and realization, "that the world of the 
rich and secure is not an exclusive club and it is willing to accept ... new 
members."411 
At the end of the twentieth century, the United States is at an historical 
crossroads. Being on the leading edge of issues like NATO expansion will cast the 
United States as a continuing dominant force in European security matters. Though 
there has been an historic strain of isolationism among politicians and the electorate, the 
United States continues to have a vital interest in maintaining a presence on the 
European continent in the twenty-first century. Advocating NATO expansion and 
offering creative solutions to resolve the perception of a Central European security 
vacuum while simultaneously keeping the Russians engaged are substantive tasks that 
will illustrate a continued American resolve in Europe. Failure to proceed with a 
proactive policy would severely limit NATO's future raison d'etre and U.S. status in 
Europe. 
In this scenario, a Republican presidential candidate advocating integration of 
CEE states into NATO might persuade other European leaders (Britain, Germany and 
Italy) to support a more ambitious American position. Britain, Germany and Italy are 
more likely to support initiatives that imply an American commitment and 
counterbalance to France's leadership. As recently as September 23, 1994, the American 
commitment was questioned in the effort to choose a new Secretary General for NATO. 
The Washington Post observed that: 
411Dr. Andrzej Olechowski, p. 8. 
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The United States hasn't really made a com.rnitrnent to the transformation 
-- not just of membership but of purpose, identity and strategy -- that 
expansion would entail. Despite some positive rhetoric from the 
president and vice president, the gears of government are not grinding 
very fast to make it happen. The Partnership for Peace that the Clinton 
administration has offered to other states serves as much to buy time --
which admittedly has its uses -as to ensure expansion ... The fact is that 
the lead falls not to NATO's top bureaucrat in Brussels but to its principal 
member in Washington.412 
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR USING THE HARMEL REPORT 
Expansion of the Atlantic Alliance utilizing the concepts of the Harmel Report 
and the post-1989 declarations is necessary to revitalize NATO and provide for its 
twenty-first century mission. NATO's raison d'etre will be reinvigorated through the 
process of taking on new members. Far from being a solely military organization 
designed to deter a massive Soviet ground attack, the Harmel Report reemphasized the 
nature of the Atlantic Alliance. The Harmel Report can be the scaffolding around which 
a revitalized NATO organization revamps its mission and membership while adhering 
to the historic mission of "stability guarantor." NATO must continue to offer a credible 
military deterrent to its members while conducting political rapprochement with the 
East. 
The Atlantic Alliance is attempting to attain these two goals in the post-Cold 
War era through the implementation of the New Strategic Concept. The political 
indecision of Western leaders to respond to the Bosnian War, however, has cast doubt 
on NATO's ability to respond to turmoil. NATO must continue to prepare for the 
eventuality of large scale conflicts and diffuse threats. Adhering to the principles of the 
Harmel Report will enable NATO leaders to recognize one of two core functions: 
preserving military strength. The other core function of the Alliance - attempting to 
reach political solutions, must also be utilized. The Harmel Report's emphasis on the 
political means is preserved through the creation of the NACC, the P£P program, the 
revival of the European Identity and the Combined Joint Task Forces. For the most part, 
these institutions enhance military cooperation, but through a political mechanism. 
NATO expansion must be carried out with special attention paid to the political 
implications of offering military security guarantees. 
412"NATO's Leader," The Washington Post, 23 September 1994, p. 26. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Chairman of the North Atlantic Military Committee, Field Marshal Sir 
Richard Vincent, recently wrote that there still remains a heavy dose of criticism 
reserved for NATO members and their lack of will to resolve the war in the former-
Yugoslavia. In disputing this cynicism, he points out the vast resources NATO has 
provided to the UN effort. He writes that, 
Within these criticisms, there seems to be some lack of understanding 
about the high level of commitment already demonstrated collectively by 
NATO, which has responded positively to every call for support made by 
the United Nations under the authority of existing Security Council 
Resolutions .. .Today, the reality is that NATO integrated forces make the 
largest single contribution to the international effort in former 
Yugoslavia. Excluding forces serving directly under UN command, there 
are now over 100 aircraft, more than a dozen highly capable ships and 
some 10,000 men and women from Alliance nations conducting NATO 
integrated maritime and air operations in support of the United Nations 
effort...ln addition, a further 15,000 personnel are contributed directly by 
Alliance nations to UNPROFOR operations. Thus out of a total of 
approximately 34,000 personnel now committed in support of UN 
operations associated with the former Yugoslavia, about 25,000 - that is 
about three quarters of them - come directly or via the Alliance from 
NATO nations.413 
One could categorize the aforementioned declarations, reports and treaty into 
the following order based upon their chronological and relevant factors that influenced 
the others. 
The Washington Treaty - articulated the goals, purpose and mission of the 
Atlantic Alliance, backed up with a political and military dimension. 
The Harmel Report - reiterated the principles of the Washington Treaty 
emphasizing the military and political aspects to maintain European stability. 
The London Declaration - became the watershed document which restated the 
premise of its existence in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the 
Harmel Report. However, it cast aside traditional views of the East, extended a 
hand of friendship to the East and laid the groundwork for a complete overhaul 
of the Alliance's strategic mission. 





The Copenhagen Declaration - further reiterated the London Summit, 
emphasized closer military contacts between NATO and the CEE states and 
listed four fundamental tasks of the Atlantic Alliance. 
The Rome Declaration - again reiterated the Atlantic Alliance's long-standing 
purpose and established the NACC and introduced the New Strategic Concept. 
The Brussels Declaration -under the auspices of the NACC, NATO created the 
Pfr initiative, the CJTF concept and the European Identity. 
To the extent that these declarations have all contributed to a better 
understanding of NATO's purpose, they have all been successful. Additionally, the 
statements made therein, have succeeded in promoting and accomplishing several 
initiatives rarely credited to NATO. Far from being a decisive factor in redefining 
Europe's post-Cold War security environment, numerous examples of NATO's utility, as 
a result of these declarations, have been offered to support the notion that despite press 
reports to the contrary, NATO is as relevant today as it was during the apex of East-
West tensions. The worst case scenario would be to witness the transmogrification of 
the Alliance into a CSCE institution prostrate from taking military actions without the 
unanimous consent of an unruly collection of three or four dozen members. Jeffrey 
Simon concludes that, 
NATO has been quite responsive to the Central and East European states 
in terms of the many discussions held during the short time since those 
states obtained their freedom. But...the C/EE states clearly believe that 
meetings are not enough. Moreover, because the NACC has rapidly 
broadened its membership to thirty-six states, it now suffers the danger 
of becoming neutralized in the manner of the United Nations and the 
CSCE. As a credible security institution, NATO retains an essential role 
in the protection of European peace and stability.414 
Despite the numerous arguments that portend to know the next course for 
NATO, it seems likely that Russia can no longer be considered a partner in a utopian 
New World Order. Instead, because of Russia's domestic instability and its newly 
emboldened foreign and military policy designed to affect a larger sphere of influence 
in Central and Eastern Europe, the rise of ultra-nationalist forces and the raging Bosnian 
War, NATO must do what it has been doing for the past five decades and adapt to a 
changing international environment. 
The argument presented is that Russia is still a threat by the very nature of its 
military and foreign policy and that security guarantees are a necessity in order to 
414Jeffrey Simon, Orbis .. Winter 1993, pp. 31-32. 
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ensure stability and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe. Though the NACC and 
the Partnership for Peace initiative are steps in the right direction, they fall short of 
offering credible and substantive security guarantees and thus create what Henry 
Kissinger has described as the emergence of a "no-man's-land between Germany and 
Russia." Accordingly, NATO must, in conforming with its own charter, go out-of-area 
and expand to incorporate Central and Eastern European nations that are serious about 
becoming democratic-market economies and provide a stable environment to do it. It is 
because of the North Atlantic Treaty's articles that an expansion is both legal and within 
the bounds of precedence. 
The Russian view of the Polish navy's revival is at best skeptical of Poland's 
attempt to integrate into western defense organizations. Russian officials view Poland's 
efforts as possibly destabilizing to the Baltic region because they fear Russia's isolation 
from the West, an overwhelming Western dominance in the Baltic, and an increasing 
effort by the United States to reassert its dominance in the East using Poland and the 
three Baltic States as staging areas for offensive amphibious operations against Russia. 
Writing in the Moscow publication Foreign Military Review, two senior Russian officers 
detailed what they believe are substantive efforts by the United States to claim a 
dominant position in the Baltic Sea.415 
Russians will continue to view any Polish efforts to reestablish a credible coastal 
defense and subsequent relations with Western institutions as inherently threatening to 
Russian interests. Regardless of any legitimate Polish security concerns and long-stated 
intentions to encourage mutually beneficial military and economic relations, there will 
always be a portion of the Russian political and military elite that will concoct any 
number of conspiracy theories. The tone of anti-Western and non-Russian xenophobic 
declarations may well increase in stridency among most factions. Even if Russian 
leaders tone down their nationalistic rhetoric, Russia will continue to be a competitor 
with the West, NATO and the United States. To be so naive as to suggest that the Cold 
War is over ignores the geo-political realities associated with traditional Russian actions. 
Defense Secretary William Perry, acknowledging a continued competition with Russia, 
regardless of any rapprochement, stated that, 
415Maj. Gen. A. Meshkov and Col. A. Nikolayev, pp. 9-11. The authors suggest that in the event that a 
confrontational situation between Russia and the Baltic countries worsen, a maritime component of 
"reaction forces" would be created. This would include "1 00 or more ships [and] ... Further reinforcement 
with ships from the Polish Navy (up to 30 ships, including 10-12 guided-missile ships) is not ruled out." 
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Russia is our partner and our rival, at one and the same time. We must 
be aware that our relationship contains elements of both ... Reality No. 1 is 
that, even given the very best of the imaginable outcomes in Russia 
today, i.e. given a fully democratic and market-oriented Russia, this new 
Russia will have interests different from ours ... Reality No. 2 is the very 
worst of the possible outcomes, and we must be prepared for it. It is 
possible that Russia will emerge from its uneasy times as an autocratic, 
militarist, imperialist state hostile to the West.416 
Though most of these threats exist in a semi-dormant, semi-static state, the 
probability that they could become a problem remains significant. Henry Kissinger 
notes that,"If Russia is to become a serious partner in building a new world order, it 
must be ready for the disciplines of stability as well as for its benefits." In other words, 
Russia is not simply, "entitled to be handed the sphere of influence that Czars and 
commissars have coveted all around Russia's vast borders for 300 years."417 
Furthermore, as a means of avoiding the next cold war, the United States and NATO 
must make it abundantly clear precisely where Western interest lie - to draw lines 
rather than let others draw them in ways and places that threaten U.S. interests. 
The international vice president of Dow Jones & Co., recently wrote that "Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic States may not remain truly free and independent nations because 
the West cravenly temporizes today about their status in mere anticipation of Russian 
displeasure."418 Along with the aggressive Russian foreign policy and the latest 
military doctrine, a large showing of support for ultranationalist candidates in the 
December 1993 parliamentary elections has fueled anxiety among its Central and 
Eastern European neighbors about Russia's intentions. Coupled with Russian 
aggressiveness has been an American acquiescence of Russian aims. This is in addition 
to numerous arguments against expansion of either NATO membership or a broader 
interpretation of its historic goals. NATO's new goal must go beyond its traditional role 
like Ambassador von Moltke states, NATO's goal is not only to enhance the projection 
of stability but to make constructive contributions to the development of security 
structures integrating the countries of Central and Eastern Europe .... 419 
Although it would be misleading to label Russia a threat as this term applied to 
the former Soviet Union, the fact remains that Russia's internal instability coupled with 
4I6secretary of Defense William Perry cited by Vladimir Nadein, p. 2. 
417Henry Kissinger, Time, p. 75. 
418Karen Elliott House, 24 February 1994. 
419 Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke, pp. 9-11. 
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the efforts to redefine its geopolitical role in Central and Eastern Europe makes it 
ominously threatening to former Warsaw Pact countries. Russia can be still considered 
a threat for the following reasons: the rise in popularity of ultranationalists like 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky; the confrontational nature of the Russian military doctrine; the 
imperial mindset of current Russian leaders and the nature of Russian foreign policy 
initiatives. Most NATO experts agree that even without Soviet Communism, there still 
exists any number of crises on Central and Eastern Europe's periphery that could easily 
engulf Western Europe and NATO in turmoil. John Kriendler remarked that the 
passing of the Soviet threat has, "revealed a multitude of crises, active and latent 
risks ... Nationalism in some places is out of controJ."420 It is also judicious to provide an 
abbreviated list of conclusions and recommendations for NATO, the United States and 
Poland: 
• Establish a coherent strategy aimed at coordinating the integration of the 
Visegrad Four (particularly Poland); 
• Offer simultaneous economic integration for those countries that have 
undertaken substantial market reforms into the European Union; 
• View expansion as taking a step towards Russia, rather than analyzing the 
Eastern extension of NATO as provocative to Russian security concerns,421 
• View "out-of-area" crises as within the sphere of NATO collective defense 
action; 
• Moderate the present "Russia-first" policy. It should become neither Russo-
centric nor Russo-phobic but rather "Russo-realistic." This is a policy that 
provides closer coordination and integration for those countries most 
serious about establishing democratic and free market institutions; 
• Do not grant Russia a special "sphere of influence" and veto power over the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe; 
• Offer membership to the various Central and Eastern European countries 
based on their accomplishments towards democratic and market reforms 
and towards fulfilling the prerequisite steps; 
• Offer a specific list of guidelines and timetable for membership; 
420John Kriendler. NATO Review, p. 16. Mr. Kriendler is Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political 
Affairs & Director, Political Directorate. In order to advert these crises, Mr. Kriendler has recommended 
adopting bolder NATO initiatives in crisis management, peacekeeping and peacemaking as well as a greater 
reliance on NACC to provide consultation with all members on issues of regional security. 
421Ronald D. Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee, p. 37. 
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• Do not grant Russia a "privileged position or a protector I guarantor status 
vis-a-vis eastern Europe or Ukraine. Nor can it be given a veto power over 
Western collective security arrangements;"422 
• Publicly object to the specific portions of the Russian military doctrine that 
threaten armed conflict if NATO pursues a policy of expanding the 
Alliance; 
• Make P£P a progressive extension; 
• Emphasize requirements and rules for all partners; 
• Make consultations and perhaps defining joint actions to maintain peace of 
non-NATO members; 
• Emphasize bilateral agreements among PfP and NATO members to 
increase cooperation/ diversity; 
• Change requirements for unanimous consent; 
• Keep WEU and EU in mind while deciding whether and when to enlarge; 
• Avoid establishing a "two-tiered Alliance" whereby some members would 
have some but not all of the Alliance's security guarantees or merely 
associate membership. 
Though P£P was initially regarded as a "graceful hedge" against making tough 
decisions on expansion, its utility as a mechanism for integrating CEE states is gaining 
more support. In the future, NATO must continue to emphasize the progressive nature 
of PEP in the sense that adhering to the program's broad guidelines will in fact enhance 
its chances at membership. NATO must not go on record as excluding the possibility of 
some PfP members never gaining membership. Yet, the consensus omnium reflects an 
unwillingness and incapacity to ever allow Belarus, Russia, Ukraine or the other former 
Soviet republics to enter NATO in the distant future. Ambiguity in this situation seems 
justifiable. 
NATO should also stress to Russia and any other CEE states left out of near term 
membership that the NACC, PEP and bi-lateral relations should still be supported at 
every opportunity. Simply gathering Poland and the other Visegrad states under the 
Atlantic Alliance's nuclear umbrella does not mean that Europe has to return to a Cold 
War scenario. Therefore, there exists a fundamental necessity for NATO and Western 
leaders to continue to promote the utility of NACC, P£P, CSCE and any other "All 
European" initiative. NATO should seriously consider reworking the unanimous 
consent rule if it intends to function successfully at any bureaucratic-military level in 
422senator Richard Lugar, 30 August 1993, p. 66. 
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Brussels. NATO leaders might consider maintaining a unanimous consent on Article 5 
decisions and a two-thirds majority in all other administrative issues. NATO leaders 
will also have to work with the European Union and Western European Union officials 
during the selection of new members on a consultative basis. Keeping in mind that EU 
and WEU membership will play into the calculus of European security affairs. NATO 
must not establish a "two-tiered" Alliance where some members would have nuclear 
guarantees and others-- because of the political ramification- were left out. To do so 
would be to degrade the legitimacy of Article 5 and the security guarantees each 
signatory agrees to uphold. 
The next two or three years will be critical elections for the presidency of 
the Russian Federation, the presidency of France, the Bundestag in 
Germany, the House of Commons in the United Kingdom. It may well 
be that the results of those elections will be the most important 
determinant of the future European security framework, rather than the 
intrinsic logic of the situation.423 
The decision to allow the Central and Eastern European countries into NATO 
will be a political one and will of course be determined by a consensus omnium and not 
necessarily dependent upon any levels of sustained or achieved requirements by CEE 
states. Renationalization of threat perceptions and regionalism stand in the way of a 
unified NATO response to expansion. Regardless of what the United States, Germany 
or France might advocate regarding NATO expansion, the decision to allow new 
members will be as a result of unanimous consent in the North Atlantic Counsel and 
successful ratification in sixteen legislative bodies. Though countries like Luxembourg 
and Iceland may have no overriding concerns regarding NATO expansion, some 
countries - namely the Southern tier states-will fight hard to keep the Alliance at 
sixteen members. A joint communique by the foreign ministers of Germany and Britain 
(Klaus Kinkel and Douglas Hurd) reiterated the belief in both countries that American 
involvement in eastern expansion is crucial for future expansion. They write, 
Enlarging NATO is a decision for the Alliance as a whole -- not just for 
Britain and Germany. All its members, above all the United States which 
continues to do so much to maintain European security, must give their 
wholehearted consent ... Without a continuing stake by the United States 
423John Roper, p. 11. Roper writes that, "As far as the Atlantic Alliance is concerned, there appears to be a 
general wish in Europe, particularly in Western and Central Europe, for its maintenance as an insurance 
policy against a deterioration of the security environment. There is a wish for a continued United States' 
presence on the continent of Europe but growing uncertainties in the United States and particularly in the 
United States Congress as to whether this is an appropriate use of US tax dollars," p. 8. 
189 
in European affairs, enlargement of the EU and NATO cannot 
succeed.424 
As long as expansion remains an issue, NATO members will continue to tum to 
the three basic "C" issues as their rallying cry against immediate NATO expansion: 
increased costs, increased commitments and degraded cohesion. Support for NATO 
expansion and a more critical appraisal of the Partnership for Peace charter may only 
come about through a change in the North American or European leadership, 
reconstitution of a clear existential threat, or improvement in the overall economic 
situation that would allow for greater resources to be diverted to CEE countries. 
424"Hurd, Kinkel Visualize Enlarged Europe, NATO," p. I. 
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